

EXHIBIT 105

Redacted Version of Document Sought to be Sealed

**Full 30(b)(6) Deposition Transcript of
Simon Cross,
dated May 9, 2022**

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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IN RE: FACEBOOK, INC.,
CONSUMER PRIVACY USER
PROFILE LITIGATION

MDL No. 2843

Case No. 18-md-02843-VC-JSC

This document relates to:

ALL ACTIONS

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REMOTE VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF
SIMON CROSS
30(B)(6) DESIGNEE, FACEBOOK, INC.

MONDAY, MAY 9, 2022

REPORTED BY: HOLLY THUMAN, CSR No. 6834, RMR, CRR
JOB NUMBER 5210141

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Remote videotaped deposition of SIMON CROSS, taken by the Plaintiffs, with the witness located in London, United Kingdom, commencing at 3:49 P.M. London Daylight Time, on MONDAY, MAY 9, 2022, before me, HOLLY THUMAN, CSR, RMR, CRR.

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JOHN MACDONELL, Videographer

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1 MONDAY, MAY 9, 2022

2 3:49 P.M.

3 --o0o--

4 PROCEEDINGS

5 --o0o--

6 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: We're on the record. 15:49:21

7 It's 3:49 P.M. London time on May 9, 2022. This is 15:49:22

8 the deposition of Simon Cross, and we're here in 15:49:29

9 the matter of Facebook Consumer Privacy User 15:49:32

10 Profile Litigation. 15:49:35

11 I'm John MacDonell, the videographer, with 15:49:39

12 Veritext. 15:49:42

13 Before the reporter swears the witness, 15:49:43

14 would Counsel please identify themselves, beginning 15:49:45

15 with the noticing party, please. 15:49:48

16 MR. LOESER: Good morning. This is 15:49:51

17 Derek Loeser from Keller Rohrbach for Plaintiffs. 15:49:52

18 With me is Adele Daniel and Cari Laufenberg and 15:49:56

19 Emma Wright, also from Keller Rohrbach. 15:50:00

20 MR. BLUME: This is Rob Blume from 15:50:03

21 Gibson Dunn on behalf of Facebook. With me is 15:50:05

22 Hannah Regan-Smith, Ian Chen, Josiah Clarke, 15:50:08

23 Matt Buongiorno, and Phuntso Wangdra. 15:50:17

24 MS. WEAVER: And good morning. It's 15:50:23

25 Lesley Weaver from Bleichmar Fonti & Auld, also on 15:50:24

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1 Q. And do you recall what those matters were 15:51:30
2 in which you were deposed? 15:51:32

3 A. The first was some -- a matter relating to 15:51:34
4 '643, the '643 case, and then the second was a -- I 15:51:38
5 don't recall exactly, but it's the -- the 15:51:45
6 Washington District Attorney's -- Washington D.C., 15:51:48
7 I think, case against -- against Meta relating to 15:51:52
8 some of the matters -- 15:51:56

9 (Reporter requested clarification.) 15:52:04

10 THE WITNESS: -- relating to the, I 15:52:04
11 recall, the Cambridge Analytica matter. 15:52:05

12 BY MR. LOESER: 15:52:08

13 Q. And the '643 matter was against Facebook 15:52:10
14 as well. Is that right? 15:52:13

15 A. That's correct, yes. 15:52:16

16 Q. Okay. Well, you've been through this 15:52:18
17 before, so -- but I'll just remind you of the basic 15:52:20
18 rules, which are really designed to have a clear 15:52:23
19 record. 15:52:26

20 As the Special Master indicated, it's very 15:52:26
21 important that we're not talking at the same time 15:52:28
22 and that we let the court reporter take down what 15:52:30
23 we are saying. 15:52:32

24 If I ask a question and you don't 15:52:33
25 understand the question, could you please ask me to 15:52:35

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1 restate it, and I'll attempt to do that. 15:52:38

2 And when you're answering questions, it's 15:52:42

3 important to answer verbally, so that would be a 15:52:44

4 good example. Shaking your head doesn't make it 15:52:47

5 onto the record, but Yes/No does. 15:52:50

6 So could we make sure that you answer 15:52:52

7 verbally? 15:52:54

8 A. I understand. 15:52:55

9 Q. And if you do answer one of my questions, 15:52:56

10 I will assume you understood the question. 15:52:59

11 Is that a fair assumption? 15:53:01

12 A. That's fine, yes. 15:53:04

13 Q. And over the course of the day, your 15:53:06

14 attorney may object to questions that I ask. And 15:53:10

15 when he does so, unless he instructs you not to 15:53:12

16 answer the question, please wait for him to finish 15:53:15

17 objecting and then go ahead and answer the 15:53:17

18 question. 15:53:19

19 Do you understand that? 15:53:20

20 A. I understand that, yes. 15:53:21

21 Q. And we'll be going for a while, and if at 15:53:23

22 any point you need a break, please just ask for 15:53:26

23 one, and I will accommodate that the best I can. 15:53:28

24 The only caveat is if there is a question 15:53:31

25 that is pending, I will ask you to finish the 15:53:35

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1 question before we take a break. 15:53:37

2 Is that understood? 15:53:40

3 A. Yeah. I understand. 15:53:41

4 Q. And sometimes if we're -- if there's a 15:53:42

5 series of questions and I'm almost through the 15:53:44

6 series, I'll ask if it's okay if we just finish the 15:53:46

7 series before taking a break. 15:53:49

8 Does that sound fair to you? 15:53:51

9 A. That sounds fair. 15:53:53

10 Q. Okay. And as the Special Master 15:53:54

11 indicated, he will be observing today, and so he 15:53:55

12 may come on camera at some point to discuss 15:53:58

13 matters. 15:54:01

14 And it's important there as well that we 15:54:01

15 make sure that he has the time and space to talk 15:54:03

16 and that the record is clear so that we're not 15:54:06

17 talking at the same time. 15:54:08

18 Is that fair? 15:54:09

19 A. Yep. That's fair. 15:54:10

20 Q. Okay. And, Mr. Cross, is there anything 15:54:12

21 that may impact your ability to testify honestly 15:54:14

22 and truthfully today? 15:54:18

23 A. Not that I'm aware of. 15:54:20

24 Q. Okay. No medications or anything of that 15:54:22

25 sort that may interfere with your recall or ability 15:54:24

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1 to testify? 15:54:29

2 A. No. I'm not on any medication, no. 15:54:29

3 Q. And, Mr. Cross, you're located in London? 15:54:32

4 A. That's correct. 15:54:36

5 Q. And is that where you -- and I gather you 15:54:37

6 work for -- for Meta. Right? 15:54:40

7 A. That's correct, yeah. I still work for 15:54:44

8 Meta and live in London. 15:54:46

9 Q. Okay. And so how often do you come to the 15:54:52

10 United States as part of your work? 15:54:54

11 A. In the last two years, not at all, sadly. 15:54:56

12 Before that, I used to come several times a year. 15:55:02

13 Q. Okay. And do you think that going forward 15:55:06

14 you'll be coming stateside more often? 15:55:08

15 A. It's too early to say how much -- how much 15:55:13

16 international we'll be doing. I doubt I'll be 15:55:15

17 doing it as much as we used to. 15:55:18

18 Q. And, sir, if there were a trial in this 15:55:20

19 case, would you be willing to fly across the ocean 15:55:22

20 to attend the trial? 15:55:25

21 A. I have to consult with my counsel on 15:55:29

22 whether or not that would be an appropriate thing 15:55:32

23 to do. 15:55:34

24 Q. Okay. And are you communicating -- and 15:55:35

25 this is -- you know, we're in this new world of 15:55:39

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1 remote depositions, so there are some things we 15:55:41
2 need to sort out for that as well. 15:55:43
3 You are not actively communicating with 15:55:46
4 anybody during the time that I'm asking you these 15:55:47
5 questions, are you? 15:55:50
6 A. No. I am not communicating with anyone. 15:55:51
7 Q. Okay. No texting or messaging or anything 15:55:54
8 of that sort happening? 15:55:57
9 A. No. My phone is screen side down on the 15:55:59
10 desk, and I've cleared my computer. 15:56:02
11 Q. Excellent. Thank you. 15:56:07
12 And, Mr. Cross, did you prepare any notes 15:56:09
13 or other materials to assist you with your 15:56:12
14 testimony today? 15:56:14
15 A. I have a document that I prepared that 15:56:17
16 includes some facts to help me answer -- I think 15:56:20
17 that might come up to help me answer your 15:56:25
18 questions, but that's all I've prepared. 15:56:27
19 Q. And do you have that with you today, sir? 15:56:31
20 A. I do, yes. 15:56:33
21 Q. And do you intend to refer to that during 15:56:35
22 your testimony today? 15:56:39
23 A. If -- if you ask me a question and I can't 15:56:42
24 remember a fact -- a specific fact I may have noted 15:56:44
25 down, then I was planning to refer to that, yes, as 15:56:50

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1 to best answer your questions. 15:56:54

2 MR. LOESER: Thank you. 15:56:57

3 And, Counsel, Mr. Blume, we would like a 15:56:57

4 copy of those notes. And we don't need to go off 15:57:00

5 the record right now to get them, but we would like 15:57:03

6 them as soon as you can get them to us during the 15:57:06

7 deposition, not after. 15:57:08

8 Could you accommodate that request, 15:57:10

9 please? 15:57:13

10 MR. BLUME: Noted. 15:57:14

11 BY MR. LOESER: 15:57:19

12 Q. And since your counsel noted that request 15:57:19

13 but did not actually tell me he was going to do it, 15:57:21

14 this is something I'll bring up again in a little 15:57:24

15 bit just to make sure we actually get those notes 15:57:27

16 during the deposition today. Okay? 15:57:30

17 And, Mr. Cross, you indicated that you 15:57:33

18 currently work for Meta. Is that right? 15:57:35

19 A. That's correct. I work for Meta -- the 15:57:41

20 U.K. arm of Meta. Meta Platforms, Inc., has a U.K. 15:57:44

21 arm. 15:57:50

22 Q. Okay. And over the course of the day, 15:57:51

23 I'll be referring to Facebook frequently. And when 15:57:53

24 I refer to Facebook and ask you a question about 15:57:55

25 Facebook, will you be drawing any distinction 15:57:58

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1	between Meta and Facebook when you answer?	15:58:00
2	A. Whether or not I need to do so may depend	15:58:09
3	on the context of the question. So I can ask for	15:58:11
4	clarification if needed.	15:58:16
5	Q. Okay. That would be helpful. I	15:58:18
6	appreciate that.	15:58:20
7	Mr. Cross, how long have you been employed	15:58:21
8	at -- and I'm going to say Facebook, and I mean	15:58:23
9	both Facebook and Meta.	15:58:27
10	A. I joined the company in September 2010.	15:58:30
11	Q. And I'm not going to take the time during	15:58:38
12	today's deposition to go through your LinkedIn	15:58:40
13	résumé in detail, but I would ask you to describe	15:58:44
14	the major responsibilities that you've had over	15:58:47
15	your time at Facebook and Meta.	15:58:49
16	A. Sure. The first part of my career was	15:58:54
17	working on the Platform Partnerships team, first as	15:58:59
18	a partner engineer, then as a -- for a short time	15:59:04
19	as a developer advocate, and then for a short time	15:59:07
20	as a strategic partnership manager.	15:59:10
21	In -- that was from September 2010 to	15:59:12
22	January 2014.	15:59:18
23	From January 2014 to the end of 2015, I	15:59:21
24	was a product manager on the Facebook Platform	15:59:25
25	team.	15:59:28

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1 your testimony today? 16:00:53

2 A. I spoke to some people currently employed 16:00:55

3 by Meta to understand their experiences relating to 16:00:57

4 this matter, yes. 16:01:05

5 Q. And who did you speak with? 16:01:07

6 A. I spoke with Eddie O'Neil, Ime Archibong, 16:01:11

7 Steven Elia, Dan Xu, Allison Hendrix, Eugene 16:01:18

8 Zarakhovsky, Francisco Varela, and Amit Sangani. 16:01:25

9 Q. And were those conversations all of 16:01:34

10 different amounts of time? 16:01:37

11 Were there some people you spoke to more 16:01:38

12 than others? 16:01:40

13 Describe in a little more detail, if you 16:01:41

14 can. 16:01:43

15 A. I spoke to each of those people once for 16:01:45

16 between 30 and 45 minutes each. The conversation 16:01:51

17 between Dan and Steven was one conversation with 16:01:57

18 both of them on the call. 16:02:01

19 Q. And were any attorneys present during any 16:02:09

20 of those conversations? 16:02:11

21 A. Yes. Attorneys for Facebook/Meta, were 16:02:14

22 present for all of those conversations, yes. 16:02:18

23 Q. Okay. And who were the attorneys that 16:02:22

24 were present, if you know their names? 16:02:23

25 A. There were a number of people on the call, 16:02:29

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1 so I probably can't give you everybody who was 16:02:30

2 there, but a combination of Rob -- Mr. Blume, 16:02:34

3 Ian Chen, and Matt -- I'm not sure I'm going to 16:02:41

4 pronounce this correctly -- Buongiorno. 16:02:49

5 Sorry, Matt, if you're listening. I 16:02:52

6 apologize if I got that wrong. 16:02:55

7 Q. Thank you. Good enough to identify him. 16:02:59

8 And, sir, did you review any of the 16:03:01

9 pleadings or filings that have been made in this 16:03:03

10 case to prepare for your testimony today? 16:03:06

11 A. I have, yes. 16:03:09

12 Q. And do you recall what specifically you 16:03:11

13 reviewed? 16:03:13

14 A. My attorneys sent over a -- a set of 16:03:16

15 documents for me to review in advance of this 16:03:21

16 testimony, and I also received a set of documents, 16:03:25

17 I think, from you folks; around 36 documents, I 16:03:28

18 think. 16:03:34

19 Q. And were you sent a stack of documents 16:03:34

20 from your attorneys? 16:03:36

21 Were they assembled in a binder or 16:03:38

22 presented to you in some other manner like that? 16:03:40

23 A. All of the documents I've reviewed to 16:03:43

24 prepare for today I've reviewed electronically. 16:03:46

25 Q. Okay. In a single folder? 16:03:50

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1 Were they delivered in a single folder, or 16:03:53
2 was it a series of separate files? 16:03:55
3 A. I received a link to a Google Drive folder 16:03:58
4 that contained a number of files. 16:04:02
5 Q. Thank you. 16:04:04
6 MR. LOESER: And, Counsel, as you know, 16:04:08
7 we've asked for Facebook to provide us with 16:04:09
8 identification of the materials given to the 16:04:11
9 witness to prepare for his testimony, and we would, 16:04:13
10 again, ask that you do that with respect to this 16:04:15
11 deposition. 16:04:18
12 (Reporter requested clarification.) 16:04:18
13 MR. BLUME: I understood the request. 16:04:25
14 BY MR. LOESER: 16:04:28
15 Q. And, Mr. Cross, you also indicated that 16:04:29
16 you reviewed some materials that you believe that 16:04:31
17 the plaintiffs sent over to you. Is that correct? 16:04:33
18 A. Yes. That's my understanding. There was 16:04:37
19 a set of documents that was sent over for me to 16:04:41
20 read in advance of today's testimony. 16:04:46
21 Q. And did you review those documents? 16:04:49
22 A. I did review those documents, yes. 16:04:54
23 Q. And how long would you say you spent 16:05:00
24 reviewing the documents that were delivered to you 16:05:03
25 from the plaintiffs? 16:05:05

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1 A. On the order of eight to ten hours or so. 16:05:12

2 Q. Good. Thank you. 16:05:20

3 And were those all documents that you had 16:05:21

4 seen before, or were there some new things in there 16:05:23

5 for you? 16:05:26

6 A. That list contained documents that I 16:05:29

7 hadn't seen before. 16:05:30

8 Q. Including documents that were -- that were 16:05:33

9 produced by Facebook in this case. 16:05:36

10 Let me ask that slightly differently. 16:05:40

11 Including documents that were internal 16:05:42

12 correspondence and other materials that were 16:05:43

13 created by Facebook? 16:05:45

14 A. That's my understanding, yes. 16:05:48

15 MR. LOESER: So if we could mark -- 16:05:55

16 actually, we don't need to mark. If we could show 16:05:56

17 Mr. Cross what has been previously marked 16:06:00

18 Exhibit 330, I believe. 16:06:02

19 (Previously marked Exhibit 330 was 16:06:03

20 presented to the witness.) 16:06:03

21 BY MR. LOESER: 16:06:04

22 Q. This should come up on your screen. 16:06:04

23 Again, we're at the mercy of the great Internet 16:06:07

24 here, but you will see the deposition notice that's 16:06:10

25 been served in this case by the plaintiffs on 16:06:13

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1 Facebook. 16:06:16

2 Let me know when you can see that 16:06:17

3 document. 16:06:19

4 MR. BLUME: I believe that's Exhibit 332. 16:06:26

5 MR. LOESER: We have it as Exhibit 330. 16:06:29

6 Prior Exhibit 330, yeah. This isn't a new exhibit, 16:06:34

7 Rob, sorry. This is -- it was marked during 16:06:38

8 Ms. Hendrix's deposition. I'll try and make 16:06:40

9 that -- 16:06:43

10 MR. BLUME: On the screen that I'm looking 16:06:44

11 at, it says "332" on the exhibit sticker. 16:06:45

12 MR. LOESER: Refresh your screen. My 16:06:52

13 technology expert tells me that you need to refresh 16:06:55

14 your screen. 16:06:58

15 It should be corrected now. 16:07:05

16 MR. BLUME: Yes, with thanks to your 16:07:08

17 technology expert. Appreciate it. 16:07:09

18 BY MR. LOESER: 16:07:12

19 Q. So, Mr. Cross, you're looking at what's 16:07:12

20 called "Plaintiff's Second Amended Notice of 16:07:16

21 Deposition of Defendant Facebook, Inc., Pursuant to 16:07:18

22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6)." 16:07:20

23 Have you seen this notice before? 16:07:25

24 A. Yes. 16:07:29

25 Q. And you understand that you have been 16:07:31

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1 designated to testify as to certain topics in 16:07:33
2 response to this notice. 16:07:36

3 A. That's my understanding, yes. 16:07:40

4 Q. Okay. And if you could turn -- attached 16:07:42
5 to the notice, there is an appendix. And if you 16:07:45
6 turn all the way to page 13, or click through to 16:07:48
7 that page or whatever you would need to do on your 16:07:51
8 screen. I'm turning to page 13, but ... 16:07:54

9 A. I have page 13 in front of me. 16:08:02

10 Q. Okay. And on page 13, there are three 16:08:04
11 topics. The bottom two, there's Topic 6 and 16:08:07
12 Topic 7. 16:08:13

13 Do you see that? 16:08:14

14 A. I see that. 16:08:14

15 Q. And is it your understanding that you have 16:08:15
16 been designated to testify on behalf of Facebook 16:08:17
17 with regard to Topics 6 and 7? 16:08:23

18 A. That's correct. 16:08:27

19 Q. Okay. And as we get into these topics in 16:08:28
20 more detail, your counsel will probably want to 16:08:31
21 clarify the -- the particular matters within those 16:08:34
22 paragraphs that you are prepared to testify about, 16:08:37
23 but we can get to that later. 16:08:40

24 But for present purposes, what's important 16:08:43
25 is that these are the two topics that you 16:08:46

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1 understand that you are here to testify about. 16:08:48

2 A. Those are the two topics I understand I'm 16:08:53

3 here to testify about. 16:08:55

4 Q. And do you understand that by being 16:08:58

5 designated to testify about these topics, you are 16:09:00

6 authorized to speak for Meta/Facebook on the 16:09:04

7 specified matters? 16:09:08

8 A. That's -- that's my understanding, yes. 16:09:11

9 Q. And you understand that your testimony, 16:09:14

10 which is under oath, is binding on Meta. 16:09:15

11 A. That's my understanding, yes. 16:09:20

12 Q. Okay. And I'm going to use Meta and 16:09:22

13 Facebook interchangeably here. I mean the same 16:09:24

14 thing every time, and, like you said before, if 16:09:26

15 there's a distinction that needs to be drawn, you 16:09:29

16 are going to draw that for me. 16:09:32

17 A. I will ask for clarification where I think 16:09:33

18 one is needed if the entities need to be 16:09:36

19 distinguished, yes. 16:09:38

20 Q. And, sir, do you understand that the time 16:09:40

21 period at issue in this litigation is 2007 to the 16:09:42

22 present? 16:09:46

23 A. That's my understanding, yes. 16:09:48

24 Q. Okay. So all of my questions will concern 16:09:50

25 that time period unless I specify something 16:09:53

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1 narrower. 16:09:55

2 Is that fair? 16:09:56

3 A. That's fair. 16:09:57

4 Q. So before we get into the specifics of 16:10:06

5 each of these topics, I think it would be important 16:10:08

6 to have a conversation about basic terminology to 16:10:10

7 make sure that when you testify, the record is 16:10:13

8 clear as to what you're saying. 16:10:14

9 Is that fair? 16:10:16

10 A. I'm happy to make sure we can align on 16:10:18

11 terminology, yes. 16:10:22

12 Q. Okay. Some of it will seem very basic to 16:10:23

13 you, but trust me, it's important for the court and 16:10:25

14 for the record and, if there's a jury in this case, 16:10:27

15 for the jury to understand and hear from Facebook 16:10:30

16 what these terms mean. 16:10:33

17 So if you'll bear with me, I'll run 16:10:34

18 through some of these basic concepts. 16:10:36

19 To start, what is an "app"? 16:10:39

20 A. An app is an entity in Facebook's systems 16:10:43

21 that has the ability to access information via the 16:10:53

22 Graph API. 16:11:00

23 There was a broader definition of "app" 16:11:01

24 that is pursuant to mobile applications and so on, 16:11:05

25 but an app in the Facebook ecosystem is a -- an 16:11:08

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1 entity that -- that has an app ID and can access 16:11:13

2 the Graph API in some way. 16:11:18

3 Q. And there are third-party apps and 16:11:22

4 Facebook apps. Correct? 16:11:24

5 A. Can you help me understand what you mean 16:11:28

6 by "third-party apps"? 16:11:29

7 Q. Yeah. I'm glad you asked. 16:11:31

8 So Facebook creates apps itself for the 16:11:34

9 platform. Right? 16:11:36

10 A. There are some apps that Facebook 16:11:41

11 engineers, Facebook, Inc., would have built that 16:11:45

12 may call the Platform APIs, yes. 16:11:49

13 Q. And then there are -- I'll call them 16:11:54

14 "third parties," but entities not owned or 16:11:57

15 affiliated with Facebook that also create apps. 16:11:59

16 A. The Facebook Platform allowed developers 16:12:04

17 to create -- third parties to create applications 16:12:07

18 on the Facebook Platform, yes. 16:12:10

19 Q. Okay. And so over the course of our 16:12:12

20 conversation today, when I refer to "third-party 16:12:14

21 apps," that is what I will be referring to. 16:12:16

22 Is that fair? 16:12:19

23 A. So to be clear, you're referring to a 16:12:20

24 third party that, in this context, is an 16:12:23

25 application developed by an entity other than 16:12:28

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1 Facebook, Inc., or Meta Platforms? 16:12:31

2 Q. Yes. Thank you. That's a good 16:12:36

3 clarification. 16:12:38

4 And you used some other terms in your 16:12:39

5 answer, and I guess we may as well define those as 16:12:42

6 well. 16:12:46

7 What is the "Facebook Platform"? 16:12:46

8 A. The Facebook Platform is a collection of 16:12:50

9 technologies that enable developers to build 16:12:57

10 applications that could interact with the Facebook 16:13:01

11 product, Facebook.com or the Facebook product as 16:13:08

12 a -- as a regular user would think of it. 16:13:14

13 Q. And help me understand: What is the 16:13:19

14 "Facebook product"? 16:13:21

15 A. So the Facebook product, by that, I'm 16:13:25

16 referring to, you know, the website Facebook.com 16:13:28

17 and the Facebook iOS and Android apps, for example, 16:13:32

18 and the experience you have when using the 16:13:39

19 Facebook.com website or the Facebook mobile apps on 16:13:43

20 iOS and Android. 16:13:48

21 Q. Thank you for that. 16:13:52

22 And, sir, what is the "Facebook 16:13:54

23 Social Graph"? 16:13:55

24 A. My understanding is that the Social Graph 16:13:57

25 would be a term used to explain the relationships 16:13:59

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1 between users of the Facebook product; who is 16:14:06

2 friends with who. 16:14:11

3 Q. Okay. And we'll have some more specific 16:14:13

4 questions about how that functions later. 16:14:16

5 What is an "API"? 16:14:18

6 A. An API, which stands for application 16:14:24

7 programming interface, is a way for -- a technical 16:14:27

8 means by which information can be exchanged between 16:14:34

9 entities. 16:14:37

10 Q. And are you familiar with the term 16:14:42

11 "high-signal APIs"? 16:14:44

12 A. I'm not familiar with that term. 16:14:47

13 Q. Are some APIs considered more sensitive in 16:14:51

14 terms of the information they provide than others? 16:14:53

15 A. Can you help me understand in which 16:14:58

16 context you are referring to? My answer with APIs 16:15:00

17 was a general concept. 16:15:03

18 Q. Sure. In the context of an app obtaining 16:15:06

19 information about Facebook users through APIs, are 16:15:10

20 there some APIs that are considered more sensitive 16:15:13

21 than others in terms of the information that's 16:15:17

22 being gathered? 16:15:22

23 A. So I would -- yeah, I think it's fair to 16:15:27

24 say that there are some APIs which are considered 16:15:31

25 more sensitive than others, yes. 16:15:37

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1 Q. And why is that? What is the type of 16:15:41
2 information that would be considered more sensitive 16:15:43
3 in that context? 16:15:46

4 A. So it depends on the definition of 16:15:48
5 "sensitive." 16:15:52

6 Can you help me understand what you mean 16:15:52
7 by "sensitive"? 16:15:54

8 Q. Yes. I mean about the Facebook user data 16:15:55
9 and information that is accessed via an API. 16:15:57

10 Are there some APIs that have the ability 16:16:01
11 to access what Facebook has considered more 16:16:03
12 sensitive information about its users? 16:16:07

13 A. So good example of a -- of an API that I 16:16:11
14 think is -- would be considered sensitive is an API 16:16:15

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

22 Q. Okay. And help me understand why that 16:16:46
23 would be considered sensitive. 16:16:50

24 Would that be considered highly sensitive 16:16:52
25 in the Facebook terminology? 16:16:55

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1 A. I'm not sure what you would be referring 16:16:58
2 to with -- by "highly sensitive." I'm not aware of 16:16:59
3 a specific set of things that would be classed as 16:17:05
4 "highly sensitive." 16:17:09
5 Q. Okay. How about friends permissions 16:17:12
6 and/or -- friend-related APIs? 16:17:16
7 Are you familiar with friend-related APIs? 16:17:19
8 A. Can you understand -- just represent -- 16:17:23
9 just for clarification, can you help me understand 16:17:26
10 what you mean by "friend-related APIs"? 16:17:28
11 Q. Sure. And we'll get into this more -- in 16:17:30
12 more detail later as well. 16:17:33
13 But APIs that provide access to the 16:17:35
14 information about a Facebook user's friends, are 16:17:36
15 those referred to by Facebook as "friends 16:17:39
16 permissions" or "friends APIs"? 16:17:42
17 A. There was a set of permissions that 16:17:46
18 were -- were referred to as the friend permissions, 16:17:48
19 yes. 16:17:52
20 Q. And did Facebook consider those 16:17:54
21 permissions to be sensitive? 16:17:56
22 A. I think -- I'm not sure -- I'm not sure if 16:18:01
23 there's a way to specifically answer that. Those 16:18:08
24 were a set of permissions that were available at 16:18:14
25 one time on the Platform and are no longer 16:18:16

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1 generally available. 16:18:21

2 Q. And, again, from the perspective of 16:18:24

3 Facebook, did Facebook discuss those permissions in 16:18:26

4 terms of them being sensitive or highly sensitive? 16:18:31

5 A. They were certainly discussed in the 16:18:39

6 context of being a set of permissions worth 16:18:41

7 discussing. 16:18:47

8 They may have been discussed at times as 16:18:48

9 sensitive. I'm not sure about whether or not they 16:18:51

10 were discussed as highly sensitive. There's no 16:18:53

11 official designation for those permissions that was 16:18:55

12 consistent across the company. 16:19:00

13 Q. And we're about to move on to some other 16:19:03

14 topics, but can you give me an example of a 16:19:06

15 permission that Facebook did refer to as "highly 16:19:09

16 sensitive"? 16:19:11

17 A. I can't give you an example here today of 16:19:14

18 a permission or a -- do you -- from reviewing the 16:19:16

19 documents I've reviewed, I don't recall a set of 16:19:21

20 APIs or permissions that would have been 16:19:24

21 considered -- referred to as "highly sensitive." 16:19:26

22 It's possible that they were referred to 16:19:29

23 using that term by some people, but I don't -- I 16:19:31

24 don't think there was an official designation in 16:19:35

25 any way. 16:19:38

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1 Sorry. Official -- I'm not aware of an 16:19:41

2 official designation of "highly sensitive." 16:19:44

3 Q. And if you were asked to prepare a list of 16:19:47

4 everything that Facebook -- every API Facebook 16:19:50

5 considered sensitive or highly sensitive, who at 16:19:54

6 Facebook would you go talk to to get that 16:19:57

7 information? 16:19:59

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

15 Q. And do you know -- do you recall who those 16:20:36

16 people -- who was in charge of that project? 16:20:38

17 A. I think Konstantine -- Konstantinos -- I 16:20:41

18 really can't pronounce his last name. 16:20:47

19 "KP" as he is otherwise known -- 16:20:50

20 Konstantinos Papamiltiadis -- I don't even want to 16:20:52

21 try -- was leading that project, as I understand 16:20:55

22 it. 16:20:57

23 Q. Okay. And there are some documents that 16:20:57

24 have his name, and I can't begin to pronounce that 16:20:59

25 either, so we'll just refer to him as "KP" for the 16:21:02

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1 benefit of the court reporter. 16:21:05

2 Understood? 16:21:07

3 A. That's good. That's good with me. 16:21:08

4 Q. So there was a few other terms that you 16:21:10

5 mentioned that I want to make sure we understand 16:21:12

6 and I've used as well. 16:21:14

7 One is a "permission." 16:21:16

8 In the context of an API, what is a 16:21:18

9 "permission"? 16:21:20

10 A. In the context of -- can you help me 16:21:23

11 understand, "in the context of an API"? 16:21:26

12 Q. Or APIs generally. 16:21:32

13 A. So my understanding would be that in the 16:21:35

14 context of an API generally, a permission would 16:21:38

15 refer to a way for users -- users of the API or 16:21:42

16 consumers or integration -- integrators of the API 16:21:48

17 to determine what information was available over 16:21:52

18 that interface. 16:21:59

19 Q. And speaking specifically about the -- the 16:22:03

20 entities that were accessing information on the 16:22:07

21 Facebook Platform, does "permission" refer to the 16:22:10

22 grant of access by Facebook to APIs? 16:22:13

23 A. "Permissions" in the Facebook Platform 16:22:17

24 context refers to permissions that a user, a 16:22:22

25 Facebook user, would grant an application to which 16:22:27

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1 information the application would then have access 16:22:34
2 to after the user had given permission. 16:22:36

3 Q. And that brings me to my next question, 16:22:41
4 which is capability. 16:22:44

5 In the context of APIs, what is the 16:22:46
6 definition of "capabilities" or a "capability"? 16:22:49

7 A. Again, do you mean in the context of an 16:22:54
8 API generally, or -- 16:22:56

9 Q. Yes. 16:22:59

10 A. So in the context of an API generally, 16:23:01
11 "capability" doesn't have an industry-standard 16:23:04
12 meaning. 16:23:07

13 Q. How does Facebook generally use that term? 16:23:13

14 A. In the context -- in the context of the 16:23:18
15 Facebook Platform, "capability" refers to a set of 16:23:21
16 features that would be available to some apps on 16:23:30
17 the Facebook Platform, and that would have enabled 16:23:37
18 a range of functionality. 16:23:41

19 Q. And specifically, when talking about APIs, 16:23:44
20 would a "capability" relate to the entity's ability 16:23:47
21 to have access to certain APIs on the Platform? 16:23:54

22 A. Capabilities would -- would modify the -- 16:24:00
23 the behavior of the Facebook Platform in a number 16:24:06
24 of different ways. 16:24:08

25 Q. And, again, I'm trying to understand how 16:24:11

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1 the term is used in the context of Facebook's 16:24:13
2 discussions of what APIs a third party has access 16:24:15
3 to. 16:24:19

4 Does that help in any way to flesh out 16:24:21
5 what it means? 16:24:25

6 A. So a capability -- my previous answer, I 16:24:27
7 think, is accurate in that a capability is a way 16:24:30
8 for the standard behavior of the Facebook Platform 16:24:34
9 to be modified in some way. 16:24:37

10 Q. And I'm -- I apologize for struggling to 16:24:42
11 understand this, but -- so let's assume that an app 16:24:44
12 or a developer wants to have access to friend 16:24:49
13 data-related permissions. Okay? 16:24:53

14 Can we start with that premise? 16:24:59

15 And I'll ask a question based on that 16:25:03
16 premise: 16:25:05

17 Is there a capability that would be 16:25:06
18 provided to that developer that would enable access 16:25:07
19 to those permissions -- or to those APIs? 16:25:10

20 A. Can you help me understand what time frame 16:25:15
21 you're referring to? 16:25:17

22 Q. Sure. Any time between 2007 and the 16:25:21
23 present. 16:25:24

24 A. So I think the answer depends on the time. 16:25:28
25 In -- you know, the early part of that time period, 16:25:34

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1 let's say 2012, access to the friend permissions 16:25:40

2 was available to all applications on the Facebook 16:25:47

3 Platform. 16:25:51

4 Later on, the friend permissions were not 16:25:53

5 available to every app on the Platform, and access 16:25:58

6 to those would have required a modification to the 16:26:03

7 standard API behavior. And that would have been 16:26:06

8 governed by capability. 16:26:10

9 Q. Thank you. You've helped me understand 16:26:12

10 any number of documents I have reviewed now. 16:26:14

11 That's helpful information. 16:26:17

12 We can move on. 16:26:20

13 Do you understand what "read permission 16:26:22

14 APIs" are? 16:26:24

15 A. So there's two different concepts that are 16:26:28

16 worth picking apart: There's the concept of 16:26:31

17 permissions, and there's a concept of APIs, and 16:26:35

18 those are separate concepts. 16:26:38

19 So I'm not sure how to answer the 16:26:44

20 question. 16:26:46

21 Q. Let me break it down. I've seen reference 16:26:47

22 to "read stream APIs," for example. 16:26:50

23 Are you familiar with those? 16:26:52

24 A. I am familiar with the -- the concept of a 16:26:56

25 read stream API, yes. 16:26:59

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1 Q. Okay. What is that? 16:27:02

2 A. In the context of the Facebook Platform? 16:27:07

3 Is that what you're asking about? 16:27:09

4 Q. Yes. 16:27:11

5 A. My understanding is that the read stream 16:27:13

6 API would allow an application to access a -- 16:27:16

7 the -- an authorized -- a user who -- let me start 16:27:20

8 again to make sure I'm framing this correctly for 16:27:24

9 you. 16:27:26

10 The read stream API would allow an 16:27:28

11 application to access a user's Newsfeed. In order 16:27:31

12 to access that API, the user would have to give the 16:27:35

13 application permission to do so. 16:27:41

14 Q. And what about Social Context APIs? What 16:27:45

15 are those? 16:27:50

16 A. My understanding is a Social Context API 16:27:54

17 refers to an API that helped applications 16:27:57

18 understand the relationships between two users of 16:28:02

19 the application. 16:28:06

20 Q. Two users, or any number of users? 16:28:10

21 A. My understanding is the Social Context API 16:28:15

22 referred to social context between two app-using 16:28:17

23 users. 16:28:22

24 Q. And we'll get into this in more detail 16:28:25

25 later, but both with read stream and social context 16:28:28

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1 APIs, the information that the app or developer 16:28:31
2 would access would include friend information for 16:28:36
3 the users that authorized the app or developer to 16:28:38
4 have access. Right? 16:28:43

5 A. Sorry. Can you restate the question? I 16:28:44
6 want to make sure I fully understand. 16:28:46

7 Q. Sure. You described what a read stream 16:28:48
8 permission was, and you described what a social 16:28:50
9 context API was. 16:28:53

10 Both of those APIs, if authorized by a 16:28:55
11 user, would provide access to friends information 16:28:57
12 of that user. Right? 16:28:59

13 A. The read stream API would grant access to 16:29:04
14 an app using a person's Newsfeed. A Newsfeed on 16:29:07
15 Facebook typically contains content posted by that 16:29:13
16 user's friends. 16:29:17

17 Q. Okay. And how about the social context 16:29:18
18 API? Would that do the same? 16:29:19

19 A. I'd have to review the API documentation 16:29:24
20 for -- for the -- if there was a specific API 16:29:26
21 you're referring to, exactly how it behaved. 16:29:31

22 Q. And that's a helpful qualification. 16:29:36

23 Is there a set of -- or a place where 16:29:40
24 documentation of APIs is stored so that if Facebook 16:29:43
25 wanted to understand the specific information that 16:29:46

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1 that API made available, it could go to that set 16:29:49

2 and find the answer? 16:29:52

3 A. The Facebook developer website is 16:29:56

4 typically where API documentation is stored and 16:29:58

5 published. 16:30:02

6 Q. And that's true for any API that has ever 16:30:04

7 existed, or simply for the active APIs? 16:30:08

8 A. That -- the Facebook developer website is 16:30:16

9 typically for APIs that are available -- publicly 16:30:18

10 available. 16:30:22

11 And so not every API that's ever existed 16:30:23

12 would necessarily have a documentation -- would 16:30:26

13 have a document on the Facebook developer website. 16:30:30

14 Q. Okay. So where would one go to find 16:30:33

15 information on every API that ever existed? 16:30:35

16 A. The -- I'm not sure every API that ever 16:30:42

17 existed necessarily had a -- a document -- an 16:30:46

18 associated document written about it. 16:30:51

19 The source of truth for which APIs existed 16:30:53

20 and so on would have been the Facebook code base 16:30:57

21 itself. 16:31:01

22 Q. And how would one go about searching that 16:31:03

23 for information about a defunct API? 16:31:06

24 A. There are internal tools at Facebook that 16:31:10

25 allow user search for code which existed in the 16:31:13

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1 Facebook code base. 16:31:19

2 Q. And what are those internal tools? 16:31:21

3 A. I am not sure of the name of the internal 16:31:27

4 tools. I'd have to get back to you on -- on the 16:31:31

5 specific name of the tool. 16:31:35

6 MR. LOESER: And, Counsel, if you could 16:31:39

7 get back to us with that information, I'd 16:31:40

8 appreciate it. 16:31:42

9 MR. BLUME: Noted. 16:31:47

10 BY MR. LOESER: 16:31:48

11 Q. And, Mr. Cross, what is a "private API"? 16:31:50

12 A. Can you help me understand the context in 16:31:58

13 which you're asking the question? 16:32:01

14 Q. Sure. In the context of email and other 16:32:03

15 materials reviewed -- that you reviewed to prepare 16:32:05

16 for this deposition, the term "private API" is 16:32:09

17 frequently used. 16:32:14

18 Do you have an understanding of what is 16:32:15

19 meant by that at Facebook? 16:32:17

20 A. My understanding of the term "private API" 16:32:19

21 is that it would be an API that was not generally 16:32:22

22 available to most applications on the Facebook 16:32:27

23 Developer Platform. 16:32:33

24 Q. Okay. So explain to me what the 16:32:36

25 difference is between a private API and a 16:32:38

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1 capability. 16:32:41

2 A. So a "private API" would refer to a 16:32:42

3 specific API method, generally, that could be 16:32:47

4 accessed by developers. 16:32:51

5 A "capability" is the means by which 16:32:53

6 access to that API is governed. 16:32:56

7 Q. We discussed how APIs function and how 16:33:07

8 APIs provide access to developers or other entities 16:33:09

9 about information about Facebook users. 16:33:16

10 Were there any other technical means by 16:33:21

11 which Facebook shared information about its users 16:33:24

12 with developers or other entities? 16:33:25

13 A. The Graph API was the -- was a primary way 16:33:31

14 that information would be exchanged with third 16:33:36

15 parties. It's possible at the company there were 16:33:40

16 other ways for people to exchange information with 16:33:44

17 third parties; email, for example. But the 16:33:49

18 Graph API would have been one of the common ways to 16:33:55

19 programmatically exchange information. 16:33:58

20 Q. And can you identify any other ways to 16:34:01

21 programmatically exchange information? 16:34:04

22 A. I don't have the ability to -- to know 16:34:11

23 every form of information interchange ever used 16:34:15

24 by -- by the company, so I -- I don't feel I can 16:34:20

25 specify other -- any specific other systems. The 16:34:26

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1 Graph API would have been a common one. 16:34:31

2 There were other APIs in existence over 16:34:34

3 time. Two examples would be the REST API and 16:34:38

4 something called FQL. 16:34:45

5 Q. And explain, if you can, what those two 16:34:49

6 systems are. 16:34:51

7 A. So the REST API was a -- a mechanism, a 16:34:53

8 form of API used by the Facebook Platform to 16:34:59

9 exchange information with third parties that 16:35:03

10 pre-existed the Graph API, and the two were in use 16:35:05

11 simultaneously for a period. 16:35:12

12 FQL -- 16:35:14

13 Q. Let me pause you there. Sorry to 16:35:16

14 interrupt, but what period did that exist, and when 16:35:17

15 was it overlapping? 16:35:21

16 A. The REST API, my understanding, was the 16:35:24

17 original form of the Facebook Developer Platform. 16:35:28

18 So my understanding is that was launched in 2007. 16:35:30

19 And my understanding is the REST API was 16:35:37

20 deprecated in -- I'm not sure of the specific date, 16:35:39

21 but my understanding is around the time that 16:35:43

22 Graph API Version 1.1 or 1.2 was -- was announced. 16:35:46

23 But that -- we can follow up with a 16:35:53

24 specific because I want to make sure I don't give 16:35:57

25 you the wrong answer. 16:36:00

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1 Q. Sure. And do you have a rough idea of 16:36:01
2 what year the Graph API came into being? 16:36:03
3 A. The Graph API was launched in April 2010. 16:36:07
4 Q. So we've touched on the Graph API 16:36:17
5 Version 1, and that's another important term. I 16:36:20
6 want to make sure I understand that. 16:36:23
7 So Graph API version, was it 1.0 or 1.1? 16:36:26
8 What was the very first version of that 16:36:31
9 system? 16:36:33
10 A. The Graph API was launched in April 2010. 16:36:35
11 At the time, it was just called the "Graph API." 16:36:39
12 Q. Okay. And I gather from your LinkedIn 16:36:42
13 résumé, you had something to do with the initial 16:36:45
14 development of the Graph API version zero, I guess, 16:36:47
15 whatever you call it. Is that right? 16:36:53
16 A. So the version of the API that was 16:36:55
17 originally launched in April 2010 is what later 16:36:57
18 became known as Version 1. 16:37:00
19 I was actually not involved in the 16:37:03
20 development of that. It was launched in 16:37:05
21 April 2010. I joined the company in 16:37:07
22 September 2010. 16:37:11
23 Q. Okay. So let's -- let me make sure I 16:37:15
24 understand the different versions. 16:37:17
25 It starts with Graph API, period, and then 16:37:19

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1 it evolved into what? 16:37:22

2 What were the different evolutions of 16:37:24

3 that, of the Graph API? 16:37:26

4 A. It was called just the "Graph API" from -- 16:37:29

5 from launch in April 2010. That -- that, kind of, 16:37:32

6 version later became known as "API Version 1" when 16:37:38

7 a new version that was referred to as 16:37:43

8 "API Version 2" was launched in April 2014. 16:37:45

9 Q. And in the evolution from Version 1 and 16:37:52

10 Version 2, were there specific reasons why Facebook 16:37:55

11 made changes? 16:37:59

12 A. The Graph API, the original version of the 16:38:02

13 Graph API, evolved constantly over time as well. 16:38:06

14 So there were changes being made to the -- to the 16:38:10

15 Graph API from launch for a wide range of reasons. 16:38:14

16 Q. Okay. And, specifically, in the changes 16:38:20

17 from Version 1 to Version 2, what were the 16:38:22

18 reasons -- what were the major changes that were 16:38:24

19 made? 16:38:27

20 A. It was a large number of changes launched 16:38:29

21 as part of API Version 2. 16:38:33

22 How much -- how much depth would you like 16:38:37

23 me to go into? 16:38:39

24 Q. Well, let me ask it this way: What were 16:38:41

25 the problems that Facebook was trying to solve in 16:38:44

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1 the transition from Version 1 to Version 2? 16:38:47

2 A. There was a -- also a whole -- also a 16:38:51

3 whole range of problems that -- that we were 16:38:53

4 attempting to solve. 16:38:56

5 Can you help me understand, like, what you 16:38:58

6 are looking for? 16:39:00

7 Q. Well, let's start at the -- are you 16:39:01

8 familiar with the expression "the 30,000-foot 16:39:03

9 level"? 16:39:07

10 A. I've heard of that term, yes. 16:39:08

11 Q. Okay. So let's think about it in terms of 16:39:10

12 at the 30,000-foot level if there were major issues 16:39:13

13 that Facebook was attempting to solve through that 16:39:17

14 transition, if any of those come to mind. 16:39:19

15 A. I'll do my best to explain some. 16:39:23

16 One was that the original way that 16:39:27

17 breaking changes had been made in the Facebook 16:39:32

18 Developer Platform was in an app configuration. 16:39:34

19 So in your app, configuring your app 16:39:39

20 settings, that was a workable mechanism when the 16:39:42

21 Facebook Platform was primarily called by 16:39:48

22 server-side applications. 16:39:52

23 In the early 2010s, the developer 16:39:55

24 ecosystem moved more and more to mobile 16:40:00

25 applications, which meant developers' code running 16:40:02

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1 on devices, which meant that it was harder for them 16:40:08

2 to centrally control changes to the API. 16:40:12

3 And so one of the big problems that 16:40:15

4 Facebook was trying to solve with the launch of 16:40:18

5 API Version 2 was the introduction of versioning 16:40:21

6 itself; to allow developers to specify the API 16:40:23

7 behavior they wanted when calling the API. 16:40:28

8 Q. Okay. And can you think any of other 16:40:32

9 major problems Facebook was attempting to resolve 16:40:34

10 with Graph API Version 2? 16:40:39

11 A. Another thing that was being solved with 16:40:45

12 Version 2 is the limiting of the amount of data 16:40:48

13 that was available via the API. 16:40:53

14 Q. And why did Facebook want to do that? 16:40:58

15 A. It was a range of reasons why Facebook was 16:41:02

16 attempting to alter the amount of information that 16:41:07

17 was available via the API. 16:41:10

18 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

24 that decision. 16:41:39

25 Q. And when Facebook heard from users about 16:41:40

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1 their concerns, were those concerns with respect to 16:41:43
2 any particular types of user information that was 16:41:48
3 being made available to third parties? 16:41:51

4 A. There was a -- a range of concerns. One 16:41:55
5 of them was the ability for apps to access friends 16:41:59
6 information. 16:42:04

7 Q. And was another reason to limit the amount 16:42:07
8 of user information made available to developers a 16:42:10
9 desire by Facebook to better profit from the data 16:42:17
10 it collected about users by giving away less to 16:42:20
11 developers for free? 16:42:23

12 A. Can you repeat the question? 16:42:28

13 Sorry, I want to make sure I understand. 16:42:29

14 Q. Sure. It took me great mental acuity to 16:42:31
15 say it in the first place, so how about if I 16:42:36
16 just -- if we read it back and see, if you heard it 16:42:38
17 a second time, it makes better sense. It might 16:42:41
18 just be a bad question, but let me look and see. 16:42:44
19 And I can read it. 16:42:47

20 Was another reason to limit the amount of 16:42:48
21 user information made available to developers a 16:42:50
22 desire by Facebook to better profit from the data 16:42:53
23 it collected about users by giving away less of 16:42:55
24 that information for free? 16:42:59

25 A. Having spoken to people and read 16:43:05

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1 documents, that's -- that's not a concern that was, 16:43:08
2 as I understand it, front and center in the 16:43:11
3 decision-making. 16:43:14

4 Q. Was that a concern that was discussed or 16:43:15
5 expressed at times, however? 16:43:17

6 A. I have recalled seeing documents that 16:43:23
7 were -- there were a number of discussions about 16:43:28
8 how to balance the equities between users, 16:43:32
9 developers, and Facebook -- in this case, the 16:43:36
10 company Meta but also the application -- as to how 16:43:39
11 the Facebook Developer Platform was being used. 16:43:43

12 Q. Thank you. Do you know, when was the 16:43:50
13 first time or time period that Facebook heard 16:43:53
14 concerns expressed by users about the amount of 16:43:58
15 their information that was being made available to 16:44:01
16 third parties? 16:44:04

17 A. I don't know -- I'm not able to sense 16:44:09
18 specifically when those concerns began to be heard. 16:44:14

19 I am aware that there was some -- some 16:44:18
20 research done, and there were some discussions 16:44:20
21 happening in -- in the 2012 and 2013 time period; 16:44:23
22 but exactly, you know, when this was -- was -- 16:44:28
23 began to be discussed is hard for me to say with 16:44:36
24 specificity. 16:44:38

25 Q. And then Graph API Version 2 became 16:44:39

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1 notice. 16:46:21

2 You testified that Facebook provided 16:46:22

3 access to Facebook user information to what we've 16:46:23

4 called "third parties" through APIs. Right? 16:46:26

5 A. The Facebook Developer Platform allowed 16:46:30

6 third parties to build applications that accessed 16:46:33

7 data on Facebook users via the Graph API or via a 16:46:38

8 set of APIs. 16:46:44

9 Q. And apps are one category of the third 16:46:47

10 parties that could access APIs on the Facebook 16:46:50

11 Platform? 16:46:54

12 A. Sorry. Can you -- this is one of the 16:47:00

13 things that -- to make sure we get right and 16:47:01

14 understand, can you specify -- just repeat the 16:47:04

15 question again? 16:47:06

16 And -- if you're referring to one of the 16:47:07

17 categories, could you help me understand what, in 16:47:10

18 your mind, is the other categories? 16:47:12

19 Q. Sure. I'm going to go through some 16:47:14

20 different categories. I'm trying to understand the 16:47:16

21 different entities that were allowed to use the -- 16:47:18

22 the -- use APIs to access information. 16:47:21

23 And one of those -- and I'm calling them 16:47:23

24 "categories." If you have different terminology, 16:47:25

25 please tell me what it is. 16:47:27

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1 But one of the categories that could 16:47:29
2 access APIs was -- are referred to as "apps." 16:47:30
3 Right? 16:47:34
4 A. So in the context of the Facebook 16:47:36
5 Developer Platform, to access any information via 16:47:38
6 the API had to be done through a Facebook app ID; 16:47:43
7 through a Facebook application with a specific 16:47:47
8 Facebook app ID. 16:47:50
9 Q. Okay. So that brings me to my next 16:47:51
10 question, which is partners. 16:47:54
11 Facebook has what it refers to as 16:47:56
12 "partners." Correct? 16:47:58
13 A. I've heard -- I've seen the term "partner" 16:48:02
14 used. It refers to a wide range of relationships 16:48:05
15 between Facebook and its -- and various third 16:48:08
16 parties. 16:48:13
17 Q. Okay. And you were involved in the 16:48:14
18 partnerships group for four years or so at 16:48:16
19 Facebook? 16:48:19
20 A. I was -- I was involved in the 16:48:21
21 partnerships organization from September 2010 until 16:48:22
22 around January 2014. 16:48:25
23 Q. Okay. And what did the term 16:48:28
24 "partnerships" mean in that context? 16:48:30
25 A. In that context, "partnerships" refers to 16:48:33

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1 a range of relationships between Facebook and -- 16:48:37
2 and third parties, ranging from informal to more 16:48:41
3 structured relationships governed by contracts. 16:48:48
4 Q. And with regard to those partnerships, was 16:48:51
5 Facebook providing access to user information 16:48:55
6 through APIs? 16:48:57
7 A. In the context of the Platform 16:49:00
8 Partnerships team, we typically -- the people on 16:49:02
9 the Platform Partnerships team would typically be 16:49:05
10 working with third parties that were using the 16:49:09
11 Facebook Platform in some way. 16:49:11
12 Q. Okay. And I think this is what I'm trying 16:49:13
13 to get at. 16:49:15
14 Are there entities that Facebook calls 16:49:16
15 "partners" that have access to Facebook user 16:49:17
16 information but do not have apps on the Platform? 16:49:21
17 A. In this specific -- in this context, I -- 16:49:27
18 I am not aware of -- of -- in this specific 16:49:34
19 context, when we're talking about platform 16:49:39
20 partnerships, it's typically referring to entities 16:49:41
21 that use the Facebook Developer Platform, which 16:49:44
22 would typically be done by -- through an app ID, 16:49:47
23 but there were other features of the Facebook 16:49:51
24 Developer Platform that did not require you to use 16:49:53
25 an app ID. 16:49:56

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1 Q. And, generally speaking, what were those 16:49:57
2 features? 16:49:59

3 A. One common set of examples was the social 16:50:02
4 plug-ins, which a developer or an entity could 16:50:04
5 embed on their own website, that didn't access the 16:50:09
6 Facebook API -- sorry -- didn't access the 16:50:13
7 Graph API. 16:50:19

8 Q. And how did those features provide access 16:50:20
9 to Facebook user information? 16:50:24

10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

17 Q. And would Facebook obtain that 16:50:53
18 information? 16:50:54

19 A. To render a social plug-in, it would be 16:50:57
20 rendered by Facebook servers. 16:50:59

21 Q. Okay. So that was a mechanism by which 16:51:02
22 Facebook obtained information about Facebook users 16:51:04
23 while they were off-platform? 16:51:07

24 A. The way the "Like" button worked was to 16:51:12
25 render -- if you visited a website that had the 16:51:15

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1 "Like" button embedded on it, then the Like button 16:51:17
2 would render. And in order to render it, Facebook 16:51:21
3 would receive a request from the user's web 16:51:24
4 browser. 16:51:29

5 Q. Okay. And that was not through an API; 16:51:29
6 that was through this other product. 16:51:31

7 A. The social plug-ins are a different way of 16:51:36
8 Facebook integrating information into third-party 16:51:40
9 contexts that users could access. 16:51:45

10 Q. And what is the time period that social 16:51:49
11 plug-ins have existed? 16:51:52

12 A. My understanding is that social plug-ins 16:51:55
13 were launched alongside the Graph API in 16:51:58
14 April 2010. 16:52:00

15 Q. And are they still active today? 16:52:03

16 A. I think there are some social plug-ins 16:52:06
17 still active today, although I'm not certain, and 16:52:09
18 that's something we can follow up on. 16:52:12

19 Q. And is there a tool that allows Facebook 16:52:15
20 to identify what social plug-ins exist and the time 16:52:17
21 period in which they've been active? 16:52:21

22 A. The Facebook code base, similar to my 16:52:25
23 previous answer, would allow you to -- would allow 16:52:29
24 someone to understand which social plug-ins have 16:52:31
25 existed over what period of time. 16:52:34

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1 Q. Are you familiar with the term 16:52:39
2 "integration partners"? 16:52:40
3 A. I've heard the phrase "integration 16:52:43
4 partners," yes. 16:52:46
5 Q. And what is an "integration partner"? 16:52:49
6 A. Again, can you help me understand in the 16:52:52
7 context in which you're asking the question? 16:52:54
8 Q. Sure. All of my questions are around 16:52:57
9 trying to understand how Facebook shares 16:52:59
10 information with what I'm calling "third parties," 16:53:00
11 and my understanding is that integration partners 16:53:02
12 are an entity with which Facebook shares user 16:53:06
13 information. 16:53:08
14 So in that context. 16:53:08
15 A. My understanding of the term -- of 16:53:12
16 integration partners in that context is a set of 16:53:14
17 entities, third parties, that Facebook had a 16:53:19
18 relationship with to enable them to build 16:53:24
19 Facebook-like or -- Facebook-branded or 16:53:28
20 Facebook-like or feedback-branded experiences on 16:53:33
21 the third party's platforms and services. 16:53:37
22 Q. And so Facebook user information was 16:53:42
23 provided to integration partners. Right? 16:53:46
24 A. Typically, the way that an integration 16:53:52
25 partner application works is that the application 16:53:54

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1 Q. Okay. So not through an app on the 16:55:36
2 Facebook Platform. 16:55:38

3 A. This is where we need to make sure we're 16:55:42
4 using the specific terms. 16:55:44

5 The way you access the Facebook set of 16:55:47
6 APIs, the Facebook Platform, is through an entity 16:55:49
7 called a "Facebook app ID" or a "Facebook app," 16:55:52
8 which has an app ID. That identifies -- that 16:55:55
9 allows the owner of the app to make calls against 16:56:00
10 the Facebook APIs. 16:56:03

11 So, in that context, that's very 16:56:06
12 specifically what I'm referring to as a "Facebook 16:56:09
13 app." 16:56:10

14 Q. Okay. And is there anything -- And, 16:56:13
15 again, this clarification is really helpful. 16:56:16

16 In thinking about how integration partners 16:56:21
17 get information about Facebook users, is there 16:56:23
18 anything different about that system than the way a 16:56:26
19 normal app developer gets information about users? 16:56:28

20 A. On a technical level, the way that the 16:56:34
21 information is exchanged would have been done 16:56:37
22 through the Graph API, which is the standard way to 16:56:39
23 access -- that users would give their information 16:56:44
24 to apps and third parties. 16:56:50

25 So, at a technical level, the mechanism of 16:56:55

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1 information interchange is the same, but an 16:56:59
2 integration partner would be -- would be billing, 16:57:03
3 typically, a different kind of experience than a 16:57:06
4 regular Facebook Platform developer. 16:57:09

5 Q. And that experience was different because 16:57:14
6 one is on the Platform, the Facebook Platform, and 16:57:17
7 the other is on the integration partner's device? 16:57:20

8 A. So this -- again, this is for me to get 16:57:27
9 very specific about. 16:57:31

10 In the context of the Facebook Platform, 16:57:32
11 there is a concept of a feedback app, which is the 16:57:34
12 entity that determines the -- how the information 16:57:38
13 is accessed, what permissions have been granted by 16:57:42
14 users, and so on. 16:57:45

15 What developers build are often also 16:57:47
16 called "apps," and, like, that's a -- that's a 16:57:50
17 different concept. 16:57:56

18 The application that a third-party 16:57:58
19 developer would build might run on their web 16:58:01
20 server. It might run on their hardware. It might 16:58:05
21 run on a user's physical device. 16:58:08

22 And so these are distinct concepts which 16:58:12
23 are important to -- to separate. 16:58:15

24 Q. Does Facebook have a term for -- for users 16:58:19
25 that interact with integration partners, or are 16:58:23

1	they called "integration users," or is there some	16:58:27
2	terminology that applies to that?	16:58:30
3	A. I'm not aware of distinct terminology that	16:58:32
4	would be different. These are just users.	16:58:35
5	Q. And before, you mentioned that a user	16:58:42
6	authorizes the integration partner to obtain	16:58:45
7	information when the user interacts with that --	16:58:47
8	let's call it -- again, let's call it a phone, a	16:58:52
9	mobile phone. Is that right?	16:58:57
10	A. When a -- a good -- I think the easiest	16:59:00
11	way to answer this question is with an example.	16:59:04
12	So one good example here would be a	16:59:07
13	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
14	platform.	16:59:15
15	The user -- a user would typically have a	16:59:17
16	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
17	There would be a Facebook-branded app available on	16:59:24
18	that device. The user would choose to log in to	16:59:29
19	the application and, as a result of doing that,	16:59:32
20	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
21	device the ability to access that information that	16:59:40
22	that user would have had access to on Facebook on	16:59:46
23	the app built onto the -- the Facebook-branded	16:59:49
24	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
25	were using.	16:59:59

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1 Q. Okay. And in that example, the user 17:00:00
2 authorizes access to the Facebook user's 17:00:03
3 information. Correct? 17:00:06

4 A. When I -- if a user chooses to use the 17:00:09
5 Facebook-branded application on a BlackBerry 17:00:14
6 device, they are logging in on -- to that 17:00:17
7 application; and, as a result, the application has 17:00:22
8 access to some of the information that that user 17:00:24
9 would be able to see on Facebook. 17:00:26

10 Q. And that information that that company 17:00:29
11 would have access to would include information 17:00:33
12 about the user's friends. Right? 17:00:36

13 A. In the specific example I was just talking 17:00:40
14 about here, this would be a Facebook-branded 17:00:42
15 application; a Facebook-branded product running on 17:00:46

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

22 Q. And that would -- among other types of 17:01:08
23 information that would be made available in that 17:01:12
24 example, friends information would be made 17:01:14
25 available. Right? 17:01:17

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1 A. Typically, a user would expect when 17:01:18
2 they're using a Facebook-branded experience to see 17:01:20
3 information about their friends and what their 17:01:26
4 friends had been doing. 17:01:28

5 Q. And so the answer is yes? 17:01:30

6 A. If I'm using a Facebook-branded 17:01:34
7 application on a BlackBerry device, I would expect 17:01:37
8 to see information about my friend, yes. 17:01:40

9 Q. And in that example, the friends are not 17:01:42
10 the ones who authorized BlackBerry to obtain that 17:01:45
11 information. Right? 17:01:50

12 A. The user is using a BlackBerry application 17:01:51
13 on the BlackBerry device, and the user has 17:01:54
14 authorized that application to access Facebook's 17:01:57
15 APIs in order to render a Facebook experience on 17:02:01
16 that device. 17:02:05

17 Q. So the answer to my question is, correct, 17:02:06
18 the friends did not authorize BlackBerry's access 17:02:11
19 to their information? 17:02:14

20 A. One of my friends may have also had a 17:02:16
21 BlackBerry device and may have logged in to the 17:02:19
22 Facebook-branded experience on that device. 17:02:22

23 Where I have -- I'm using Facebook -- the 17:02:27
24 Facebook-branded experience on my BlackBerry 17:02:31
25 device, then I am receiving -- I would be seeing 17:02:34

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1 data on my phone that was from my friends that may 17:02:37
2 not have been using BlackBerry. 17:02:43

3 Q. So, again, to answer the question, when 17:02:50
4 BlackBerry obtained friend information, that friend 17:02:52
5 information would include the information of people 17:02:56
6 who did not themselves use the BlackBerry device. 17:02:59

7 A. I'm trying to -- I'm trying to 17:03:04
8 understand -- 17:03:05

9 Q. I -- like -- 17:03:06

10 A. Sorry. 17:03:08

11 Q. Sorry. Go ahead. I apologize for 17:03:09
12 interrupting. 17:03:10

13 A. I -- I'm trying to work through the 17:03:12
14 specific example and explain the -- you know, how 17:03:16
15 these things, you know, worked from a user level 17:03:18
16 and a technical level. 17:03:22

17 In this case, you know, it's a -- it's a 17:03:24
18 set of code that happened to be written by 17:03:27
19 engineers at BlackBerry that ran on a user's 17:03:31
20 device, and it was that code that would have been 17:03:36
21 accessing -- typically, in that case -- accessing 17:03:38
22 the Facebook API. 17:03:41

23 Q. Right. As you said, as you explained in 17:03:44
24 more detail, when a user authorizes BlackBerry to 17:03:46
25 obtain the information, some of those user's 17:03:49

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1 friends may also have authorized BlackBerry. 17:03:53

2 And in that situation, both of those 17:03:56

3 people had authorized BlackBerry to obtain their 17:03:58

4 information. Right? 17:04:01

5 A. It's possible that -- yes, I would have 17:04:03

6 had -- I might have used -- I never actually had a 17:04:07

7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

17 application on their BlackBerry device. 17:04:39

18 MR. LOESER: Okay. Thank you. 17:04:41

19 Mr. Blume, we have been going for a bit, 17:04:43

20 and we're about to transition into another area. 17:04:46

21 If now would be a time you would want to 17:04:49

22 take a break, that would be fine with me, or we can 17:04:51

23 keep rolling. 17:04:54

24 MR. BLUME: Now would be great. Thank you 17:04:55

25 very much. 17:04:57

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1 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: Okay. And we're off 17:04:58

2 the record. It's 5:04 P.M. 17:04:59

3 (Recess from 5:04 P.M. to 5:22 P.M.) 17:21:36

4 (Mr. Melamed joined the deposition.) 17:22:59

5 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: We're back on the 17:23:01

6 record. It's 5:22 P.M. 17:23:01

7 BY MR. LOESER: 17:23:03

8 Q. I'm not sure whether to say good morning 17:23:05

9 or good afternoon, but still morning here and late 17:23:07

10 afternoon for you, so whichever. 17:23:10

11 Welcome back. 17:23:12

12 And a few other questions I realized 17:23:15

13 before we get into the notice itself, and I'm going 17:23:17

14 to ask you about a term I've seen in some Facebook 17:23:21

15 documents called "nonapp user-sharing." 17:23:24

16 Is that a term that you're familiar with? 17:23:28

17 A. I'm not familiar with the term "nonapp 17:23:33

18 user-sharing" specifically, no. 17:23:36

19 Q. Okay. Let me try and dig in a bit and see 17:23:39

20 if we can figure it out. 17:23:42

21 In addition to user information and users' 17:23:44

22 friends' information, Facebook at times provided 17:23:50

23 third parties access to information from people who 17:23:53

24 are not friends with the user. Is that correct? 17:23:55

25 A. I think my -- sorry. 17:24:03

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1 Repeat that again. The specifics matter, 17:24:05

2 yeah. 17:24:07

3 Q. Yeah. So let me give you an example, and 17:24:09

4 you can -- and maybe what I said makes more sense. 17:24:12

5 Are you familiar with the Events API? 17:24:16

6 A. I am familiar with the Events API. 17:24:21

7 Q. And what is the "Events API"? 17:24:23

8 A. The Events API, as I understand it, refers 17:24:26

9 to a set of APIs that would be used by a Facebook 17:24:29

10 Platform application to access the events that a 17:24:35

11 user of the application was attending or had been 17:24:40

12 invited to attend, for example, or had attended in 17:24:47

13 the past, and -- yeah. I think that's -- that's a 17:24:52

14 high-level explanation. 17:25:00

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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that described as "providing access to nonapp-user
information"?

A. I don't recall seeing it described as
that, but that -- that term seems like a reasonable
one to use in that context.

Q. Let's go back to Exhibit 330 and to
page 13, which was the -- and we're going to post
all the exhibits on the screen so if it's easier
for you to look that way, you can do that.

And while we're getting there, I am going
to read Topic 6, which is one of the topics for
which you have been designated to testify.

It is:

"The development of friend-sharing,
including but not limited to: its purpose
and identification of those involved in its
development; how the technology functioned;
the APIs and permissions associated with
friend-sharing; the communication of this
technology to users, including the drafting
of Facebook's Terms of Service, SRR, and Data
and Privacy Policies relating to

17:25:41

17:25:46

17:25:53

17:25:55

17:26:02

17:26:09

17:26:15

17:26:21

17:26:23

17:26:38

17:26:40

17:26:43

17:26:46

17:26:46

17:26:48

17:26:50

17:26:52

17:26:55

17:26:59

17:27:01

17:27:04

17:27:09

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1 friend-sharing; and the revenue impact and 17:27:11
2 net profits for Facebook relating to 17:27:15
3 friend-sharing throughout the Class Period." 17:27:16
4 Did I read that correctly? 17:27:19
5 A. You read that correctly. 17:27:21
6 Q. And my understanding from communications 17:27:23
7 from your counsel is that you have not prepared or 17:27:26
8 been prepared to testify about the following 17:27:30
9 clause: 17:27:34
10 "...the communication of this technology 17:27:35
11 to users, including the drafting of 17:27:36
12 Facebook's Terms of Service, SRR, and Data 17:27:39
13 and Privacy Policies relating to 17:27:43
14 friend-sharing." 17:27:44
15 Is that correct? 17:27:46
16 A. That's correct with my understanding, yes. 17:27:47
17 Q. And, sir, over the course of your 17:27:50
18 employment at Facebook, have you developed personal 17:27:51
19 knowledge of the topic I just read? 17:27:54
20 A. My personal knowledge would cover that to 17:28:03
21 some degree, yes. 17:28:05
22 Q. Mr. Cross, tell me what you did to prepare 17:28:07
23 to testify regarding Topic 6. 17:28:11
24 A. I spoke to a number of people inside the 17:28:16
25 company. I reviewed the documents that have been 17:28:18

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1 produced in this case, both some documents that my 17:28:25
2 legal team shared with me and the documents that 17:28:30
3 you have shared with me. 17:28:34

4 I also spent some time looking at the 17:28:36
5 Facebook developer website as it was in the past to 17:28:39
6 understand how -- how the platform originally 17:28:45
7 worked would refresh my memory. 17:28:50

8 Q. And as to the statement you just made, 17:28:54
9 where did you go to find how the Developer Platform 17:28:57
10 existed in the past? 17:29:02

11 A. I used the Wayback Machine, otherwise 17:29:05
12 known as archive.org, I think, is its address. 17:29:12

13 Q. Okay. So you didn't use any system or 17:29:17
14 tool within the Facebook structure. 17:29:20

15 A. Not to access the previous versions of the 17:29:24
16 Facebook developer website, no. 17:29:26

17 Q. And I asked you about whether you had 17:29:30
18 personal knowledge of the communication subtopic. 17:29:32

19 With regard to the remainder of the topics 17:29:36
20 covered by Topic 6, over the course of your 17:29:38
21 employment, did you develop personal knowledge of 17:29:41
22 those topics as well? 17:29:43

23 A. Given my involvement in this product area, 17:29:47
24 I did develop personal knowledge of how these 17:29:50
25 things worked. 17:29:54

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1 Q. And is there any component of this notice 17:29:56
2 that is a topic that the sole source of your 17:29:58
3 knowledge is the preparation you did for this 17:30:03
4 deposition? 17:30:06

5 A. Give me a second just to read the terms 17:30:10
6 again. 17:30:15

7 (Reviewing document.) 17:30:19

8 THE WITNESS: And your question was the -- 17:30:26
9 the -- in preparing -- sorry. 17:30:29

10 Just repeat your question again. 17:30:31

11 Is it the sole thing is my personal 17:30:33
12 experience, or the sole thing is not my personal 17:30:36
13 experience? 17:30:38

14 BY MR. LOESER: 17:30:39

15 Q. Not your personal experience. 17:30:39

16 I'm trying to find out if there's any 17:30:40
17 aspect of this that you only know about because of 17:30:43
18 the preparations that you did for this deposition 17:30:45
19 today. 17:30:47

20 A. Of those, the -- the revenue impact and 17:30:49
21 net profits is an area that I was not closely 17:30:51
22 involved in at the time. And so in trying to 17:30:54
23 answer your forthcoming questions on that topic, 17:30:59
24 I'll be primarily, if not exclusively, relying on 17:31:04
25 the preparation I've done and the documents I've 17:31:07

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1 read. 17:31:09

2 Q. And for that particular issue, what 17:31:11

3 preparation did you do? 17:31:15

4 A. I reviewed a set of documents that had 17:31:18

5 been produced in this -- in this case, and I asked 17:31:21

6 some of the people that I spoke to in preparation 17:31:25

7 what their recollection was around assessments of 17:31:30

8 revenue impact and net profits. 17:31:34

9 Q. And who were the people that you spoke to 17:31:38

10 on that topic? 17:31:41

11 A. I would have spoken to Eddie O'Neil, 17:31:45

12 Ime Archibong, and -- I'm trying to remember who I 17:31:52

13 spoke to about what -- and I think Francisco 17:32:01

14 Varela. 17:32:14

15 Q. Mr. Cross, based on your preparation with 17:32:21

16 regard to Topic 6, do you believe you are 17:32:25

17 reasonably educated to testify on these matters, 17:32:28

18 with the one caveat of the communication piece? 17:32:31

19 A. I've done my best to be prepared to 17:32:34

20 testify on these matters, yes. 17:32:36

21 Q. Okay. So do you believe you are 17:32:37

22 reasonably educated to testify on these matters? 17:32:39

23 A. I believe I'm reasonably educated to 17:32:43

24 testify on these matters. 17:32:46

25 Q. And do you agree that the notice concerns 17:32:47

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1 information that is known or reasonably available 17:32:50
2 to Facebook? 17:32:53
3 A. That matches my understanding; yes, known 17:32:56
4 or reasonably available to Facebook. 17:33:02
5 Q. So let's look more at Topic 6. 17:33:05
6 And this topic, obviously, concerns 17:33:08
7 friend-sharing. Right? 17:33:16
8 A. The topic concerns the development of 17:33:19
9 friend-sharing, as I understand it, yes. 17:33:22
10 Q. And tell me: What was the purpose of 17:33:24
11 friend-sharing for Facebook? 17:33:26
12 A. To help me answer that, can you define for 17:33:30
13 me what you think you mean by the phrase 17:33:32
14 "friend-sharing"? 17:33:34
15 Q. That is an excellent question, and so let 17:33:35
16 me ask you: 17:33:38
17 How does Facebook -- what does Facebook 17:33:40
18 mean by the term "friend-sharing"? 17:33:42
19 A. In this context, my understanding of the 17:33:47
20 phrase "friend-sharing" is where a Facebook 17:33:51
21 application would be able to access some 17:33:54
22 information about an app user's friends that hadn't 17:33:58
23 necessarily explicitly used that application. 17:34:04
24 Q. And can we expand the definition to also 17:34:11
25 cover the context in which private APIs are used to 17:34:14

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1 give access to friend information, or would that be 17:34:19
2 covered by what you said? 17:34:24

3 A. It's hard to answer that question given 17:34:30
4 the -- the definition of "private API" being a wide 17:34:31
5 range of things would be classified or classifiable 17:34:37
6 as private APIs; many not limited -- or not 17:34:40
7 involving friend-sharing in any way. 17:34:46

8 Q. And I appreciate that, and so I'm asking 17:34:48
9 specifically about private APIs that provided 17:34:51
10 access to friend-sharing information. 17:34:54

11 I mean, I guess I should ask: Private 17:35:01
12 APIs did, in fact, for some partners provide access 17:35:03
13 to friend information. Right? 17:35:06

14 A. There were some partners who had access to 17:35:12
15 information that users had authorized the 17:35:18
16 application to access that included friend 17:35:23
17 information. 17:35:29

18 Q. Okay. And so when I use the phrase 17:35:30
19 "friend-sharing" for purposes of this deposition, I 17:35:33
20 intend to mean any friend-sharing, when it was via 17:35:35
21 private APIs or otherwise via APIs on the Platform. 17:35:40

22 Is that fair? 17:35:46

23 A. I think we should -- I'll try and call out 17:35:49
24 where that distinction is important because there's 17:35:52
25 a number of different ways in this -- that these 17:35:56

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1 things worked. 17:36:00

2 I understand your -- your initial 17:36:01

3 understanding of -- I refer back to my definition 17:36:04

4 of "friend-sharing," and I will try and -- I will 17:36:08

5 try and call out where I see a distinction between 17:36:12

6 friend-sharing as it was available to regular, 17:36:16

7 nonwhitelisted developers and via private APIs. 17:36:21

8 Q. I appreciate that. And I have some 17:36:28

9 questions, too, that separate along those lines, so 17:36:29

10 I think that will work quite well. 17:36:32

11 And I asked you what the purpose of 17:36:34

12 "friend-sharing" was. 17:36:35

13 So with that definition of 17:36:37

14 "friend-sharing," can you describe what the purpose 17:36:37

15 was? 17:36:39

16 A. Friend-sharing was an inherent part of the 17:36:42

17 Facebook Platform as it was built, starting in 17:36:47

18 2007, to allow app developers to build engaging 17:36:50

19 social experiences. 17:36:55

20 In many cases, a user would be the first 17:37:02

21 person to -- they know to authorize an application, 17:37:05

22 and in order for that application to build an 17:37:12

23 engaging social experience, the application would 17:37:14

24 have access to a subset of the information that 17:37:18

25 that user could see on Facebook. 17:37:23

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1 The original premise of the Facebook 17:37:26
2 Platform is the -- the app that a user was 17:37:28
3 authorizing would be able to see things that they 17:37:34
4 could also see on Facebook. 17:37:39

5 Q. And who came up with the idea of 17:37:43
6 friend-sharing? 17:37:45

7 Is there a particular person? 17:37:46

8 A. I don't know. We -- I don't know the 17:37:49
9 specific name of the person who came up with 17:37:54
10 friend-sharing. 17:37:56

11 The ability to access information about 17:37:57
12 the friends of a person using an application was, 17:38:04
13 as I understand it, part of the Facebook Developer 17:38:10
14 Platform from its inception; and so the people 17:38:12
15 involved in developing the Facebook Platform would 17:38:15
16 have been the people determining how it operated. 17:38:17

17 Q. And was Mark Zuckerberg involved in the 17:38:23
18 development of the platform? 17:38:27

19 A. There were a number of people involved in 17:38:31
20 the development of the platform circa 2007, when it 17:38:33
21 was launched. I imagine Mark was aware that this 17:38:36
22 platform was launching. I don't know how much he 17:38:41
23 was involved in the development of the platform. 17:38:45

24 Q. And do you know if Mark Zuckerberg had 17:38:49
25 anything to say one way or the other about whether 17:38:55

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1 friend-sharing should be part of the platform at 17:38:57
2 its outset? 17:38:59

3 A. I have not seen any documents or 17:39:01
4 communication that would indicate how the decisions 17:39:04
5 as to how the platform was designed were -- were 17:39:11
6 come to. 17:39:14

7 Q. And would you agree that the 17:39:17
8 friend-sharing APIs provided a significant amount 17:39:21
9 of information about users to app developers? 17:39:27

10 A. Can you help me understand what you mean 17:39:33
11 by the "friend-sharing APIs"? 17:39:34

12 That's not a term I'm familiar with. 17:39:36

13 Q. Well, what is the term you use to describe 17:39:38
14 the different APIs that provided for access to 17:39:40
15 friend information? 17:39:44

16 A. They would just be called the "APIs." The 17:39:48
17 Likes API, for example, would be one. And then 17:39:52
18 that API could be called in a number of different 17:39:57
19 contexts. 17:40:00

20 Q. And weren't there a number of APIs that 17:40:01
21 had the word "friends" in them? 17:40:04

22 A. There were a number of permissions that 17:40:08
23 had the words "friends" in them. There may have 17:40:10
24 been some APIs with the word "friends" in, but I -- 17:40:14
25 again, the difference between APIs and permissions 17:40:18

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1 is an important concept to draw. 17:40:21

2 Q. Okay. Well, let's talk about permissions, 17:40:24

3 then. 17:40:26

4 So when I've seen lists of what I've been 17:40:27

5 referring to as "APIs" that say "friends video 17:40:30

6 watch" or "friends posts" or "friends whatever," 17:40:33

7 I've been -- I think of those as APIs. 17:40:36

8 But you're telling me I should think of 17:40:39

9 those as permissions. 17:40:42

10 A. There's a -- in Graph API Version 1, there 17:40:44

11 was a specific set of permissions that were 17:40:47

12 referred to as the "friends permissions." 17:40:50

13 And I think that's the most proper way to 17:40:53

14 refer to them. 17:40:57

15 Q. And were friends permissions widely used 17:40:59

16 permissions prior to the implementation of 17:41:03

17 Graph API Version 2? 17:41:06

18 A. Can you help me understand what you mean 17:41:09

19 by "widely used"? 17:41:10

20 Q. Well, what does that term just naturally 17:41:13

21 mean to you? 17:41:17

22 A. It could mean a number of different 17:41:18

23 things. It could mean whether or not they were 17:41:20

24 frequently asked by applications; regularly granted 17:41:23

25 by users. 17:41:31

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1 Hard to answer without the specifics. 17:41:32

2 Q. Well, let's start with frequently called 17:41:34

3 by applications. 17:41:36

4 Were friends permissions frequently called 17:41:40

5 by applications? 17:41:42

6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

12 Q. And -- but a tremendous volume of user 17:42:04

13 data was made accessible through friends 17:42:08

14 permissions, wouldn't you say? 17:42:11

15 A. I am not sure what you mean by 17:42:14

16 "tremendous." 17:42:15

17 The friend permissions allowed 17:42:17

18 applications on the Facebook Platform to access 17:42:20

19 information about an app user's friends. 17:42:22

20 Q. And Facebook was concerned about the 17:42:25

21 amount of information that was made available via 17:42:27

22 the friends permissions. Correct? 17:42:30

23 A. There were discussions internally about 17:42:34

24 how the friend permissions were being used by 17:42:38

25 applications. 17:42:42

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1 MR. LOESER: Why don't we put up an 17:42:53
2 exhibit. And -- Tab 4, which would be 331 now? 17:42:54
3 332. All right. We're going to mark 17:43:03
4 Exhibit 332. 17:43:06
5 (Deposition Exhibit 332 was marked for 17:43:07
6 identification.) 17:43:09
7 BY MR. LOESER: 17:43:12
8 Q. And over the course of the day, I'm going 17:43:12
9 to be referring to "tabs." That's really just for 17:43:15
10 our benefit over here. A document will magically 17:43:18
11 appear on your screen that are tabs for me but are 17:43:21
12 Bates numbers for you. So -- and exhibit numbers. 17:43:25
13 This is a slipcover sheet which is not the 17:43:34
14 document itself that has the metadata for the 17:43:37
15 document. 17:43:39
16 So if we can go to the next page of the 17:43:40
17 document, I'm showing you an email from the name 17:43:42
18 that we can't say that we have agreed to call "KP" 17:43:45
19 to a number of people, including Allison Hendrix, 17:43:50
20 dated September 27, 2013. 17:43:54
21 Is that the document that's in front of 17:43:57
22 you? 17:44:00
23 A. That's the document I see, yes. 17:44:01
24 Q. And can you look at the first paragraph, 17:44:09
25 the first full paragraph of that document? 17:44:11

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1 A. Yep. 17:44:16

2 Q. And KP writes: 17:44:17

3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

12 A. You missed the word "data" between 17:44:44

13 "identity" and "required," I think, but other than 17:44:46

14 that, you got -- 17:44:48

15 Q. Thank you. 17:44:49

16 And do you understand what "identity data" 17:44:50

17 is? 17:44:52

18 A. It's hard for me here to be -- to know 17:44:56

19 specifically what he's referring to, but -- yeah, 17:44:59

20 so it's hard for me to know explicitly what he is 17:45:06

21 referring to. 17:45:09

22 In my personal capacity, I would 17:45:09

23 understand that to mean -- no, I'm not sure I could 17:45:13

24 conclusively say what he's referring to by 17:45:24

25 "identity data." 17:45:26

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```
2 | users? 17:45:30
```

4	interpretation of that phrase?	17:45:32
---	--------------------------------	----------

6 would -- my understanding is this is referring to 17:45:40

```
7 | the number of requests to a user ID, like a user -- 17:45:43
```

```
8 | the user -- what we would call the "user method" of 17:45:49
```

```
9 |         the Graph API.                                     17:45:52
```

10 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[illegible]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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A. "MAUs" means monthly active users. 17:48:21

█ [REDACTED] █

[REDACTED] █

█ [REDACTED] █

[REDACTED] █

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■

■

4

Is that what that says?

17:48:47

5

A. That's what I read from the document.

17:48:48

6

Q. So there were 138 times more requests than

17:48:51

7

there were users in the last 30 days.

17:48:55

8

A. I can't do the math in my head, but I

17:49:00

9

understand --

17:49:03

10

Q. He has it -- yeah, sorry to interrupt, but

17:49:04

11

the math is there. It says "138X." Right?

17:49:07

12

A. I see "138S" on the page, yeah.

17:49:10

13

Q. You're saying that you're not sure his

17:49:13

14

math is right, but -- right?

17:49:14

15

A. Yeah, I'm not doing a -- I'm not doing the

17:49:17

16

math in my head. I'm just reading the numbers off

17:49:19

17

the page.

17:49:22

18

Q. And what does it suggest to Facebook if --

17:49:22

19

if there are 138 times as many requests for

17:49:26

20

identity data than there are monthly active users?

17:49:31

21

A. It might suggest that the app was not very

17:49:37

22

efficiently developed.

17:49:40

23

Q. Might it also suggest that the app was

17:49:43

24

obtaining information in ways that weren't related

17:49:45

25

to the use case for the app?

17:49:51

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[illegible]

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Q. And for Facebook, is that considered
somewhat of a red flag?

A. I think there's a number of reasons why
Facebook might be interested in how applications
are calling the API.

One example might be that if the app is
developed inefficiently, then there is an impact on
Facebook's ability to serve those requests 'cause
every time the API is called, a lot of code has to
be run.

Q. And do you think that's what KP was
sending this email about?

A. I'm not -- there's no reference here as to
exactly what -- whether or not that was a reason
that KP was sending this email.

17:51:31

17:51:33

17:51:39

17:51:41

17:51:43

17:51:45

17:51:50

17:51:54

17:51:57

17:52:01

17:52:04

17:52:08

17:52:13

17:52:15

17:52:19

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1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

2 A. From this email, it's hard to know 17:52:58

3 specifically what the issue was. I -- I was not on 17:53:00

4 this email thread in a personal capacity, and I was 17:53:05

5 unable to talk to KP about what he meant because 17:53:11

6 he's no longer at the company. 17:53:15

7 Q. And in stepping away from this email, was 17:53:19

8 Facebook aware that friends permissions were often 17:53:23

9 called by apps in ways that exceeded the use case 17:53:29

10 for the app? 17:53:35

11 A. At the time there was a number of 17:53:40

12 discussions about how apps were using the 17:53:41

13 information they got via the API. One of those 17:53:46

14 reasons would have been that there were some 17:53:53

15 questions about how that information was being 17:53:58

16 used. 17:54:00

17 Q. And what's the time frame you're referring 17:54:02

18 to in your answer? 17:54:04

19 A. My answer here, I'm referring to around 17:54:08

20 2013, the -- roughly when I have reviewed documents 17:54:12

21 about this time, where there was a number of 17:54:15

22 discussions taking place about how apps were using 17:54:18

23 the Facebook Developer Platform and which 17:54:23

24 particular APIs and permissions they were using. 17:54:27

25 Q. The way friend-sharing was set up, a 17:54:33

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1 Facebook user decided whether an app or integration 17:54:35
2 partner got access to the user's friend data. 17:54:39
3 Right? 17:54:43
4 A. The way the Facebook Platform worked is 17:54:44
5 that users would authorize an application to access 17:54:46
6 their information. They could also, in API 17:54:49
7 Version 1 and before, grant the application access 17:54:56
8 to information about -- some information about that 17:54:58
9 user's friends who had not -- who were not 17:55:05
10 necessarily using the application. 17:55:07
11 Q. Okay. And on an app-by-app basis, the 17:55:09
12 friends themselves did not have a say in whether 17:55:16
13 their information was made available to the app 17:55:19
14 that their friend used. Right? 17:55:20
15 A. My understanding is that developers -- 17:55:24
16 users could opt out of the Facebook Developer 17:55:27
17 Platform, and that would prevent their information 17:55:29
18 being shared with most third parties. 17:55:33
19 Q. Okay. And that -- and let me make sure I 17:55:37
20 understand your testimony. 17:55:41
21 The only way to stop your friends from 17:55:43
22 sharing your information with an app was to turn 17:55:45
23 off apps altogether on the Platform. Is that 17:55:47
24 right? 17:55:49
25 A. The controls available to users changed 17:55:54

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1 over time. For a period, there was a way for users 17:55:57
2 to access a setting -- an area of settings called 17:56:04
3 "Apps Others Use" -- I think I'm getting that 17:56:08
4 right -- which allowed them to control which 17:56:11
5 subsets of their information were available to 17:56:14
6 applications via the friend permissions. 17:56:19

7 Q. And what period was that choice available? 17:56:22

8 A. I don't know specifically when that -- 17:56:31
9 those settings were made available or were removed. 17:56:33
10 It was certainly available, as I understand it, in 17:56:37
11 around 2014. 17:56:40

12 Q. And why was that choice taken away from 17:56:48
13 users? 17:56:51

14 A. My understanding is that that area of 17:56:52
15 settings was removed when there were no or few 17:56:54
16 third-party applications that had access to that 17:57:04
17 information via the APIs. 17:57:08

18 Q. And do you have an understanding -- or 17:57:15
19 what is Facebook -- well, strike that. 17:57:16

20 What was the time period for which the 17:57:18
21 only way to stop your friends from sharing 17:57:20
22 information was to turn off apps altogether on the 17:57:23
23 Platform? 17:57:25

24 A. To answer that question, I'd need to know 17:57:29
25 exactly when the Apps Others Use setting was 17:57:31

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1 introduced, which is a date I don't have, I'm 17:57:36
2 afraid. 17:57:38

3 Q. Okay. And will you follow up and provide 17:57:39
4 that information? 17:57:41

5 You would provide it to your counsel, who 17:57:46
6 can provide it to us. 17:57:47

7 A. I'm sure we could try and attempt to 17:57:49
8 follow up on determining when those settings 17:57:51
9 were -- were introduced. 17:57:54

10 Q. And where would you go to search for the 17:57:57
11 answer to that question? 17:57:59

12 A. My immediate step would be to ask the 17:58:08
13 engineers who had worked on that feature or may 17:58:10
14 have worked on that feature to try and identify 17:58:15
15 when that feature was made available. 17:58:20

16 Q. Thank you. During the time that the only 17:58:27
17 way to turn off -- or to block your friend from 17:58:29
18 sharing your information was by turning off apps 17:58:33
19 altogether, can you explain why friend-sharing was 17:58:37
20 set up that way? 17:58:41

21 A. The original design of the Facebook 17:58:45
22 Platform rested on a very simple premise, which is 17:58:47
23 that the user has access to information by using 17:58:54
24 Facebook, and the user could allow apps to access 17:58:58
25 the information that they could see on Facebook, 17:59:04

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1 and that would allow those applications to build 17:59:06
2 rich, engaging social experiences. 17:59:11
3 That was the simple, clear, founding 17:59:14
4 premise of the Facebook Developer Platform. 17:59:18
5 Q. From your testimony, it sounds like, just 17:59:22
6 from a technical standpoint, it is possible for 17:59:25
7 Facebook to provide a setting through which, on an 17:59:27
8 app-by-app basis, Facebook users can determine 17:59:32
9 whether their friends share their information. 17:59:37
10 Right? 17:59:44
11 A. The testimony I think you're referring to 17:59:44
12 from a few minutes ago refers to a set of settings 17:59:46
13 called "Apps Others Use," which allowed users to 17:59:50
14 opt out of certain types of their information being 17:59:55
15 shared with any apps their friend used. 17:59:59
16 My understanding is that was not an 18:00:03
17 app-by-app setting. 18:00:05
18 Q. Okay. I want to make sure I understand 18:00:10
19 that. 18:00:13
20 So was there any time when a Facebook user 18:00:13
21 could block a particular app that one of their 18:00:18
22 friends used? 18:00:23
23 Let's call the app "friend's app." So was 18:00:25
24 there at any time a setting where a user would have 18:00:30
25 the option of saying no to a friend's app getting 18:00:32

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1 their information because their friend used that 18:00:37

2 app? 18:00:40

3 A. The feature that enables -- there was a 18:00:42

4 feature called "Blocks" which allows a user to 18:00:47

5 block a specific application. 18:00:50

6 My understanding is that that would mean 18:00:52

7 the application would not have access to their 18:00:55

8 information by the -- 18:00:58

9 Q. So would the user get a notice, say, from 18:01:04

10 friend's app that said, "Your friend wants to share 18:01:07

11 your information. Do you -- are you providing -- 18:01:11

12 like, will you authorize that?" 18:01:13

13 Is that how it functioned? 18:01:15

14 A. The way friend-sharing worked was that a 18:01:17

15 user could authorize an application, grant 18:01:20

16 permissions to that application to access -- well, 18:01:24

17 actually, let me back up. 18:01:28

18 The -- the permissions were introduced 18:01:30

19 into the API sometime after the Facebook Developer 18:01:33

20 Platform was first launched. 18:01:39

21 When -- in the original version, when a 18:01:44

22 friend -- when a user authorized an application, 18:01:46

23 that application had access to information about 18:01:48

24 that user and some information about that user's 18:01:52

25 friends. 18:01:55

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1 There were -- the user -- the user's 18:01:57

2 friends would not get notified that their friend 18:02:00

3 was using the application. There would be no 18:02:02

4 placebo active notifications. 18:02:05

5 Q. And what was that time period? 18:02:08

6 A. The way the permissions -- the granular 18:02:11

7 permissions were launched in April 2010, and so the 18:02:16

8 specific feature I'm referring to there is prior to 18:02:21

9 April 2010, apps would access a range of 18:02:27

10 information without granular permissions needed to 18:02:35

11 be granted. 18:02:38

12 Starting in April 2010, users granted 18:02:40

13 specific permissions to an application determining 18:02:43

14 which data that application had access to. 18:02:46

15 Q. Right. 18:02:52

16 A. Through both of those periods, when a user 18:02:52

17 installed an application, their friends would not 18:02:56

18 be notified that they had done so. 18:02:59

19 Q. Okay. And was there a point in time when, 18:03:03

20 before a user could share the user's friends 18:03:04

21 information, the users got notice that the app was 18:03:10

22 seeking friends information? 18:03:13

23 A. I'm not aware of any time where a 18:03:16

24 nonapp-user would be notified that one of their 18:03:20

25 friends was using an application. 18:03:23

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1 Q. Okay. And why was Facebook set up that 18:03:26
2 way so that friends didn't receive notification 18:03:29
3 when their users -- when their friends were trying 18:03:33
4 to provide access to their information? 18:03:36

5 A. The original premise of the Facebook 18:03:41
6 Platform was that when a user was using an 18:03:42
7 application, that application had access to, at the 18:03:48
8 limit, potentially, anything that that user would 18:03:52
9 be able to see on Facebook. 18:03:55

10 It was the user taking the information 18:03:57
11 that had been shared with them and making that 18:03:59
12 available to an application. 18:04:02

13 Q. And have you seen in documents that 18:04:07
14 structure referred to as "authorization by proxy"? 18:04:10

15 A. I don't recall seeing that phrase in 18:04:16
16 particular. 18:04:17

17 Q. So, now, could Facebook have set up the 18:04:24
18 platform so that before an app could get access to 18:04:26
19 a person's information, where that person was the 18:04:30
20 friend of someone using the app, that they could 18:04:33
21 have received notice that this app is attempting to 18:04:36
22 gain the nonapp user's information? 18:04:40

23 A. It's technically possible that when a user 18:04:50
24 authorized an application and granted friends 18:04:52
25 permissions, that a notification could have been 18:04:58

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1 sent. That's technically possible. 18:05:03

2 It would have introduced a number of 18:05:07

3 unusual experiences, however. 18:05:09

4 Q. And what do you mean by that? 18:05:15

5 A. So sometimes I'm logging into an 18:05:21

6 application or I'm using an application for the 18:05:24

7 very first time. I'm not necessarily, you know -- 18:05:26

8 I'm using an application for the very first time. 18:05:30

9 It might be unexpected for Facebook to 18:05:33

10 broadcast -- to send a notification to some of my 18:05:39

11 friends that I was using the application. 18:05:46

12 Q. Now, unexpected or not, it would have 18:05:49

13 given those friends the ability to choose not to 18:05:51

14 share information in that context. Right? 18:05:54

15 A. So, again, in this case, the -- the way 18:05:58

16 that the Facebook Developer Platform was originally 18:06:01

17 set up was that an app -- based on the simple 18:06:03

18 founding premise that when -- if there was 18:06:10

19 information that a user could see on Facebook 18:06:13

20 because it had been shared with them on Facebook, 18:06:15

21 the -- that information would also be available to 18:06:18

22 applications that user was using. 18:06:23

23 Q. And were there discussions at Facebook of 18:06:30

24 the pros and cons of that approach to treating 18:06:33

25 information about users' friends? 18:06:37

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1 A. I've seen evidence of -- I've seen 18:06:42
2 evidence of discussions where the -- the impact of 18:06:45
3 that model was resulting in users being concerned 18:06:49
4 about the information that they could share with 18:06:55
5 applications and that their friends might be 18:07:01
6 sharing with applications, ultimately leading to 18:07:03
7 the changes made in 2014. 18:07:06
8 Q. And would it be fair to describe those 18:07:08
9 concerns as "privacy concerns"? 18:07:10
10 A. I think there are a range of concerns as 18:07:13
11 to how information was being shared with 18:07:15
12 third-party apps through the Developer Platform. 18:07:21
13 Q. And were privacy concerns included in that 18:07:25
14 range of concerns? 18:07:27
15 A. Privacy would have been -- information 18:07:31
16 expectation would have been one of the concerns 18:07:34
17 that was discussed. 18:07:36
18 Q. And by that, you mean people didn't 18:07:40
19 realize their information was being shared in that 18:07:42
20 way? 18:07:44
21 A. The -- there was discussion about the fact 18:07:47
22 that some people might not be aware that a friend 18:07:50
23 was using an application and that that friend's -- 18:07:56
24 some of that user's friends' information had been 18:08:00
25 shared with the app. 18:08:05

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1 MR. LOESER: Okay. If we could go to 18:08:08
2 Tab 5. 18:08:10
3 I'm going to introduce what will be marked 18:08:15
4 as Exhibit 333. 18:08:17
5 (Deposition Exhibit 333 was marked for 18:08:29
6 identification.) 18:08:30
7 BY MR. LOESER: 18:08:31
8 Q. In a moment you'll see an email from 18:08:32
9 David Poll to Eddie O'Neil and also dated 18:08:35
10 December 9, 2013. 18:08:39
11 Do you see that on your screen? 18:08:42
12 A. I do. 18:08:44
13 Q. Do you know who David Poll is? 18:08:44
14 A. David Poll was an employee of Facebook, 18:08:50
15 now Meta, in the past, and I recall him being one 18:08:54
16 of the cofounders of a company called Parse. 18:08:58
17 Q. And from -- was there discussion at 18:09:07
18 Facebook about who owned friend information; 18:09:11
19 whether it was the user's information or the 18:09:14
20 friends' information? 18:09:19
21 A. Let me just read the exhibit before I 18:09:21
22 answer your question. 18:09:23
23 Q. Sure. And I -- it's a long string, and 18:09:25
24 I'm going to be asking you about some statements 18:09:29
25 made by Eddie O'Neil and David Poll on the second 18:09:32

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1 page of the email, if that helps, on the bottom. 18:09:37

2 A. (Reviewing document.) 18:09:54

3 Okay. It just scrolled. 18:09:55

4 Q. Let me apologize. Let me save some time 18:09:56

5 by just referring you to -- if you go to the second 18:09:59

6 page, this is a chat between Eddie O'Neil and 18:10:01

7 David Poll. Is that right? 18:10:04

8 A. This to me represents a chat between Eddie 18:10:07

9 and David, yes. 18:10:10

10 Q. Okay. And if you go to the bottom of the 18:10:11

11 second page, about two thirds of the way down, 18:10:13

12 Eddie O'Neil says: 18:10:17

13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

19 Do you see that? 18:10:32

20 A. I do see that. 18:10:33

21 Q. And does this -- does this suggest that at 18:10:35

22 Facebook, there was discussion about who owned -- 18:10:39

23 and I can put in air quotes -- who owned friend 18:10:43

24 information; whether it belonged to the user or 18:10:46

25 belonged to the friends? 18:10:48

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1 A. My understanding, this is a discussion 18:10:54
2 about who -- who did or should have the ability to 18:10:55
3 choose how information was shared with third 18:11:04
4 parties. 18:11:09

5 It's -- I'm not sure I'd refer to it as 18:11:10
6 "who owns," but it's certainly a discussion about 18:11:13
7 the model or the models for which information could 18:11:19
8 or should be shared with third parties. 18:11:25

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

20 Q. But Facebook, obviously, knows what 18:12:08
21 regulatory and legal issues are -- were raised with 18:12:12
22 regard to friends permissions. Right? 18:12:22

23 MR. BLUME: Excuse me. I object. 18:12:26
24 Privilege. Potential privilege. If I may -- 18:12:28

25 MR. LOESER: And let me -- sorry. Go 18:12:32

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1 ahead, Mr. Blume. 18:12:34

2 MR. BLUME: I just was asking permission 18:12:36

3 to instruct the witness unless you want to 18:12:38

4 rephrase. 18:12:40

5 MR. LOESER: Sure. 18:12:42

6 Q. Really, the point of my question was, you 18:12:42

7 don't know the answer to this question what the 18:12:44

8 regulatory or legal issues were, but Facebook knows 18:12:46

9 the answer to that. Right? 18:12:49

10 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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And do you know what he is referring to
here?

A. There's a couple of terms here.
Which one do you want me to focus on
first?

Q. Well, is this a reference to the amount of
information that friends permissions was making
available to developers?

A. Reading this, it seems relevant to the
friend permissions, but "huge amount of value" may
refer to a number of different ways that a
developer would perceive the -- the value of the
experience that they had got by integrating with
the Facebook Platform.

Q. And what are -- what -- how can you
describe or what are the different ways that
developers obtained value from friends permission
information?

A. So the friend permissions allowed
applications to build rich, engaging social
experiences even when, you know, one -- let me
start that again to make sure I frame this
correctly for you.

One of the benefits of the friend

18:15:32
18:15:34
18:15:38
18:15:40
18:15:42
18:15:43
18:15:45
18:15:48
18:15:55
18:15:59
18:16:03
18:16:07
18:16:13
18:16:15
18:16:17
18:16:21
18:16:23
18:16:28
18:16:32
18:16:35
18:16:38
18:16:45
18:16:48
18:16:49

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1 permissions for developers was that they could 18:16:51
2 build rich, engaging social experiences, including 18:16:54
3 those where not all of a user's friends were also 18:16:59
4 using the same application; also using the same 18:17:04
5 app. 18:17:09

6 That could manifest value in different 18:17:09
7 ways. It could enable applications to be more 18:17:12
8 retentive, so they were more frequently used a 18:17:19
9 whole number of different ways that the developers 18:17:23
10 might benefit from building social experiences. 18:17:26

11 Q. And what are the ways that providing 18:17:32
12 access to friends information was at "great expense 18:17:34
13 to Facebook as a business"? 18:17:39

14 A. So one of the ways that this might be 18:17:47
15 considered an expense is in trust and reputation. 18:17:50
16 Because of the way the APIs functioned originally. 18:17:57

17 And, as I've testified previously, there 18:18:03
18 were some concerns that we'd heard from users about 18:18:06
19 how the Platform worked, and that confusion could 18:18:10
20 have impacted the trust in Facebook as a product. 18:18:17

21 Q. And can you -- are there other types of 18:18:24
22 expense that Facebook recognized related to 18:18:28
23 providing access to friends permissions to 18:18:31
24 developers -- or partners, for that matter? 18:18:34

25 A. One way that you might classify that is 18:18:38

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1 the computational energy it took to serve these 18:18:45
2 requests. 18:18:50
3 Actually serving an API call requires 18:18:52
4 compute, and so that's another way that providing 18:18:56
5 the platform in general and certain APIs would have 18:19:02
6 been an expense to Facebook. 18:19:08
7 Q. And what about the value of the -- of the 18:19:12
8 friend information itself? 18:19:14
9 Is that information valuable to Facebook 18:19:17
10 as a business, from a monetization standpoint? 18:19:19
11 A. Sorry. Can you help me understand the 18:19:25
12 context of your question? 18:19:27
13 That was a very general -- a general 18:19:29
14 question. I would like to get to the specifics. 18:19:31
15 Q. Sure. I'm just trying to understand from 18:19:33
16 Facebook's perspective what the great expense to 18:19:36
17 Facebook as a business was, and you've given me 18:19:39
18 some examples. 18:19:42
19 And I'm wondering if there's an economic 18:19:42
20 impact as well that would be covered by providing 18:19:45
21 thousands of apps with access to friend 18:19:47
22 permissions. 18:19:50
23 A. I'm not aware of any analysis that was 18:19:53
24 done that specifically determined -- or attempts to 18:19:56
25 determine the -- the financial value of friend 18:20:01

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1 permissions or the friend data as part of the 18:20:08

2 Developer Platform. 18:20:11

3 Q. Okay. Let's look at David Poll's text at 18:20:15

4 the bottom of the page. And he states: 18:20:18

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 Do you see that? 18:20:32

11 A. I see that on the screen, yes. 18:20:33

12 Q. And as you testified earlier, that's the 18:20:35

13 type of setting that Facebook could have 18:20:37

14 technically implemented had it chosen to do so. 18:20:40

15 A. Let me just read the statement to make 18:20:44

16 sure I can answer accurately for you. 18:20:46

17 (Reviewing document.) 18:21:00

18 THE WITNESS: There's a lot of context 18:21:19

19 here to unpack. So I'm just trying to understand 18:21:21

20 what David Poll is speaking about. 18:21:24

21 So my understanding is that the "apps 18:21:38

22 others use" setting was partly delivered on the 18:21:41

23 expectation that -- that David is referring to 18:21:51

24 here. 18:21:54

25 So it would have been technically possible 18:21:59

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1 to allow a user to choose whether or not an 18:22:01
2 application had access to their data. 18:22:10
3 BY MR. LOESER: 18:22:14
4 Q. All right. We've talked a bit about 18:22:20
5 the -- I'm sorry, go ahead. 18:22:22
6 A. Sorry. Carry on. 18:22:25
7 Q. Okay. So moving on, the -- I've asked you 18:22:26
8 some questions about the different permissions, and 18:22:28
9 you've provided some helpful information about the 18:22:31
10 terminology used to discuss different permissions. 18:22:33
11 I do want to make sure I have a complete 18:22:37
12 understanding of all of the different permissions 18:22:40
13 that allowed access to friend information. 18:22:44
14 And I asked before if a number of the 18:22:48
15 permissions had the word "friends" in them, and you 18:22:52
16 said "Yes." 18:22:56
17 And it's also the case the number of 18:22:57
18 permissions that provided access to friend 18:22:59
19 information did not have the word "friend" in them. 18:23:02
20 Is that right? 18:23:05
21 A. There were permissions that allowed an app 18:23:08
22 to access information about a user and that user's 18:23:11
23 friends that didn't have "friend" in the title. 18:23:17
24 Q. Okay. And I'm going to run through some, 18:23:22
25 and then you can help me understand if there are 18:23:24

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1 others. 18:23:26

2 User-posts APIs are a type of -- emit 18:23:27

3 friend information. Right? 18:23:37

4 A. The user-posts API allowed an app to 18:23:38

5 access the posts of a user who had authorized the 18:23:42

6 application. 18:23:46

7 Q. And did it also provide access to the 18:23:48

8 user's friends' posts? 18:23:52

9 A. My understanding is the user-posts 18:23:56

10 permission is no. It would not have allowed an app 18:24:01

11 to access a user's friends' posts. 18:24:04

12 Q. And even where the friend responds to the 18:24:08

13 post or comments or indicates a like to a post? 18:24:10

14 A. My understanding of the way the user posts 18:24:16

15 permission worked was that it would have emitted 18:24:19

16 the posts of the user who had authorized the 18:24:23

17 application. It may have also included likes and 18:24:26

18 comments on that post. 18:24:29

19 Q. Okay. And likes and comments from a 18:24:32

20 friend would be friend information. Right? 18:24:34

21 A. Some posts, if they had only been shared 18:24:43

22 with a friend and they had been liked or commented 18:24:47

23 on by a friend, then the -- the app would be able 18:24:50

24 to see the user ID and the comment and some other 18:24:57

25 information about the comment that you could 18:25:02

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1 Q. What is the "Pages API"? 18:26:42

2 A. The Pages API refers to a collection of 18:26:45

3 APIs that would allow an application to access 18:26:48

4 content on or information about a Facebook page. 18:26:52

5 Q. And could that API also allow access to 18:26:58

6 friends information of the user who used the app 18:27:03

7 with access to that API? 18:27:07

8 A. So the Pages API allowed an application to 18:27:12

9 access information about the page. At times, it 18:27:21

10 also allowed the application to access posts on 18:27:24

11 that page's timeline, and those posts could also 18:27:26

12 have included comments on those posts. And those 18:27:31

13 comments were publicly available on Facebook and 18:27:38

14 may have been also available by the API. 18:27:41

15 Q. And so that would include friends 18:27:44

16 information as well. Right? 18:27:46

17 A. The Pages API could be called by an 18:27:49

18 application without a specific logged-in user, and 18:27:52

19 so the information available may have included 18:28:00

20 friend information. 18:28:03

21 Q. And what is the "Groups API"? 18:28:06

22 A. The Groups API refers to a collection of 18:28:12

23 APIs which allow an app to access the groups that a 18:28:15

24 user is a member of. 18:28:21

25 Q. And could the Groups APIs also provide 18:28:26

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1 access to information about friends of the app 18:28:31

2 user? 18:28:34

3 A. The Groups API would have allowed the app 18:28:37

4 to access the member list of a -- that at the time 18:28:42

5 included the member list of the groups that the 18:28:49

6 user was a member of and posts in the group that 18:28:51

7 the user was a member of. 18:28:53

8 The member list could include people who 18:28:57

9 were the app user's friends. 18:28:59

10 Q. And it could also include people who were 18:29:02

11 not the app user's friends. Right? 18:29:04

12 A. A group on Facebook can be open or closed 18:29:08

13 and secret and may contain people who are not the 18:29:14

14 user's friends, and the group's API would have 18:29:16

15 allowed the app to see the members of the group. 18:29:21

16 Q. Are you familiar with the Taggable Friends 18:29:25

17 API? 18:29:27

18 A. I am familiar with the Taggable Friends 18:29:31

19 API. 18:29:33

20 Q. And what information does that API provide 18:29:34

21 access to? 18:29:37

22 A. My understanding is that the Taggable 18:29:39

23 Friends API retrieved -- allowed an app to retrieve 18:29:43

24 a very limited set of information about the app 18:29:48

25 user's friends specifically to enable them to 18:29:51

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1 Do I recall that correctly? 18:31:36

2 A. That's not the intent of my testimony. 18:31:37

3 It provided the social -- it provided 18:31:43

4 social context between two app users. 18:31:46

5 So when you called the Social Context API, 18:31:50

6 it was called on behalf of a user, and you would 18:31:53

7 also specify one of that user's friends who was 18:31:56

8 also -- or another user ID of somebody who was 18:32:01

9 using the application, and the API would return 18:32:04

10 social context between those two people. 18:32:07

11 Q. And so could that API provide information 18:32:15

12 about people who are not using the app with access 18:32:18

13 to Social Context API? 18:32:22

14 A. My understanding is the information 18:32:24

15 returned by that API would be different whether or 18:32:26

16 not two users -- one of the users was using the 18:32:28

17 application and one of the users displayed in the 18:32:32

18 Social Context wasn't. 18:32:36

19 Q. And so walk me through what happens when 18:32:39

20 the -- the other person is not using the app. 18:32:44

21 What information about that person is 18:32:49

22 provided through the app? 18:32:51

23 A. I'd need to refer to the API documentation 18:32:53

24 at the time to give -- to give you specifics, but 18:32:56

25 my understanding is it would return a very limited 18:32:59

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1 set of information about people that the two users 18:33:04
2 had in common that were not using the application. 18:33:09
3 Q. Okay. So let's -- let's -- let me provide 18:33:12
4 an example. Maybe this would be helpful. 18:33:15
5 So if a Facebook user watches a movie, 18:33:17
6 let's say The Godfather, and the app that user 18:33:21
7 is -- authorizes an app that has a Social Context 18:33:29
8 API permission, what other information about people 18:33:34
9 watching The Godfather, and from whom, would that 18:33:39
10 API provide access? 18:33:43
11 A. I can't -- I don't recall the specific 18:33:47
12 behavior of the API, and I think to do that, I'd 18:33:49
13 need to refer to the developer documentation that 18:33:52
14 was available at the time as to how -- how that 18:33:54
15 specific API behaved. I don't want to speculate if 18:33:57
16 I don't have the -- the facts. 18:34:01
17 Q. Well, let's try and create enough facts so 18:34:04
18 you can provide some helpful information. 18:34:06
19 Let's say a user did watch the movie 18:34:08
20 Godfather and posts on their Facebook page, "I love 18:34:11
21 the movie Godfather. I just watched it." 18:34:15
22 Explain to me how the Social Context API 18:34:20
23 would use that information and with whom it would 18:34:23
24 use it if there's an app that has Social Context 18:34:26
25 API. 18:34:29

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1 A. So I need to refer to the specifics about 18:34:30
2 the -- how the social context API works. You're 18:34:33
3 asking a very -- a question that requires, you 18:34:36
4 know, a detailed answer, and I don't have in my 18:34:40
5 mind the exact behavior of how the Social Context 18:34:42
6 API worked and the context in which it worked and 18:34:47
7 the specifics of the information that would have 18:34:51
8 been returned by the API. 18:34:53

9 Q. Okay. Well, then, if you can, describe 18:34:56
10 more generally -- and I'm trying to understand from 18:34:58
11 where the Social Context API draws information. 18:35:02

12 So I know from what you said that it draws 18:35:05
13 information from the user who authorized the app. 18:35:07

14 And what other information does it draw 18:35:10
15 that pertains to that user? Like -- or from who? 18:35:13
16 Who else would be sort of folded into the -- or who 18:35:17
17 else would be in the net that that API casts? 18:35:20

18 A. The precise answer depends on the 18:35:25
19 specifics of the Social Context API. It's one of 18:35:29
20 the APIs that I don't have the details of exactly 18:35:31
21 how it worked -- in my head today -- so it's hard 18:35:34
22 to give you a specific answer to that accurately. 18:35:38

23 Q. Okay. But there's -- as you mentioned, 18:35:43
24 there's a source -- there's a place you can go at 18:35:45
25 Facebook where you can see and learn exactly what 18:35:48

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1 information that API provides access to? 18:35:51

2 A. My understanding is that the code base of 18:35:55

3 Facebook may help understand which API specifically 18:35:59

4 you're referring to and its behavior over time. 18:36:04

5 Q. And based upon what you know now, can you 18:36:09

6 say whether that API provides access to friends 18:36:12

7 information? 18:36:16

8 A. I -- again, to answer that question 18:36:19

9 specifically, I'd need to go and look at the exact 18:36:22

10 behavior of the Social Context API. There are 18:36:25

11 other APIs whose behavior I can describe. The 18:36:28

12 Social Context API, I -- I don't have the 18:36:31

13 information as to, like, exactly which API you're 18:36:34

14 referring to, exactly how it behaved, and exactly 18:36:37

15 who it was available to and when. 18:36:43

16 So I just don't want to give you incorrect 18:36:46

17 information. 18:36:49

18 Q. Well, that's fair, and I appreciate that 18:36:50

19 answer. 18:36:51

20 Do you know of or can you provide any 18:36:52

21 other APIs that provided access to friend 18:36:54

22 information? 18:36:59

23 And let me make your answer easier. Other 18:37:00

24 than those that have the word "friends" in the -- 18:37:03

25 A. When you're referring to friends 18:37:07

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1 information here, can you be more specific 18:37:09

2 precisely what information -- what would classify 18:37:12

3 as friends information in your question? 18:37:15

4 Q. Yeah, and I'm trying to use the definition 18:37:17

5 we came up with before. But it's really any 18:37:19

6 information about the friends -- any Facebook data 18:37:22

7 or information about the friends of the person who 18:37:24

8 authorized the app. 18:37:26

9 A. Okay. Cool. 18:37:32

10 Some other APIs that -- that would have 18:37:36

11 been -- that fit that description, there is an API 18:37:38

12 called a "Taggable Friends API" that you've 18:37:46

13 previously mentioned. There was another one called 18:37:51

14 the "Invisible Friends API." 18:37:54

15 And then the -- several of the user 18:38:01

16 permissions, user_posts, user_photos, user_videos, 18:38:08

17 as per my previous testimony, would have allowed 18:38:20

18 the app to access the user's photos, but comments 18:38:23

19 and likes on those photos by my friends may also 18:38:28

20 have been returned by that API. 18:38:33

21 Q. And you said "photos," but that would be 18:38:36

22 the same for videos as well? 18:38:38

23 A. The user photos and user videos APIs 18:38:41

24 behaved the same way, to my knowledge -- or in a 18:38:47

25 similar way, to my knowledge. 18:38:50

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1 Q. And do you know, with regard to those user 18:38:52
2 permissions, what time period they were active on 18:38:56
3 the Platform? 18:38:58

4 A. The permissions, as I understand it, were 18:39:00
5 added in April 2010, in terms of the permissions 18:39:03
6 themselves. 18:39:08

7 The behavior of the APIs that were gated 18:39:11
8 by those permissions changed over time. So it's 18:39:16
9 hard to say exactly when the behavior changed, but 18:39:20
10 the permissions that those -- those specific 18:39:23
11 permissions were made available, as I understand 18:39:27
12 it, in April 2010. 18:39:29

13 MR. BLUME: I'm sorry to -- when you're at 18:39:32
14 a breaking point, if we could break. 18:39:34

15 MR. LOESER: Yeah. One more question. 18:39:36

16 Q. Those permissions, the user permissions 18:39:38
17 you just described, are they still available on the 18:39:41
18 Platform today? 18:39:44

19 A. My understanding is that some of those 18:39:47
20 permissions are still available today, but I would 18:39:49
21 want to review the public API documentation to be 18:39:54
22 sure. 18:39:58

23 MR. LOESER: And I apologize, Mr. Blume, I 18:39:59
24 just have two more questions that relate to this. 18:40:01
25 If that's okay, I'll ask -- 18:40:04

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1 MR. BLUME: Okay. 18:40:06

2 BY MR. LOESER: 18:40:06

3 Q. Now, we've gone through a number of 18:40:07

4 different APIs, and I have attempted to elicit 18:40:08

5 information about all the APIs that provide access 18:40:11

6 to friend information as we've defined that. 18:40:13

7 Is there a tool or is there a list or a 18:40:16

8 database or something at Facebook that identifies 18:40:19

9 every single API that provides friend information 18:40:22

10 in any way? 18:40:28

11 A. I'm not aware of a tool that identifies 18:40:33

12 the subset of the Facebook Developer Platform APIs 18:40:38

13 that would have returned information about a user's 18:40:42

14 friends. 18:40:47

15 Q. And do you know if, at any point, Facebook 18:40:49

16 has undertaken the effort to identify every single 18:40:51

17 API that emitted friend information? 18:40:55

18 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

22 Q. And do you know if that effort looked at 18:41:22

23 all of the different APIs that I just ran through 18:41:25

24 with you: Taggable Friends, Invisible Friends, 18:41:29

25 User Permissions, Groups, Events, Posts, and the 18:41:33

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1 like? 18:41:36

2 A. My understanding is that effort would have 18:41:38

3 looked through all of the APIs that were commonly 18:41:40

4 available on the Facebook developer endpoint 18:41:42

5 platform at the time. 18:41:45

6 Q. My last question, then we can take a 18:41:47

7 break: 18:41:49

8 Facebook can determine definitively with 18:41:50

9 respect to every API whether that API emitted any 18:41:53

10 friend information. Right? 18:41:57

11 A. My understanding is that for a given API 18:42:02

12 method, it is determinable what information would 18:42:06

13 have been emitted by that API. 18:42:10

14 MR. LOESER: Okay. We can take a break 18:42:14

15 now. Thank you for continuing on until we finished 18:42:16

16 that topic. 18:42:19

17 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: Okay. Then we're off 18:42:21

18 the record at 6:42 P.M. 18:42:23

19 (Recess from 6:42 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.) 18:42:25

20 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: We're back on the 19:00:38

21 record at 7:00 P.M. 19:00:39

22 MR. LOESER: Mr. Cross, we're going to put 19:00:44

23 up another exhibit for you. It's previously been 19:00:45

24 marked Exhibit 98. 19:00:48

25 And while it's being loaded, this appears 19:00:55

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1 to be a post from you on the internal group app 19:00:58

2 review and policy enforcement feedback and 19:01:03

3 questions on June 11, 2015. Is that right? 19:01:05

4 A. I'm not seeing anything on the screen just 19:01:14

5 yet. Or in the Veritext Egnite thing. 19:01:16

6 (Previously marked Exhibit 98 was 19:01:21

7 presented to the witness.) 19:01:26

8 MR. BLUME: Do you have an exhibit number? 19:01:28

9 MR. LOESER: Yeah, it's Exhibit Number 98. 19:01:30

10 THE WITNESS: I'm just going to quickly 19:01:39

11 turn on the lights in my room. It's getting dark 19:01:41

12 here. 19:01:45

13 Okay. I'm seeing something now. Thank 19:01:50

14 you. 19:01:52

15 BY MR. LOESER: 19:01:54

16 Q. And do you see the exhibit stamp 98? 19:01:54

17 A. I do. 19:01:58

18 Q. Okay. And then if you look at the top of 19:01:59

19 the next page, it says "App Review and Policy 19:02:01

20 Enforcement Feedback and Questions." 19:02:04

21 A. I see that, yes. 19:02:09

22 Q. And what -- is this a -- like, what is 19:02:11

23 this? 19:02:13

24 Where was this posted? 19:02:15

25 A. I can't confirm where this was posted from 19:02:20

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1 what I'm seeing here. It's -- yeah. I -- from 19:02:23

2 what I'm seeing on the screen, I can't 100 percent 19:02:27

3 confirm where this -- where this was posted. 19:02:30

4 Q. Okay. And in June of 2015, what was your 19:02:34

5 position at Facebook? 19:02:36

6 A. I was a product manager on the Facebook 19:02:39

7 Developer Platform. 19:02:42

8 Q. Okay. And was there a list serve or 19:02:45

9 something that was -- where people provided 19:02:48

10 feedback and questions for app review and policy 19:02:52

11 enforcement? 19:02:55

12 A. There was likely a Facebook group. We 19:02:57

13 used Facebook internally to discuss that. That's 19:02:59

14 what this may be. I just can't 100 percent confirm 19:03:03

15 it from what I'm looking at here. 19:03:06

16 Q. Okay. And if you look at just your post 19:03:09

17 starting at the top, it refers to something called 19:03:13

18 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

19 But before I ask you questions about that, 19:03:20

20 there's a link below that. 19:03:23

21 Can you tell what that link is? 19:03:25

22 A. That looks to me like a -- what, a URL to 19:03:31

23 an image of -- first of all, that's what it looks 19:03:39

24 like to me. I can't confirm if that URL is the URL 19:03:42

25 for the image directly below it. It's possible, 19:03:47

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1 but I can't confirm that. 19:03:52

2 Q. Okay. Well, let's look at your -- your 19:03:54

3 post. It says: 19:03:57

4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

7 Do you see that? 19:04:09

8 A. I see that on the screen, yeah. 19:04:09

9 Q. And below that, you write: 19:04:11

10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

17 the user who's authorized the application who have 19:04:36

18 not yet authorized the application themselves. 19:04:41

19 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
9 Did I read that correctly? 19:05:41
10 A. You read that correctly. 19:05:43
11 Q. And "V2," is that a reference to Graph API 19:05:45
12 Version 2? 19:05:47
13 A. That would be a reference to Graph API 19:05:48
14 Version 2. 19:05:50
15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
19 A. So the intended use, as I understand it, 19:06:06
20 and user_posts and user_photos was to grant apps 19:06:08
21 the ability -- well, for users to be able to 19:06:12
22 authorize an application to access their user posts 19:06:15
23 and photos for some value that the application was 19:06:19
24 providing to users. 19:06:24
25 Q. Okay. And you thought that because user 19:06:29

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1 posts and user photos were emitting friend data and 19:06:31

2 Facebook had announced it had deprecated friend 19:06:34

3 data. Right? 19:06:38

4 A. So Facebook had announced it had -- it was 19:06:41

5 deprecating the friend permissions. That's what 19:06:44

6 Facebook announced as part of the API V1 changes. 19:06:49

7 So that's important to clarify. 19:06:55

8 Q. Okay. And -- but when you say that it 19:06:59

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

13 A. Several of the changes in API V2, or the 19:07:20

14 suite of things that were launched along with API 19:07:26

15 V2, were about limiting the ability of applications 19:07:29

16 to access a user's friends' content and 19:07:36

17 information. 19:07:45

18 In this case, what's still available to 19:07:46

19 this application is the likes and comments made by 19:07:50

20 a user's friends on a user's timeline posts. 19:07:54

21 Q. Okay. And how does that violate the 19:08:08

22 spirit of the V2 changes? 19:08:10

23 A. The spirit of the V2 changes, as I 19:08:16

24 recall -- trying to remember what I wrote in this 19:08:19

25 post nearly seven or eight years ago -- is the apps 19:08:23

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1 would have less access to information about a 19:08:30

2 user's friends who were not using the application. 19:08:39

3 That was indeed behind any of the changes 19:08:45

4 in API V2; but in this case, the application was 19:08:51

5 still accessing some information about the user's 19:08:58

6 friends who had commented or liked on the original 19:09:02

7 post -- on the app-using user's posts. 19:09:05

8 Q. And so you expressed those concerns. 19:09:22

9 And do you recall whether this app 19:09:27

10 continued to have access to the user posts and user 19:09:30

11 photos after you expressed these concerns? 19:09:35

12 A. From reading the thread that continues 19:09:40

13 below -- below this, it looks like the conclusion 19:09:45

14 was reached that this activity was not against 19:09:48

15 policy as defined at the time, and this access -- 19:09:54

16 this use case should continue. 19:10:00

17 I don't recall -- I do not know what 19:10:05

18 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

19 Q. Now, Mr. Cross, there were thousands of 19:10:24

20 apps that had access to friend information. Is 19:10:26

21 that right? 19:10:28

22 A. Over what time period are you referring 19:10:35

23 to? 19:10:37

24 Q. Oh, that's a good question. 19:10:38

25 So prior to the introduction of Graph API 19:10:40

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1 Version 2, there were thousands of apps that had 19:10:43
2 access to friend permissions. Right? 19:10:46

3 A. Prior to the introduction of API 19:10:49
4 Version 2, any application on the Facebook 19:10:51
5 Developer Platform could request the friend 19:10:53
6 permissions from users. 19:10:56

7 Q. And Facebook evaluated the number of apps 19:10:59
8 that had access to friend permissions as part of 19:11:04
9 its preparation for the introduction of Graph API 19:11:08
10 Version 2. Right? 19:11:12

11 A. In preparation for the changes launched on 19:11:15
12 April 30, 2015, a number of initiatives were 19:11:18
13 undertook to understand the potential impact of 19:11:24
14 these changes on the developer ecosystem. 19:11:26

15 Q. And included in those initiatives was 19:11:31
16 identifying the number of users who downloaded apps 19:11:34
17 with access to friend information. Right? 19:11:37

18 A. Can you help me understand what you mean 19:11:40
19 by "downloaded"? 19:11:41

20 Q. I'm sorry. Installed the apps. 19:11:43

21 A. My understanding is that one of the things 19:11:50
22 that was looked at is the number of users who had 19:11:52
23 granted one or more friend permissions to one or 19:11:56
24 more applications. 19:11:59

25 Q. And as part of those initiatives as well, 19:12:01

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1 Facebook identified the number of API calls on the 19:12:05
2 friend-sharing APIs. Right? 19:12:09

3 A. I would need to see, like, specific 19:12:16
4 documentation there. 19:12:19

5 Like, recall there was no such thing as 19:12:21
6 the friend APIs. There are friend permissions, and 19:12:25
7 there are APIs, and those APIs can be called by the 19:12:29
8 app-using user or on behalf of that app-using 19:12:32
9 user's friends. 19:12:38

10 So, again, I want to make sure I'm giving 19:12:39
11 you the right answer, given the specifics. 19:12:41

12 Q. I appreciate that. So let's speak in 19:12:43
13 terms of friend permissions, then. 19:12:45

14 One of the things that Facebook can 19:12:47
15 identify is the number of API calls on any of the 19:12:49
16 permissions that are available on the Platform. 19:12:53
17 Right? 19:12:56

18 A. So, again, the -- 19:13:00

19 Q. Or did I mix up the terminology -- the 19:13:01
20 calls are referred to the APIs themselves, not the 19:13:03
21 permissions. Is that right? 19:13:06

22 A. When you -- when you see a reference to 19:13:07
23 "API calls," that's referring to APIs. 19:13:09

24 The permissions determine what information 19:13:12
25 is available via those APIs. 19:13:15

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1 So, yeah, those concepts are separate, 19:13:18

2 yeah. 19:13:21

3 Q. So Facebook can identify and did identify 19:13:21

4 the number of API calls on the APIs that provided 19:13:24

5 access to friend information. 19:13:30

6 A. The -- the documents I've read show that 19:13:41

7 there was an effort done to determine how API calls 19:13:45

8 that were made by applications -- and some of the 19:13:50

9 API calls -- some of the APIs would -- would 19:13:54

10 specifically map to friend data; other API calls 19:13:59

11 would not be specific to friend data. 19:14:03

12 Q. And I appreciate that. And I'm trying to 19:14:08

13 make sure I understand what Facebook knew about the 19:14:10

14 use of APIs that provided access to friend 19:14:13

15 information. 19:14:18

16 And my understanding is that Facebook 19:14:18

17 identified that thousands of apps installed by 19:14:20

18 millions of users made millions of calls on 19:14:24

19 friend-sharing APIs. Is that a fair statement? 19:14:27

20 A. No. The -- the friend-sharing API part of 19:14:31

21 that doesn't map with my understanding of how the 19:14:36

22 platform worked. 19:14:39

23 If you could show me a document that 19:14:40

24 states that, that might be helpful for me to 19:14:42

25 analyze. 19:14:45

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1 Q. Yeah. And we'll get into a document 19:14:47
2 that -- 'cause as you say, there were various 19:14:49
3 initiatives that studied the extent to which friend 19:14:52
4 information was made available by apps via APIs 19:14:56
5 that provided access to that information. Okay. 19:15:01
6 Right? 19:15:05

7 A. There were a number of studies done to 19:15:05
8 analyze the use of the Platform by developers and 19:15:08
9 how they were using the Platform and which 19:15:12
10 permissions they were requesting and which APIs 19:15:15
11 they were -- they were calling. 19:15:17

12 Q. And deprecating -- and I hope I'm using 19:15:20
13 the terminology right -- but deprecating friend 19:15:24
14 permissions, that was a thing. Right? 19:15:27

15 A. In API Version 2, the friend permissions 19:15:31
16 were not readily grantable by a user using an 19:15:35
17 application that was using API Version 2. 19:15:40

18 Q. And that was a big change at Facebook 19:15:44
19 because thousands of apps had access to the APIs 19:15:46
20 that allowed friend-sharing. Right? 19:15:52

21 A. The way that the Facebook Developer 19:16:01
22 Platform worked before API Version 2 allowed any 19:16:03
23 application to request friend permissions, and a 19:16:08
24 number of applications did so. 19:16:14

25 And so the removal of those permissions 19:16:17

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1 from the public API surface area in API Version 2, 19:16:21
2 yes, was considered a significant change to the 19:16:27
3 Facebook Developer Platform. 19:16:30
4 MR. LOESER: If we could go to Tab 8. 19:16:35
5 (Deposition Exhibit 334 was marked for 19:17:10
6 identification.) 19:17:12
7 MR. LOESER: This is Exhibit 334. The 19:17:15
8 Bates number on this is 01685319.ppt. 19:17:20
9 Q. Is that right? 19:17:26
10 And, Mr. Cross, do you see what's on your 19:17:28
11 screen? 19:17:30
12 A. I do. 19:17:30
13 Q. And this is -- you can take a minute to 19:17:32
14 skim through it. I just have a few questions about 19:17:36
15 this slide deck. And the first page says: "Login 19:17:39
16 V4 (+PS12n) - 1/24/2014 update." 19:17:42
17 Can you describe what this refers to just 19:17:49
18 by looking at the title of it? 19:17:55
19 A. "Login V4" refers to the update to the 19:17:57
20 Facebook Platform Login dialogue that were launched 19:18:00
21 in -- as part of the changes announced on 19:18:06
22 April 30, 2014. So that's what "Login V4" refers 19:18:10
23 to. 19:18:16
24 And "PS12n" refers to a term called 19:18:16
25 "platform simplification," which was one of the 19:18:20

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1 terms used as part of the work that led up to the 19:18:23
2 changes that were announced in -- on April 30, 19:18:30
3 2014. 19:18:34

4 Q. Okay. And if you -- if you turn to the 19:18:37
5 next page of that slide deck, there's an "Overview" 19:18:41
6 slide which describes the content of this 19:18:47
7 presentation. 19:18:51

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

13 Did I read that correctly? 19:19:05

14 A. You read that correctly. 19:19:06

15 Q. And we've discussed user trust. 19:19:07

16 What does "developer trust" refer to? 19:19:10

17 A. "Developer trust" refers to how Facebook 19:19:14
18 thought about its relationship with its platform 19:19:17
19 developers; whether or not those developers would 19:19:21
20 be keen to continue developing integrations with 19:19:27
21 the Facebook Developer Platform. 19:19:31

22 Q. And why did Facebook want developers to do 19:19:33
23 that? 19:19:36

24 A. If you're building a developer platform, 19:19:40
25 you typically want developers to build for your 19:19:43

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1 developer platform. 19:19:46

2 Q. And what does Facebook gain from that? 19:19:48

3 A. Facebook gained a number of things from 19:19:55

4 its Developer Platform, various different types, 19:19:56

5 depending on the functionality of the app provided. 19:20:03

6 Q. Okay. Are there a couple of main 19:20:08

7 priorities? 19:20:11

8 A. One example would be allowing apps that 19:20:15

9 would -- users using applications where users would 19:20:22

10 share content or activity in their applications 19:20:26

11 back to Facebook so that it could be seen on 19:20:31

12 Facebook by that user's friends on that Newsfeed. 19:20:33

13 Q. And did Facebook, then, have an appetite 19:20:38

14 for more information because it utilized that 19:20:42

15 information in its Advertising Platform? 19:20:44

16 A. I haven't prepared to talk about how the 19:20:51

17 advertising systems work. That's -- that's not my 19:20:54

18 area of expertise in general, and it's not 19:20:57

19 something I prepared in this -- to testify on. I 19:21:01

20 understand there are other people doing that. 19:21:04

21 My understanding of the reason why we were 19:21:09

22 keen for apps to share contact back to Facebook is 19:21:13

23 that that would result in content on Facebook that 19:21:18

24 could be viewed in Newsfeed that people could like 19:21:21

25 and comment and reshare. 19:21:24

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1 Q. And -- and you're not knowledgeable about 19:21:26
2 whether it was also -- that information was used 19:21:29
3 to -- for the benefit of the targeted advertising 19:21:32
4 systems? 19:21:36

5 A. I am not an expert in how Facebook's 19:21:38
6 targeted advertising systems work or what 19:21:41
7 information is used to inform how ad-targeting 19:21:43
8 works. 19:21:48

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

16 Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 6 of this 19:22:24
17 slide deck -- and it doesn't have page numbers on 19:22:28
18 it, so we'll flip to the sixth page and tell you, 19:22:31
19 "This is the sixth page." 19:22:34

20 Do you see the slide on the screen now? 19:22:36

21 A. I do. 19:22:40

22 Q. And do you see the title of that slide? 19:22:41

23 A. I do. 19:22:44

24 Q. And what does it say? 19:22:46

25 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

2 A. I -- I don't know what high-value perms 19:22:57

3 are in a general context. The slide includes a 19:23:04

4 number of permissions that were available on the 19:23:07

5 Facebook Developer Platform, and this slide is by 19:23:10

6 inference calling those "high-value perms." 19:23:15

7 But I can't say today exactly what 19:23:18

8 "high-value perms" means in general. 19:23:20

9 Q. And what is Facebook's definition of 19:23:24

10 "high-value perms"? 19:23:27

11 And I assume that's the permissions. So 19:23:30

12 high-value permissions? 19:23:32

13 A. I'm not aware of Facebook having a 19:23:34

14 definition of "high-value perms" that's general and 19:23:35

15 commonly used. This seems to be a set of 19:23:38

16 terminology created by the author of this deck. 19:23:43

17 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A. Well, I can see on the slide the number of

permissions that the author of this deck has

somehow categorized as "high-value perms."

But, like I said, this isn't -- this

doesn't resonate to me as a -- as a general

classification that was widely used.

■

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

right?

A. That's what I see in the column header,

yeah.

Q. And so earlier, I was asking you questions

to try and get a scope -- understand the scope of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

19:24:58

19:25:01

19:25:04

19:25:07

19:25:09

19:25:13

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

19:25:26

19:25:28

19:25:30

19:25:32

19:25:34

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1 friend-sharing use in particular. 19:25:38

2 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 It's not clear from what I'm seeing here 19:26:16

11 whether or not that was an average or what 19:26:19

12 particular day or from what time period that data 19:26:21

13 was collected, to be clear. 19:26:23

14 Q. And earlier you talked about various 19:26:27

15 initiatives that Facebook undertook before 19:26:29

16 implementing the new version of the graph. 19:26:32

17 And does this appear to be one of the 19:26:35

18 evaluations that Facebook did of the extent of the 19:26:37

19 use of various permissions that were going to be 19:26:40

20 deprecated? 19:26:44

21 A. Given my understanding of the -- of the 19:26:48

22 date of this slide deck, given it was before the 19:26:50

23 changes were announced and the data contained 19:26:54

24 within, it seems reasonable that this is an output 19:26:57

25 of some of the analysis that was done to understand 19:27:03

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1 the scale of the apps using to-be-deprecated 19:27:07

2 permissions, including the friend permissions. 19:27:14

3 Q. And let's go to the next slide. 19:27:18

4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 A. I have -- I do not know which apps are 19:27:40

11 being referred to here, like, which apps are the 19:27:44

12 number -- which represent the 31, and I also don't 19:27:47

13 know how that number was derived. 19:27:50

14 So I -- it's hard for me to -- I am unable 19:27:56

15 to -- to answer the question what -- what were 19:27:59

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

26 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

27 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

28 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

29 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

30 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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1 A. My first step would be to try and identify 19:28:40
2 the author of the deck and to see if they are 19:28:43
3 contactable and to attempt to determine if they 19:28:49
4 recall how this determination was made. 19:28:52

5 Q. Is asking Mark perhaps one of the ways to 19:28:58
6 find the answer to that as well? 19:29:00

7 A. I doubt Mark would know how this slide 19:29:02
8 deck was prepared or what went into determining 19:29:05
9 that number on the screen. 19:29:08

10 Q. And without having any commentary on the 19:29:11
11 fact that Sheryl has more friends than Mark, where 19:29:14
12 would one go to find out what key apps are Sheryl's 19:29:17
13 friends? 19:29:21

14 A. Well, so first of all, you said there that 19:29:22
15 Sheryl has more friends than Mark. 19:29:28

16 The numbers here refer to apps, not 19:29:31
17 friends, to be clear. 19:29:34

18 And the same answer applies here, which is 19:29:35
19 I -- I do not know how this slide deck was created 19:29:40
20 or who created it or how they came to this 19:29:45
21 determination. There's no evidence here of how 19:29:49
22 that was determined. 19:29:54

23 Q. So I can tell you from the metadata that 19:29:55
24 this is from Eddie O'Neil's custodial file. 19:29:57

25 So does that suggest to you that you would 19:30:02

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1 ask -- if he's the author of this deck, you could 19:30:04

2 ask him how he came up with these numbers? 19:30:07

3 A. If he is indeed the author of the deck, 19:30:09

4 it's -- he could be asked. Whether or not he would 19:30:15

5 recall how these numbers were derived is a question 19:30:17

6 for him. 19:30:21

7 Q. Okay. And what is "Generating TPV"? 19:30:23

8 What is "TPV"? 19:30:27

9 A. TPV in this context refers to total 19:30:29

10 payment volume, which is the payments happening in 19:30:31

11 the games, as I understand it, that are being 19:30:39

12 referred to here. 19:30:44

13 Q. Okay. So this appears that when 19:30:47

14 evaluating the deprecation of certain permissions, 19:30:50

15 Mr. O'Neil identified key apps that were generating 19:30:55

16 TPV. Correct? 19:30:59

17 A. Sorry. Can you ask that again? I want to 19:31:02

18 make sure I -- 19:31:04

19 Q. Yeah, I'm just trying to understand -- 19:31:05

20 sorry, we're talking at the same time, which is my 19:31:07

21 fault. 19:31:10

22 But I'm trying to understand the -- this 19:31:10

23 appears to be an analysis of what APIs were going 19:31:12

24 to be deprecated, but also what apps would be 19:31:16

25 affected by those deprecations. Right? 19:31:20

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1 And so one of the categories here that 19:31:23
2 appears was -- that was being evaluated was whether 19:31:24
3 the app that could be impacted by deprecation was 19:31:27
4 generating TPV. 19:31:32

5 Is that a fair read? 19:31:34

6 A. My understanding is this deck has referred 19:31:36
7 to a range of potentially to-be-deprecated APIs and 19:31:38
8 permissions -- sorry -- specifically, the previous 19:31:46
9 slide refers to permissions that were at this point 19:31:49
10 proposed to be deprecated, publicly -- not publicly 19:31:53
11 available to developers anymore, and the "Key apps" 19:31:59
12 slide is an attempt to quantify the number of apps 19:32:02
13 that the author estimated to be impacted by those 19:32:05
14 deprecations. 19:32:09

15 Q. And what -- is it "Neko"? Is that "Neko 19:32:12
16 spenders"? 19:32:17

17 A. Neko or Neko, that refers to a product 19:32:18
18 that is -- that came to be known as "Mobile App 19:32:24
19 Install Ads." 19:32:27

20 Q. Okay. And what are "Neko spenders"? 19:32:31

21 A. So my understanding is that would refer to 19:32:36
22 apps that were -- in some period of time had spent 19:32:38
23 some money on mobile app install ads. 19:32:42

24 Q. And when you say "spend some money," what 19:32:47
25 does that mean? 19:32:50

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1	A. "Mobile App Install Ads" is an ads	19:32:52
2	product. And so if a developer wanted to have ads	19:32:57
3	for their app, then they would buy those ads just	19:33:02
4	like any other ad on Facebook.	19:33:06

8 | A. I don't know what "Noisy" refers to. 19:33:22

11	Do you know what that refers to?	19:33:31
----	----------------------------------	----------

17	Q. Do you know what a "T0 partner" is?	19:33:48
----	--	----------

22	Q. And then T1, it -- my understanding is it	19:34:07
23	has to do with the importance of the partner to	19:34:11
24	Facebook.	19:34:14

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1 understanding? 19:34:16

2 A. My understanding is there were various 19:34:17

3 tiers of partners, Tier 0 being the top, Tier 1 19:34:20

4 being one below. 19:34:25

5 But again, I -- it's unclear. I am unable 19:34:27

6 to say what was -- why an app would be categorized 19:34:31

7 in Tier 0 versus Tier 1. 19:34:35

8 Q. And does Facebook classify its partners 19:34:38

9 differently based upon how much revenue Facebook 19:34:43

10 receives from the partner? 19:34:47

11 A. I don't know how the -- the tiering, as 19:34:53

12 represented here, was -- was determined. My 19:34:56

13 understanding is there would have been a range of 19:34:59

14 factors that would have gone into that tiering 19:35:01

15 determination. 19:35:06

16 Q. Now, my understanding of the -- of the 19:35:14

17 purpose of allowing an app to have access to friend 19:35:18

18 information was to use that information in the -- 19:35:22

19 solely in the context of the person who authorized 19:35:28

20 the app to obtain the information. 19:35:32

21 Is that your understanding? 19:35:34

22 A. My understanding is that the existence of 19:35:43

23 the ability for apps to access information about a 19:35:50

24 user who used the app and their friends was to 19:35:54

25 build an engaging social experience for that user. 19:35:59

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1 Q. And there were rules at Facebook, 19:36:03
2 developer rules, that limited the use of friend 19:36:06
3 information to the purpose you just described. Is 19:36:09
4 that right? 19:36:12

5 A. There was a range of platform policies 19:36:15
6 that developers -- it was a specific set of 19:36:17
7 platform policies that the -- that developers of 19:36:20
8 the Facebook app -- the developers of apps that 19:36:25
9 used the Facebook Developer Platform would have to 19:36:27
10 agree to. 19:36:32

11 Q. And so if an app gets access to friend 19:36:34
12 data and then uses that information to target the 19:36:39
13 friends of the app users with advertisements, that 19:36:41
14 would be an example of an app using friend 19:36:46
15 information in a way that is -- that violates 19:36:48
16 Facebook's developer policies. Is that right? 19:36:52

17 MR. BLUME: Objection to scope. 19:36:55

18 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I haven't prepared 19:37:00
19 to speak to Facebook's developer policies and 19:37:01
20 precisely what they allowed or prohibited -- and 19:37:04
21 also how Facebook's advertising ecosystem worked. 19:37:09

22 BY MR. LOESER: 19:37:15

23 Q. And based upon your knowledge of the 19:37:19
24 platform, was my statement correct? 19:37:20

25 A. I -- I am not -- I'm not sure I can 19:37:24

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1 confirm exactly that -- that statement. I am not 19:37:33
2 sure, as I sit here today, exactly what the 19:37:37
3 policies were at any given time in the past. 19:37:39

4 Q. Okay. Let me ask one more related 19:37:46
5 question. Perhaps this is something that you are 19:37:48
6 familiar with. 19:37:50

7 If an app gets access to friend data and 19:37:51
8 then sells that friend information to another third 19:37:53
9 party, would that be an example of the app using 19:37:56
10 friend information in a way that is not solely 19:37:59
11 within the app user's experience? 19:38:03

12 A. If an app developer is making data 19:38:10
13 available to another entity that isn't -- that -- 19:38:16
14 it's hard -- yeah. 19:38:26

15 It's hard for me to, like, give a specific 19:38:27
16 answer to that based on my understanding of how 19:38:29
17 the -- of what was and wasn't okay in terms of the 19:38:33
18 Facebook Developer Platform policies. 19:38:37

19 Q. Okay. But you described for me Facebook's 19:38:39
20 understanding of how friend information was to be 19:38:43
21 used, which was to create the experience between 19:38:45
22 the user of the app and the app. Right? 19:38:48

23 A. So my answer there was referring to my 19:38:52
24 understanding of the -- the primary reason why the 19:38:56
25 Facebook Platform existed, which was to primarily 19:38:59

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1 allow developers to build engaging social 19:39:04
2 experiences that users could interact with that was 19:39:08
3 valuable to them. 19:39:11

4 Q. And Facebook did not intend in that 19:39:12
5 context for apps to use friend information it 19:39:15
6 obtained from a user outside of the context of the 19:39:18
7 user's experience with that app. Right? 19:39:25

8 A. So there were a number of users -- uses of 19:39:29
9 the Facebook Developer Platform where 19:39:33
10 information -- often publicly available information 19:39:37
11 about a user's activity would be available to an 19:39:40
12 app developer without the user explicitly 19:39:43
13 authorizing the application. 19:39:47

14 Q. And let's confine our answer to 19:39:53
15 information obtained about a friend that was 19:39:55
16 intended for friends only; that wasn't public. 19:39:57

17 And I'm just trying to understand kind of 19:40:01
18 how friend-sharing works. It's not a trick 19:40:04
19 question. I'm just trying to understand if an app 19:40:06
20 obtains friend information but then uses that 19:40:08
21 information for purposes other than the experience 19:40:10
22 of the app user and the app, is that something that 19:40:12
23 is beyond what Facebook intended when it provided 19:40:16
24 access to the friend information? 19:40:20

25 A. So limited to -- limited to the context of 19:40:27

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1 a user having explicitly authorized an application 19:40:30
2 and then that application having access to the -- 19:40:36
3 the data made available via the friend permissions, 19:40:39
4 my understanding is that the -- that that 19:40:43
5 information was to be used within the context of 19:40:46
6 the application that the user was using. 19:40:48

7 Q. Did Facebook have any technology making it 19:40:51
8 impossible for apps to use friend data other than 19:40:54
9 in connection with the app user? 19:40:58

10 A. One piece of technology Facebook has, or 19:41:06
11 had, is the privacy settings available governing 19:41:11
12 visibility of content on Facebook. 19:41:18

13 As a result, it's possible that, for 19:41:22
14 example, if we were friends and you posted a post, 19:41:26
15 you could make that post not visible to me, even 19:41:31
16 though we were friends using on-Facebook privacy 19:41:36
17 settings. 19:41:40

18 If you had done that, then that piece of 19:41:41
19 content wouldn't be available via the API if it was 19:41:44
20 being called on my behalf. 19:41:50

21 Q. Okay. And if you have shared information 19:41:52
22 with your friend based upon your privacy setting 19:41:54
23 that allowed friends to have that information, was 19:41:59
24 there technology that prevented an app from -- 19:42:01
25 could Facebook have utilized technology that would 19:42:07

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1 prevent that app from getting the friend 19:42:10

2 information since the app is not the friend of the 19:42:13

3 person who posted it? 19:42:15

4 A. So the -- again, which time frame are you 19:42:17

5 referring to here? 19:42:20

6 Q. At any point since 2007. 19:42:22

7 A. Okay. So once a -- once an app makes an 19:42:25

8 API call on behalf of a user and the Facebook API 19:42:32

9 returns that information to the application, then 19:42:38

10 the application or the developer, whether or not 19:42:44

11 that's their servers or the code, technically has 19:42:48

12 access to that information. 19:42:51

13 And once they have that information, 19:42:54

14 the -- there's very little -- there's no technical 19:42:57

15 way for Facebook to prevent it being used outside 19:43:01

16 the use of the application itself. 19:43:06

17 Q. Does Facebook perform financial analysis 19:43:17

18 of the different products it offers? 19:43:20

19 A. That's a very -- 19:43:25

20 Sorry, Rob, it looks like you were going 19:43:27

21 to say something. 19:43:30

22 MR. BLUME: I was just going to object to 19:43:31

23 the form. 19:43:33

24 THE WITNESS: Facebook as a company does 19:43:40

25 look at its various products and how they are 19:43:44

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1 performing. 19:43:47

2 BY MR. LOESER: 19:43:47

3 Q. Okay. And do the different products 19:43:48

4 engage in analysis of revenue and the income, 19:43:50

5 et cetera, of that product to -- to Facebook? 19:43:55

6 A. Different products assess their 19:44:01

7 performance in different ways. Ads products, for 19:44:02

8 example, typically would look at revenue as to 19:44:06

9 whether or not they were performing. 19:44:10

10 Q. And what about partnership-based products? 19:44:14

11 Are there partnership-based products? 19:44:18

12 A. Help me understand what you mean by 19:44:21

13 "partnership-based products." 19:44:23

14 Q. Well, you were in the Partnership team. 19:44:25

15 Did it have a product? 19:44:27

16 A. The Partnership team doesn't have 19:44:29

17 products, no. 19:44:30

18 Q. And does it report revenue or income? 19:44:33

19 A. The Partnership -- the Platform 19:44:39

20 Partnerships team would typically assess the 19:44:41

21 utilization of the Facebook Developer Platform 19:44:49

22 product by Platform developers, and income from 19:44:52

23 Platform developers is one of the things that may 19:45:01

24 have been looked at in terms of understanding the 19:45:05

25 performance of the Platform products. 19:45:08

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1 Q. And what types of income did Facebook 19:45:11
2 receive from Platform developers? 19:45:13

3 A. The types of income that Facebook would 19:45:18
4 receive from Platform developers were, broadly: 19:45:21
5 One, ad spend related to the Platform developer's 19:45:25
6 products; and, two, in the case of games that used 19:45:35
7 in-game currency where that game was rendered 19:45:41
8 inside the Facebook Chrome on the web, Facebook 19:45:44
9 would take a cut of the total payment volume inside 19:45:54
10 of that game or app. 19:45:59

11 Q. And does Facebook consider the user data 19:46:07
12 it collects and infers about users valuable? 19:46:09

13 A. Can you help me understand the -- the 19:46:15
14 context, as in -- yeah. 19:46:17

15 Can you help me understand the context 19:46:20
16 you're asking in? 19:46:21

17 Q. Sure. I'll ask more specifically. 19:46:22

18 Did Facebook do any financial analysis of 19:46:24
19 the value of user data it collects and infers about 19:46:26
20 users? 19:46:30

21 A. In -- let me understand. In any way, 19:46:39
22 across any part of the company? Is that what 19:46:41
23 you're asking? 19:46:43

24 Q. Yes. Yes. We can start big and go small. 19:46:44
25 So, in any way. 19:46:47

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1 MR. BLUME: Objection to scope. 19:46:50

2 THE WITNESS: Yeah. It's hard for me to 19:46:52

3 answer that question at the full company level. 19:46:54

4 That's not what I've prepared to testify on. 19:46:57

5 On a personal level, there -- I can say 19:47:00

6 that there are products that the -- where the -- 19:47:04

7 where, like, the impact of the -- or the -- it's 19:47:18

8 hard for me to say. I can't give you a very crisp 19:47:22

9 and clear and accurate answer to that -- to that 19:47:26

10 question. It's not what I've testified on, and I'd 19:47:28

11 be giving you an inappropriate answer, I think. 19:47:31

12 BY MR. LOESER: 19:47:36

13 Q. If I wanted to have Facebook answer the 19:47:36

14 question whether it does financial analysis of the 19:47:38

15 value of user data that it collects, where would I 19:47:40

16 go in the company to get information about that? 19:47:44

17 Is that the finance department or -- or 19:47:47

18 where would that get reported? 19:47:50

19 MR. BLUME: Objection. Beyond the scope. 19:47:52

20 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think different 19:47:57

21 teams assess the performance of their products in 19:47:59

22 different ways, and those products involve 19:48:02

23 different kinds of information. 19:48:05

24 So it's really hard to give you a specific 19:48:07

25 answer to that question. I couldn't give you a 19:48:09

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1 specific answer to that question. 19:48:11

2 BY MR. LOESER: 19:48:15

3 Q. Okay. And has Facebook done any analysis 19:48:15

4 of the value of the data it makes available to 19:48:17

5 third parties through the Facebook Social Graph? 19:48:20

6 MR. BLUME: Objection. Scope. 19:48:24

7 THE WITNESS: I've seen some analysis of 19:48:33

8 the impact of the Platform changes that were 19:48:34

9 proposed, and I've also seen and heard about 19:48:37

10 analysis done of the -- of the use of the Facebook 19:48:43

11 Developer Platform in terms of how people use it 19:48:46

12 and how that contributes revenue to Facebook. But 19:48:51

13 I've -- I don't recall seeing analysis specific to, 19:48:58

14 like, the user data itself. 19:49:01

15 BY MR. LOESER: 19:49:04

16 Q. Okay. Well, walk me through the two types 19:49:06

17 of analyses you just mentioned. 19:49:12

18 MR. BLUME: Objection to scope, but he can 19:49:18

19 in his personal capacity. 19:49:21

20 BY MR. LOESER: 19:49:23

21 Q. Well, let me clarify. 19:49:23

22 Your answer was: "I've seen some analysis 19:49:25

23 of the impact of the Platform changes that were 19:49:26

24 proposed." 19:49:29

25 So what's the analysis that you've seen of 19:49:30

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1 the impact of the Platform changes that were 19:49:32
2 proposed? 19:49:34

3 A. So one of the documents I reviewed in 19:49:38
4 preparation for the testimony today seems to -- 19:49:40
5 seems to make an assessment of the various changes 19:49:45
6 that were proposed to be launched and estimates the 19:49:48
7 impact that might have on Facebook's revenues from 19:49:53
8 developers. 19:49:57

9 So I recall reviewing a document of that 19:50:00
10 form. 19:50:02

11 Q. And can you tell me more about that 19:50:03
12 document; who created it and when it was created? 19:50:05

13 A. I don't know who created it or when it was 19:50:10
14 created, but I do know it was -- my understanding 19:50:12
15 is it was previously produced in -- in this 19:50:15
16 litigation. So it should be available to you. 19:50:20

17 Q. Okay. We'll follow up with Mr. Blume and 19:50:28
18 try and pin down that document. 19:50:33

19 And the second thing you said was an 19:50:35
20 assessment of the various changes that were 19:50:39
21 proposed and estimates of the impact they might 19:50:46
22 have on Facebook's revenue from developers. 19:50:48

23 So what was that analysis? 19:50:51

24 A. So I think that's the thing I've just -- 19:50:52
25 that's the thing I've just talked about. 19:50:54

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1 Q. Okay. Was there -- I thought you 19:50:56
2 mentioned two different assessments that you saw. 19:50:58
3 A. So that -- that document, I -- I saw in 19:51:03
4 preparation for this case, this testimony. 19:51:06
5 The other thing I recall mentioning is in 19:51:10
6 my personal capacity, I recall there being analysis 19:51:16
7 done of the -- the revenue that Facebook games 19:51:20
8 provided to the Facebook company. 19:51:28
9 But I don't recall a specific document on 19:51:32
10 that, and I have not reviewed a document of that 19:51:36
11 form in reference -- in preparation for this 19:51:38
12 testimony. 19:51:41
13 Q. And this may be covered by what you said 19:51:45
14 before, but has Facebook ever analyzed the 19:51:47
15 financial or other business benefits Facebook 19:51:49
16 obtained by allowing third-party access to Facebook 19:51:52
17 user friends data in particular? 19:51:56
18 MR. BLUME: Objection to scope. 19:52:00
19 THE WITNESS: I don't recall seeing any 19:52:03
20 analysis that was specifically limited to friends 19:52:07
21 data, no. 19:52:12
22 BY MR. LOESER: 19:52:14
23 Q. And what about analysis that was limited 19:52:16
24 to deprecated permissions more broadly? 19:52:19
25 A. I have not seen analysis related to 19:52:24

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1 deprecated permissions specifically, no. 19:52:27

2 Q. And has Facebook ever analyzed the 19:52:35

3 financial or other business impact of continuing to 19:52:37

4 allow certain apps and partners to have access to 19:52:40

5 friend-sharing after publicly deprecating 19:52:46

6 friend-sharing permissions? 19:52:49

7 A. So here we need to be specific when we 19:52:51

8 talk about friend-sharing permissions versus your 19:52:54

9 broader definition of friends data. 19:52:57

10 No, I -- I have not seen and am not aware 19:53:00

11 of any analysis that was done relating to 19:53:04

12 extensions allowing apps to continue to have 19:53:10

13 access -- some apps to continue to have access to 19:53:14

14 the friend permissions after they were more 19:53:17

15 publicly deprecated. 19:53:22

16 Q. And if the question is not friends 19:53:24

17 permissions specifically, but deprecated 19:53:27

18 permissions, does that change your answer? 19:53:30

19 A. I am not aware of any analysis that was 19:53:33

20 done to understand the impact of deprecated 19:53:36

21 permissions in particular. 19:53:40

22 As I testified previously, I -- sorry. 19:53:44

23 Q. Go ahead. I'm sorry. 19:53:46

24 A. As I testified previously, I have seen 19:53:50

25 analysis of the impact of the changes in general, 19:53:53

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1 but not specifically I recall seeing anything 19:53:59

2 related to just the deprecation of permissions. 19:54:03

3 Q. And did Facebook evaluate the loss of 19:54:08

4 revenue that could occur if a Facebook partner or 19:54:13

5 partners stopped doing business with Facebook 19:54:17

6 because Facebook deprecated permissions that the 19:54:20

7 partner used? 19:54:23

8 A. I don't recall seeing any analysis of 19:54:29

9 the -- on an app-specific basis or a 19:54:35

10 partner-specific basis. 19:54:40

11 It's possible that people that worked with 19:54:43

12 that partner might assert a potential loss of 19:54:45

13 revenue, but I don't recall any, you know, formal 19:54:52

14 analysis being done of -- of the financial impact 19:54:55

15 of deprecating something. 19:54:58

16 Q. And you say you don't recall, but I want 19:55:01

17 to make sure I understand what you're saying. 19:55:04

18 Did Facebook do that analysis, do you 19:55:06

19 know? 19:55:10

20 A. I do not know, and I have not seen any 19:55:11

21 evidence in preparation for this that they did. 19:55:13

22 Q. And if you were to find -- to search for 19:55:16

23 the answer to that question, who would you ask? 19:55:19

24 A. I would ask Ime, probably, who was 19:55:26

25 involved in -- who led the Partnerships team around 19:55:35

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1 this time -- sorry, let me be clearer about around 19:55:39

2 this time. 19:55:42

3 In the period 2013 to 2018, I believe, he 19:55:45

4 may be aware of whether or not such analysis was 19:55:51

5 done. 19:55:53

6 Q. So -- sorry, I have to reach for a 19:56:02

7 document. 19:56:05

8 Going back to the notice, on Topic 6, you 19:56:06

9 have -- the last part of that notice calls for 19:56:08

10 testimony about the revenue impact and net profits 19:56:15

11 for Facebook relating to friend-sharing throughout 19:56:19

12 the class period. Correct? 19:56:21

13 A. I'll wait to see till it comes on the 19:56:26

14 screen. 19:56:29

15 Q. Sure. And so I am going to ask you a 19:56:30

16 question -- yeah, I'm going to ask you a question 19:56:36

17 based on the notice, and you can tell me what 19:56:38

18 Facebook's answer is. 19:56:40

19 But what is the revenue impact and net 19:56:41

20 profits for Facebook related to friend-sharing 19:56:44

21 before Facebook publicly deprecated friend-sharing 19:56:46

22 APIs? 19:56:49

23 A. My understanding is that Facebook did 19:56:53

24 not -- has not done analysis as to the revenue 19:56:56

25 impact and net profits related to friend-sharing. 19:57:01

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1 Q. And what is the revenue impact and net 19:57:07
2 profits for Facebook related to friend-sharing 19:57:09
3 after publicly deprecating friend-sharing APIs but 19:57:16
4 continuing to allow friend-sharing for certain apps 19:57:19
5 and partners? 19:57:21

6 A. In preparation for this -- this testimony, 19:57:24
7 I attempted to see whether or not any such analysis 19:57:28
8 has been done. 19:57:33

9 My understanding is that no analysis was 19:57:34
10 done. I am not aware of any analysis having been 19:57:36
11 done about the revenue impact to net profits 19:57:40
12 relating to friend-sharing before or after the 19:57:44
13 deprecation period. 19:57:47

14 Q. And who -- what did you do to educate 19:57:48
15 yourself on that question? 19:57:52

16 A. I spoke to Ime, and I reviewed the 19:57:56
17 document -- several documents provided to me in 19:58:03
18 this case. 19:58:05

19 Q. So I'm about to move on to Topic 7, and 19:58:27
20 we've been going for about an hour, so it's 19:58:30
21 probably a good time to take a break. We also have 19:58:33
22 your notes, and I just need to quickly look at them 19:58:36
23 and see if I have any other questions about Topic 6 19:58:38
24 regarding your notes. 19:58:39

25 If you don't want to take a break, I can 19:58:42

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1 plow ahead, but it's been an hour, and if you want 19:58:42
2 to take a break, that's fine too. 19:58:42
3 A. Yeah, let's just take five minutes. That 19:58:44
4 would be good. I'll just stretch a bit; make sure 19:58:48
5 I'm fresh. 19:58:51
6 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: We're off the record 19:58:52
7 at 7:58 P.M. 19:58:53
8 (Recess from 7:58 P.M. to 8:12 P.M.) 19:58:55
9 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: We're back on the 20:12:47
10 record. It's 8:12 P.M. 20:12:48
11 MR. LOESER: Mr. Cross, we're going to 20:12:56
12 mark as an exhibit the notes that -- that you 20:12:57
13 provided to your counsel who then provided them to 20:13:01
14 us. 20:13:03
15 And if we have time today, we might come 20:13:14
16 back and ask a few questions about them, but for 20:13:17
17 now, I just wanted to mark them as an exhibit. So 20:13:19
18 we can just put them up, introduce them, and move 20:13:22
19 on. 20:13:25
20 (Deposition Exhibit 335 was marked for 20:13:25
21 identification.) 20:13:29
22 BY MR. LOESER: 20:13:30
23 Q. I do have, actually, one -- we don't need 20:13:31
24 to put the exhibit back up, but I had noticed in 20:13:33
25 your notes when I asked you earlier who had 20:13:35

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1 developed friend-sharing, you couldn't recall, but 20:13:38
2 your notes indicate it was Luke Shepherd, 20:13:40
3 Ari Steinberg, and Alex Himmel. Is that correct? 20:13:43
4 A. Those are three names of people that I 20:13:49
5 believe to have been involved in the early 20:13:51
6 development of the Facebook Developer Platform 20:13:53
7 which included sharing friends data as part of the 20:13:55
8 model. 20:14:02
9 Q. And when you say "early development," 20:14:02
10 what's the time period that you're referring to? 20:14:03
11 A. My understanding is that Ari Steinberg was 20:14:11
12 involved in the 2007/2008 time frame, although I 20:14:14
13 don't have the specifics. 20:14:19
14 Luke Shepherd was involved in the Platform 20:14:21
15 when I joined in September 2010. I'm not sure when 20:14:24
16 his tenure in that space began or ended. 20:14:29
17 And Alex Himmel is another person that I 20:14:36
18 know was involved in the Facebook Developer 20:14:39
19 Platform. 20:14:40
20 Whether or not these folks were 20:14:42
21 specifically involved in the original design of the 20:14:44
22 platform, which included friend-sharing, it's hard 20:14:49
23 for me to know specifically. 20:14:53
24 Q. Okay. Thank you. 20:14:57
25 Let's go back to the notice. We're going 20:14:59

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1 to move on to Topic 7. 20:15:00

2 It's a little longer, so I won't read the 20:15:08

3 whole thing into the record, but I gather you have 20:15:10

4 read all of Topic 7 and you are prepared to testify 20:15:12

5 about this topic. 20:15:19

6 And you've described what you did to 20:15:34

7 prepare for Topic 6. 20:15:36

8 When you prepared for Topic 6, were you 20:15:38

9 also at the same time preparing for Topic 7? 20:15:40

10 A. That's correct. I was preparing for the 20:15:44

11 two in parallel. 20:15:45

12 Q. And is there anybody that you talked to at 20:15:49

13 Facebook to get information about Topic 7 that is 20:15:51

14 different than the folks that you talked to about 20:15:54

15 Topic 6? 20:15:57

16 A. No. The set of people I talked to, I 20:15:59

17 talked to about all of the matters I was preparing 20:16:03

18 to testify on. 20:16:05

19 Q. And is there any component of Topic 7 that 20:16:14

20 you only have knowledge of based upon the 20:16:17

21 preparations that you did for this deposition? 20:16:19

22 A. Yes. I think 7-a, each whitelisted 20:16:24

23 entity; b, only -- so b, I have some personal 20:16:33

24 experience there; c, I also have some personal 20:16:46

25 experience. 20:16:56

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1 D -- could you scroll d onto the screen, 20:17:02
2 please? There you go. That was easy. 20:17:05
3 So I think I have some personal experience 20:17:08
4 in all, but with 7-a, primarily I'm relying on the 20:17:11
5 forensic work that was done after my involvement in 20:17:19
6 the Facebook Developer Platform to answer those 20:17:25
7 questions. 20:17:29
8 Q. And based on your preparation with regard 20:17:31
9 to Topic 7, do you believe you are reasonably 20:17:33
10 educated to testify on these matters? 20:17:37
11 A. I believe I am reasonably educated to 20:17:39
12 testify. I've done as much as I could to prepare. 20:17:41
13 Q. And last night, your counsel informed us 20:17:53
14 that you are not prepared to testify about call 20:17:54
15 logs, APIs, or permissions granted to any 20:17:57
16 particular entity. 20:18:00
17 And is that -- is that your understanding? 20:18:03
18 A. Yeah. We -- I want to make sure that I -- 20:18:12
19 in answering those questions, I want to make sure I 20:18:15
20 have done as much preparation as possible, and I 20:18:17
21 think a couple more -- a bit more time to make sure 20:18:25
22 I can speak to those topics would be valuable. 20:18:28
23 Q. Okay. And over the course of your 20:18:33
24 employment at Facebook, did you develop any 20:18:34
25 personal knowledge of call logs, APIs, or 20:18:36

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1 permissions granted to any particular entity? 20:18:40

2 A. I developed -- I was in -- I had access to 20:18:44

3 and would have used some of the tools that would 20:18:48

4 help analyze call logs and Platform API usage and, 20:18:56

5 in the course of doing that, would have seen 20:19:03

6 information to do with particular apps. 20:19:05

7 But that's a long time ago, and I wouldn't 20:19:10

8 remember the specifics, and I don't know what in 20:19:13

9 general Facebook would have access to today, many 20:19:15

10 years after -- many years after my time directly 20:19:18

11 involved in this stuff. 20:19:23

12 Q. Okay. Thank you. 20:19:24

13 Mr. Cross, please explain what it means to 20:19:27

14 "whitelist" an app or a partner in the context of 20:19:29

15 access to APIs. 20:19:33

16 A. The -- can you be specific? 20:19:47

17 Which APIs are we referring to here? 20:19:49

18 Q. Just generally, back to making sure we 20:19:52

19 have the terminology down and I'm using the right 20:19:54

20 words to talk about what we're discussing, there's, 20:19:57

21 obviously, a lot of documents that talk about, 20:19:59

22 refer to, and use the term "whitelist," and I 20:20:01

23 gather that's a term that can be applied in a 20:20:05

24 variety of contexts. 20:20:07

25 But when it's connected to granting access 20:20:08

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1 to particular APIs or -- I'm continually getting 20:20:11
2 this wrong -- permissions, does it have a 20:20:17
3 particular meaning? 20:20:20

4 A. In the context -- we referred to in the 20:20:21
5 context of the Facebook Developer Platform again? 20:20:23

6 Q. Yeah. Yes. 20:20:26

7 A. So in that context, I understand 20:20:32
8 "whitelisting" to refer to where a given 20:20:33
9 application is added to a list of applications 20:20:38
10 that -- whose behavior or whose -- the behavior of 20:20:45
11 the API, and the Facebook Developer Platform is 20:20:50
12 modified in some way for those applications. 20:20:53

13 Q. And consistent with that definition, when 20:21:05
14 did Facebook first start whitelisting any app or 20:21:07
15 partner? 20:21:10

16 A. So the -- given that the concept of 20:21:14
17 whitelisting in general applies to making -- you 20:21:16
18 know, modifying the changes to the -- modifying the 20:21:21
19 behavior of the Facebook Developer Platform, then 20:21:24
20 whitelisting in some form has been used 20:21:27
21 consistently throughout the development of the 20:21:31
22 Facebook Developer Platform in some way. 20:21:35

23 Q. And, again, I want to make sure I have the 20:21:46
24 technology correct, but what does it mean to 20:21:48
25 whitelist friend-sharing APIs for an app? 20:21:52

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1 Or let me put it this way: What does it 20:21:55
2 mean to whitelist an app's ability to collect 20:21:58
3 friend-sharing data? 20:22:00
4 A. So this would refer to what we mean by 20:22:06
5 "friend-sharing data." In this context, one way 20:22:11
6 that that could have manifested is where an app has 20:22:20
7 access to APIs and permissions which were not 20:22:28
8 generally available to other Facebook developers 20:22:33
9 and applications at the time. 20:22:38
10 Q. Okay. And I've seen in Facebook's 20:22:42
11 documents "whitelisting" used in reference to apps, 20:22:45
12 but I've also seen it used in reference to 20:22:50
13 partners. 20:22:52
14 Is there a different definition that 20:22:53
15 Facebook uses when thinking of whitelisting 20:22:55
16 partners in the context of the Platform? 20:22:59
17 A. So back to my original definition of 20:23:04
18 "application" being a very specific entity in the 20:23:06
19 Facebook Developer Platform ecosystem, a partner 20:23:08
20 would refer to an entity, a -- for example, a 20:23:14
21 company. And that company may have several, one or 20:23:17
22 more, Facebook applications, and those applications 20:23:24
23 may or may not have been whitelisted for 20:23:32
24 alternative API behavior. 20:23:35
25 So in that context, you know, when a -- a 20:23:38

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1 partner is -- if you see the phrase "partner has 20:23:41
2 been whitelisted," what specifically happens in 20:23:45
3 the -- in the -- in the code base is that the 20:23:48
4 applications owned -- the Facebook applications 20:23:54
5 owned and maintained by that partner, the app IDs 20:23:59
6 have been granted some modification to the standard 20:24:05
7 API behavior. 20:24:09

8 Q. And through those modifications, those 20:24:12
9 partners, vis-à-vis their apps or, if it's a 20:24:15
10 developer, the developer vis-à-vis its app would 20:24:19
11 gain access to friend data that would not otherwise 20:24:23
12 have been available to that app or partner. 20:24:28

13 Is that a fair description? 20:24:33

14 A. Well, it's a wide range of whitelists and 20:24:35
15 capabilities that were in the system. Many of 20:24:39
16 them, in fact, my understanding is the vast 20:24:44
17 majority of them were not related to friend data at 20:24:47
18 all. 20:24:49

19 Q. Okay. And, in fact, there's plenty of 20:24:54
20 discussion in Facebook documents about the other 20:24:56
21 permissions that were deprecated with Version 2 20:24:58
22 that also were whitelisted for certain apps and 20:25:03
23 partners. Right? 20:25:07

24 A. There's -- when you say "whitelisted," 20:25:09
25 what time period are you referring to here? 20:25:13

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1 It's very specific, given that 20:25:15
2 whitelisting as a concept is something that's very 20:25:17
3 common in the industry and will have been used in 20:25:21
4 this context for many years. 20:25:24

5 Q. Sure. Is the use of whitelisting 20:25:26
6 vis-à-vis the Facebook Platform, did that mean 20:25:30
7 something different at different times in 20:25:35
8 Facebook's lifespan? 20:25:38

9 A. Well, the general definition of 20:25:42
10 whitelisting in the context of the Facebook 20:25:44
11 Platform is that by being on a whitelist, you get 20:25:46
12 some kind of different behavior -- the Platform 20:25:50
13 behaves in some kind of different way to people not 20:25:54
14 on the whitelist. 20:25:57

15 Exactly what that behavior is depends on 20:25:59
16 specifically what the capability is. 20:26:02

17 And so, again, over time, the high -- at 20:26:06
18 the conceptual level, the concept of whitelisting 20:26:11
19 hasn't changed, but exactly which whitelists 20:26:15
20 existed, for what purpose they were used, and who 20:26:18
21 had access to them at any given time will have 20:26:21
22 changed considerably over time. 20:26:23

23 Q. Okay. And so we've talked about 20:26:26
24 whitelisting. 20:26:28

25 Let's talk about private APIs for a 20:26:29

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1 minute. 20:26:32

2 Does Facebook conceive of private APIs as 20:26:32

3 something different than whitelisting? 20:26:36

4 A. I think we discussed the definition of 20:26:42

5 private APIs earlier in the -- in the testimony. 20:26:44

6 So that would be, in my -- in my determination, 20:26:46

7 APIs or behaviors which were not available -- in 20:26:55

8 this case, "private APIs" would typically refer to 20:27:01

9 APIs or permissions that were not generally 20:27:04

10 available. 20:27:06

11 Whitelisting is the concept of who has 20:27:07

12 access to the private APIs, but there is also 20:27:10

13 whitelisting which is nothing to do with private 20:27:15

14 APIs or permissions in any way. 20:27:19

15 Q. And your answer probably helps to explain 20:27:22

16 why there is some confusion in the documents about 20:27:25

17 this because these terms do seem to get -- they 20:27:27

18 seem overlapping but also different; so I want to 20:27:30

19 make sure I understand. 20:27:33

20 The only way an app that is created by a 20:27:34

21 developer that is not a partner with Facebook can 20:27:40

22 get access to publicly deprecated APIs is through a 20:27:43

23 whitelist. Right? 20:27:47

24 A. That would depend on the precise time 20:27:50

25 we're talking about. It would also depend on when 20:27:53

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1 the application was created. 20:27:56

2 Q. Okay. Well, let's talk about 2014 to the 20:27:59

3 present. 20:28:02

4 Is there a way other than a whitelist for 20:28:04

5 a developer or an app that is not considered a 20:28:07

6 partner of Facebook's to get access to publicly 20:28:10

7 deprecated permissions? 20:28:13

8 A. Via permission being publicly 20:28:21

9 deprecated -- let's take an example, I think, is 20:28:23

10 the easiest way to answer that question. 20:28:26

11 So the -- where permissions which were 20:28:28

12 publicly available to API Version 1 which were not 20:28:33

13 publicly available in API Version 2, for 20:28:37

14 applications that originally could call API 20:28:41

15 Version 1 that later could only call API Version 2, 20:28:45

16 when that public deprecation was complete, the only 20:28:52

17 way to access those publicly deprecated permissions 20:28:56

18 would have been to be on a whitelist; one or more 20:29:01

19 whitelists. 20:29:06

20 Q. And so developers -- well, let's start 20:29:09

21 with apps. 20:29:12

22 Apps could be on that whitelist, right? 20:29:13

23 A. In the context of the Facebook Developer 20:29:17

24 Platform and specifically referring to app-based 20:29:18

25 whitelisting -- there are other forms of 20:29:21

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1 whitelisting available -- then, yes, the 20:29:23

2 application ID would have been on a whitelist. 20:29:28

3 Q. And partners could be on a whitelist too. 20:29:33

4 But in order for that to be functional, they had to 20:29:39

5 have a private API? 20:29:41

6 A. Sorry. I think we're getting our concepts 20:29:44

7 mixed up here, and it's getting hard to answer -- 20:29:47

8 answer the questions. 20:29:50

9 So how do you want to proceed? I feel 20:29:52

10 like we may need to reclarify some of these 20:29:56

11 definitions because you're mixing them up in your 20:29:59

12 questions. 20:30:02

13 Q. All I'm trying to do is figure out what 20:30:03

14 the distinction is between a whitelist and a 20:30:05

15 private API, and specifically in the context of 20:30:08

16 giving a third-party access to deprecated 20:30:10

17 permissions after 2014. 20:30:12

18 So is there a difference between, in that 20:30:14

19 context, a whitelist and a private API? 20:30:16

20 A. Yes. As I previously testified, a 20:30:20

21 whitelist is a -- a mechanism by which -- in the 20:30:22

22 context of the Facebook Platform, an app ID is 20:30:26

23 specified in some way as having alternative -- you 20:30:30

24 know, having a different API behavior than happens 20:30:33

25 that are not on the whit list. 20:30:37

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1 Private APIs are -- some of the things 20:30:39
2 that you could be whitelisted for, but there are 20:30:43
3 other things that you could also be whitelisted 20:30:45
4 for. For example, rate limit behavior. Different 20:30:48
5 rate limit behavior. Right? 20:30:51

6 So whitelisting is the concept by which an 20:30:53
7 application ID, in the -- sorry. 20:30:56

8 Whitelisting is the concept by which an 20:30:59
9 application ID in the context of the Facebook 20:31:02
10 Platform is offered some deeper, nonstandard, or 20:31:03
11 nonpublic behavior, different behavior. 20:31:09

12 And then there are some whitelists, 20:31:11
13 specifically called "capabilities," that would 20:31:16
14 determine exactly what behavior those applications 20:31:18
15 had that was different to the standard. 20:31:23

16 Q. Okay. And are private APIs established 20:31:28
17 through a contract between Facebook and a Facebook 20:31:30
18 partner? 20:31:32

19 A. Not always. Not always. There -- again, 20:31:38
20 there are a number of private APIs and a number of 20:31:42
21 different private behaviors -- different behaviors. 20:31:45
22 Some of those would be governed -- granted under a 20:31:49
23 contract; others would not. 20:31:53

24 For example, rate-limiting; you wouldn't 20:31:56
25 necessarily expect a developer to agree to a 20:31:58

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1 contract to be on the rate-limit whitelist. 20:32:01

2 Q. What is a "rate-limit whitelist"? 20:32:06

3 A. So "rate limits" refers to the number of 20:32:09

4 API calls that an application can make within a 20:32:14

5 given time period in a number of different, 20:32:17

6 complicated ways. 20:32:20

7 There's the standard set of how the rate 20:32:22

8 limits work. 20:32:26

9 And then, for some applications that 20:32:27

10 needed to operate differently, then there was a 20:32:32

11 whitelist that allowed those rate limits to be 20:32:35

12 changed for certain applications. 20:32:39

13 And so, again, that's an example of a 20:32:43

14 whitelist, which is a concept implemented by a 20:32:45

15 capability, which is a specific thing that modified 20:32:49

16 the behavior of the API for the people on the 20:32:53

17 whitelist that was not in any way related to 20:32:56

18 friends data. 20:32:59

19 Q. And so one of the ways private APIs were 20:33:01

20 used at Facebook was to enable certain Facebook 20:33:05

21 partners to continue to have access to friends 20:33:08

22 data. Right? 20:33:11

23 A. Can you be specific as to what time period 20:33:14

24 you're talking about here? Because this -- the 20:33:16

25 time periods here matter greatly in the specificity 20:33:18

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1 of my answers. 20:33:22

2 Q. So when did private APIs first appear at 20:33:24

3 Facebook? 20:33:29

4 A. The -- the concept of private API, I -- 20:33:33

5 you're -- I'm referring to any API or permission 20:33:37

6 that was not generally available. 20:33:41

7 When the Facebook Developer Platform was 20:33:47

8 launched, it was launched with launch partners. 20:33:49

9 Actually, a better example is, let's say, 20:33:52

10 Facebook Connect in 2008. There were a number 20:33:55

11 of -- Facebook Connect as a product was -- before 20:33:59

12 it was launched -- not publicly available; and yet 20:34:05

13 on launch day, there were a number of partners that 20:34:08

14 had built integrations with it. 20:34:11

15 Before the launch, you could consider 20:34:14

16 Facebook Connect a private API; and, therefore, 20:34:16

17 access to it was governed by a whitelist. 20:34:20

18 After the launch, Facebook Connect was 20:34:23

19 generally available to all developers, and so you 20:34:25

20 didn't need to be on a whitelist to access it. 20:34:28

21 So whitelists are an industry-standard way 20:34:31

22 of modifying API behavior in certain circumstances, 20:34:34

23 launching new products, and offering them to your 20:34:39

24 launch partners in advance of them being generally 20:34:43

25 available. 20:34:45

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1 And, in the context of the Facebook 20:34:48

2 Platform in this litigation, it's also possible to 20:34:50

3 use a whitelist to grant some developers and 20:34:57

4 partners access to permissions that had been 20:35:01

5 removed from other developers. 20:35:04

6 Q. Okay. And when was the first time that 20:35:09

7 partners obtained access to publicly deprecated 20:35:11

8 friend permissions via a private API? 20:35:18

9 (Rose Ring joined the deposition.) 20:35:21

10 THE WITNESS: The -- strange noise. 20:35:25

11 So, specifically, when it comes to friend 20:35:28

12 permissions, as a set of things that were 20:35:32

13 deprecated, then up until beginning April 30, 2015, 20:35:35

14 if your app had been created before April 30, 2014, 20:35:44

15 then you would have access to those permissions. 20:35:50

16 When the deprecation of API 1 -- the 20:35:55

17 public deprecation of API V1 began on April 30, 20:36:00

18 2015, that's when the -- that's the beginning where 20:36:03

19 an application that would otherwise have lost 20:36:07

20 access to their friend permissions could have 20:36:09

21 continued to access them if they were on a 20:36:13

22 whitelist. 20:36:18

23 BY MR. LOESER: 20:36:19

24 Q. Through private APIs. 20:36:19

25 A. Well, via being on a whitelist. 20:36:22

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1 In this case, we're specifically referring 20:36:25
2 to friend permissions, which is, I think, what your 20:36:27
3 original question was. 20:36:30

4 Q. And what is the "Capability" tool at 20:36:33
5 Facebook? 20:36:36

6 A. The Capability tool is an internal tool 20:36:39
7 used at Facebook to manage which application -- to 20:36:42
8 manage applications and whitelists. 20:36:47

9 (Discussion off the record.) 20:36:50

10 MS. RING: I am very sorry. This is 20:37:12
11 Rose Ring, and I am counsel for Meta. I'm sorry 20:37:12
12 for not announcing myself. 20:37:16

13 BY MR. LOESER: 20:37:26

14 Q. And, Mr. Cross, you were starting to 20:37:28
15 describe the Capability tool, so keep going. 20:37:31

16 A. So the Capability tool is an internal tool 20:37:35
17 at Facebook Meta that's used to manage which 20:37:39
18 applications have access to which capabilities; a 20:37:44
19 "capability" being a -- a mechanism for changing 20:37:51
20 the -- modifying the behavior of the Facebook 20:37:58
21 Developer Platform. 20:38:01

22 So with an application having access to a 20:38:02
23 capability, you would say it had been 20:38:05
24 "whitelisted." 20:38:07

25 Q. And for what period of time has the 20:38:09

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1 Capability tool been in existence? 20:38:13

2 A. My understanding is it was built in around 20:38:16

3 2011 and replaced a previous tool that did a 20:38:20

4 similar job. 20:38:30

5 But the development, as I understand it, 20:38:31

6 began in around 2011. 20:38:33

7 Q. And do you know what the previous tool was 20:38:36

8 called? 20:38:38

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

11 Q. Okay. It seems like it had bold 20:38:47

12 ambitions. 20:38:49

13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

14 and replaced by the capability tool? 20:39:01

15 A. My understanding is that the Capabilities 20:39:04

16 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

17 apps and which whitelists they had access -- which 20:39:12

18 capabilities they had access to. 20:39:17

19 Q. And do you know why it was called 20:39:19

20 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

21 A. I do not. 20:39:23

22 Q. And what are "Gatekeepers"? 20:39:26

23 A. So a Gatekeeper is -- or Gatekeepers. 20:39:30

24 Gatekeeper is a tool at Meta which is widely used 20:39:34

25 to gate access to features within the Facebook apps 20:39:38

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1 and services, including the Facebook app itself and 20:39:47
2 a number of other services inside the company. 20:39:56
3 "Gatekeepers" refers to the set of checks 20:39:59
4 that exist in code to determine who and what has 20:40:09
5 access to which features. 20:40:14
6 I think the best way to explain it is with 20:40:16
7 an example. 20:40:18
8 Typically, when Facebook develops a new 20:40:20
9 feature, the engineers will -- will gate that 20:40:22
10 feature behind a Gatekeeper. 20:40:29
11 So let's imagine Facebook Dating. So the 20:40:31
12 team working on Facebook Dating would be working on 20:40:36
13 that feature. That feature would be gated by a 20:40:39
14 gatekeeper or multiple gatekeepers, and then the 20:40:44
15 Gatekeeper tool would be used to determine who had 20:40:48
16 access to Facebook Dating as a feature. 20:40:50
17 And so Gatekeeper is a mechanism by which 20:40:54
18 Meta typically controls who has access to which 20:41:00
19 features across many aspects of our business. 20:41:04
20 Q. So the Capabilities tool is more or less a 20:41:11
21 tracking device, and the Gatekeeper is more or less 20:41:13
22 a functional system. 20:41:17
23 Is that a fair description? 20:41:19
24 A. I wouldn't characterize them that way. 20:41:20
25 They both, in some ways, do a similar job. 20:41:22

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1 The Gatekeeper tool is widely used at Meta 20:41:26
2 to manage all kinds of conditional access to 20:41:32
3 things. 20:41:37

4 The Capabilities tool is specifically just 20:41:38
5 used for the Facebook Developer Platform and how to 20:41:41
6 manage which applications have access to which 20:41:47
7 additional features. 20:41:51

8 Q. Okay. So if you wanted to identify every 20:41:52
9 single app that had been whitelisted and, because 20:41:54
10 of that, received deprecated permissions, would all 20:41:59
11 of your information be in the Capability tool, or 20:42:03
12 would you also need to look at the Gatekeeper tool? 20:42:06

13 A. My understanding is that most of the 20:42:11
14 whitelists -- most of the way in which publicly 20:42:16
15 deprecated permissions were made available to 20:42:23
16 applications was via the Capabilities tool. 20:42:28

17 There was, as I understand it, some 20:42:32
18 whitelists managed by Gatekeeper, and an effort was 20:42:36
19 undertaken to migrate that management from 20:42:40
20 Gatekeeper to the Capabilities tool for 20:42:42
21 consistency. 20:42:45

22 Q. And when was that done? 20:42:46

23 A. I don't have the information as to when 20:42:50
24 that was done. 20:42:52

25 Q. So, today, is the Capability tool the more 20:42:54

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1 complete set of information on whitelisted 20:42:58

2 entities? 20:43:01

3 A. When it comes to Facebook Developer 20:43:02

4 Platform and app IDs being whitelisted, my 20:43:04

5 understanding is that the Capabilities tool is the 20:43:09

6 primary and most complete system that tracks which 20:43:11

7 apps have access to which capabilities. 20:43:17

8 Q. And what is "Sitevars"? 20:43:20

9 A. Sitevars is another mechanism that is used 20:43:25

10 at Meta to control and modify the behavior of -- of 20:43:30

11 various products. It has a different set of 20:43:36

12 features the Gatekeeper and the Capabilities tool 20:43:39

13 do not have. 20:43:45

14 Q. And are there entities that have access to 20:43:46

15 publicly deprecated permissions tracked by Sitevars 20:43:48

16 that are not tracked by the Capabilities tool? 20:43:52

17 A. My understanding, but -- from talking to 20:43:56

18 the engineers involved in this is that no, Sitevars 20:43:59

19 would not be a way of determining whether or not an 20:44:06

20 application had access to publicly deprecated 20:44:11

21 permissions. 20:44:14

22 MR. LOESER: Okay. If we could have 20:44:18

23 Tab 9. 20:44:26

24 (Deposition Exhibit 336 was marked for 20:44:26

25 identification.) 20:44:26

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1 MR. LOESER: I'm going to mark the next 20:44:41

2 exhibit. This is Exhibit 336. The Bates number on 20:44:42

3 this is FB-CA-MDL-00200051. 20:44:53

4 And you're looking at, Mr. Cross, an email 20:44:59

5 from you to Zhen Fang, cc to Jackie Chang and 20:45:02

6 Christopher Blizzard, October 31, 2013, "Subject: 20:45:09

7 Docs for Private Platform/Capabilities." 20:45:14

8 Do you see that? 20:45:17

9 A. I do. 20:45:18

10 Q. And do you recall writing this email? 20:45:20

11 A. I do not recall writing it, but I have 20:45:24

12 seen this document as part of my preparation for my 20:45:28

13 testimony today. 20:45:31

14 Q. Okay. And you write: 20:45:32

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

22 Q. And do you recall -- or explain for me if 20:45:53

23 Facebook had a tough time figuring out what all of 20:45:56

24 the -- what all was supposed to be included on the 20:46:00

25 Capabilities tool or who all had been whitelisted 20:46:03

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1 at this time. 20:46:11

2 MR. BLUME: Objection. Compound. 20:46:12

3 THE WITNESS: Yeah. Could you separate 20:46:13

4 the question into two parts because I think the 20:46:14

5 answer -- the answer may be different depending on 20:46:17

6 which part I'm answering. 20:46:20

7 BY MR. LOESER: 20:46:22

8 Q. Sure. It looked like, based upon your 20:46:22

9 email here, that tracking the capabilities that 20:46:24

10 apps had was at this time disorganized and 20:46:28

11 difficult. 20:46:31

12 Is that fair? 20:46:34

13 A. What I -- what's being referred to here is 20:46:35

14 to do with the capabilities themselves and what 20:46:39

15 their behavior was; what each individual capability 20:46:45

16 did or could do. 20:46:50

17 So that's what this is referring to. 20:46:55

18 Q. And so you're proposing here creating a 20:46:59

19 tool that would allow Facebook to better understand 20:47:02

20 and organize the capabilities that the different 20:47:04

21 apps have. Right? 20:47:08

22 A. No. What I'm referring to here is the -- 20:47:12

23 the idea, or the request, to be able to gate 20:47:16

24 documents on the Facebook Developer website based 20:47:21

25 on whether or not the viewer of the website had -- 20:47:26

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1 was a developer of an app that had a specific 20:47:32
2 capability. 20:47:34

3 Q. So what problem were you trying to solve 20:47:36
4 here? 20:47:38

5 Or let me ask it another way. 20:47:41

6 What problem was Facebook trying to solve 20:47:43
7 here? 20:47:45

8 A. What Facebook is trying to solve here is a 20:47:46
9 way to automatically control whether or not a given 20:47:49
10 developer user -- so an individual person -- had 20:47:57
11 the ability to see a document on the Facebook 20:48:01
12 Developer website that was only visible to them if 20:48:04
13 they were the developer of an application that 20:48:08
14 had -- was granted a particular capability. 20:48:11

15 MR. LOESER: Okay. We can go to the next 20:48:30
16 exhibit, Tab 10. 20:48:32

17 (Deposition Exhibit 337 was marked for 20:48:36
18 identification.) 20:48:40

19 BY MR. LOESER: 20:48:53

20 Q. So as we're waiting for the document, 20:48:53
21 Mr. Cross, as we've discussed already today, with 20:48:55
22 the implementation of Graph API Version 2, Facebook 20:48:58
23 had decided to deprecate a number of permissions, 20:49:00
24 right, and had come up with a list of the 20:49:06
25 permissions that would be deprecated. 20:49:09

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1 Is that an accurate description? 20:49:11

2 A. As part of API Version 2 launch, Version 2 20:49:14

3 contained -- there were a number of permissions 20:49:18

4 that were not available to API Version 2 in general 20:49:20

5 that were available in API Version 1. 20:49:24

6 Q. And so if you look at Exhibit 337, which 20:49:30

7 is a -- which is a document that is captioned 20:49:32

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 Do you see that? 20:49:49

10 A. I do see that. 20:49:50

11 Q. And this appears to be a document that was 20:49:50

12 describing the changes that would be made to the 20:49:52

13 platform in the transition from Version 1 to 20:49:58

14 Version 2. Right? 20:50:01

15 A. It seems to talk about those changes, but 20:50:04

16 it's not clear to me when this document was 20:50:06

17 authored or the audience of the document. 20:50:09

18 Q. Okay. At the very top of the document, 20:50:14

19 you can see that it was authored -- it's a little 20:50:15

20 faint, but it's June 5, 2014. 20:50:18

21 Do you see that? 20:50:22

22 A. I see that there, but it's not clear to me 20:50:24

23 that this is when the document was authored. That 20:50:26

24 may have been when the document was captured. It's 20:50:31

25 hard to read from this exactly what this -- where 20:50:35

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1 this document was posted. It seems to contain -- 20:50:40

2 Q. Okay. And I'll just -- 20:50:48

3 A. Yeah, it -- I'm not clear -- I'm not clear 20:50:50

4 when this document was authored or whether or not 20:50:53

5 that date -- what that date at the top right 20:50:55

6 pertains to. 20:50:58

7 MR. LOESER: Okay. And just for the 20:50:59

8 record, I'll note that the metadata of this 20:51:00

9 document indicates that it was created June 5, 20:51:03

10 2014. The author is Gillian Dunne, and the 20:51:06

11 custodian for the document was Bill Fusz. 20:51:12

12 But I'm just noting that for the record, 20:51:15

13 and perhaps it provides you some context. 20:51:18

14 But all I want to do with this document is 20:51:20

15 look at -- if you go down to the bottom of the 20:51:22

16 first page, there is a statement: "Permissions no 20:51:24

17 longer available in V2.0." 20:51:29

18 Q. And do you see there's a list that begins 20:51:33

19 there and goes onto the next page? 20:51:35

20 A. I do see that. 20:51:37

21 Q. And included in that there's the category 20:51:40

22 that says: "All friends_* permissions have been 20:51:44

23 removed," and then it lists all of them? 20:51:48

24 A. I see a list of permissions, yes. 20:51:51

25 Q. And above that, there's also a number of 20:51:54

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1 other permissions. 20:51:58

2 Now, does this list of deprecated 20:52:02

3 permissions include all permissions that provided 20:52:05

4 for the sharing of friend data? 20:52:09

5 A. Can you -- in this context, can you help 20:52:19

6 me understand what you mean by "friends data"? 20:52:21

7 Q. Yeah. We earlier talked quite a bit about 20:52:25

8 different APIs that didn't have the word "friends" 20:52:27

9 in the permissions but, based on how they worked, 20:52:33

10 resulted in an app's ability to access information 20:52:35

11 about a user's friends. 20:52:39

12 Do you recall that testimony? 20:52:41

13 A. Yes, I recall that testimony. 20:52:42

14 Q. And so looking at this list here, does it 20:52:45

15 appear to you that this removes -- indicates that 20:52:47

16 the deprecated permissions will cover all of the 20:52:54

17 different permissions that existed at the time that 20:52:57

18 allowed access to friends data? 20:53:00

19 A. No. This looks relatively complete in 20:53:06

20 terms of the -- the friends permissions that 20:53:10

21 allowed an app access to a friend's data in terms 20:53:15

22 of the specific things listed here. 20:53:22

23 Your definition earlier was -- included 20:53:25

24 things like a friend's comments on my photos. 20:53:32

25 Through that definition, then other 20:53:40

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1 permissions, including, for example, user_photos, 20:53:42
2 would have also emitted some friends' data; 20:53:46
3 specifically, the comments that they had made on my 20:53:55
4 photos. 20:53:57

5 So that is not a set of things that was 20:53:58
6 removed in API Version 2. 20:54:01

7 What was removed is this list of 20:54:03
8 permissions which, for example, would have 20:54:05
9 allowed -- the friends_photos permission would have 20:54:08
10 allowed an app to access the photos of an app-using 20:54:12
11 user's friends. 20:54:17

12 Q. And at the time that Facebook was 20:54:19
13 analyzing and identifying all of the permissions 20:54:20
14 that provided access to friends data, did Facebook 20:54:25
15 make a list that included every single one of those 20:54:30
16 permissions so that it could identify whether there 20:54:33
17 was any friend-sharing that would be still 20:54:37
18 publicly -- still be a publicly available API? 20:54:41

19 A. No. The focus of the deprecations 20:54:48
20 announced in Version 2 was the removal of the 20:54:50
21 friend permissions and the other permissions that 20:54:53
22 are represented here. 20:54:56

23 Q. Okay. And when you say "friend 20:54:59
24 permissions," you mean the ones that had the word 20:55:00
25 "friends" in them? 20:55:03

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1 A. When I said "friend permission," that 20:55:05
2 specifically refers to the permissions that have 20:55:07
3 the word "friend" in them. 20:55:10

4 And by "other permissions," I'm referring 20:55:12
5 to the ones listed above; for example -- I'm trying 20:55:14
6 to give an example -- like, manage_friend lists, 20:55:27
7 for example. 20:55:31

8 Q. Now, if we move up this document back to 20:55:33
9 the first page, there's a heading: "New features 20:55:36
10 available in Version 2.0." 20:55:40

11 Do you see that? 20:55:42

12 A. I do. 20:55:43

13 Q. And there is a list of APIs that we've 20:55:43
14 discussed: "Taggable Friends, Invitable Friends, 20:55:47
15 Social Context." 20:55:51

16 And there's one, "Business Mapping API," 20:55:51
17 which we haven't discussed, and another one that 20:55:53
18 looks like it says "Tagged Places API." 20:55:56

19 Do you see that? 20:55:59

20 A. I do see that. 20:55:59

21 Q. And for Taggable Friends, Invitable 20:56:01
22 Friends, Social Context, those are all permissions 20:56:06
23 that it appears did not exist prior to Version 2.0 20:56:09
24 but were going to be introduced at this time. 20:56:13

25 Is that a fair read? 20:56:16

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1 A. These are specifically -- these are APIs 20:56:18
2 that were introduced in Version 2 that were not 20:56:20
3 previously available. 20:56:26

4 These are not permissions; these are APIs. 20:56:27

5 Q. And a number of those APIs that we've 20:56:29
6 discussed did provide access to certain friend 20:56:31
7 information of users not using the apps that would 20:56:33
8 be -- that would have access to those APIs. Right? 20:56:36

9 A. So, yeah. If we go back to the 20:56:41
10 previous -- the previous testimony I gave on this, 20:56:43
11 the Taggable Friend API returned a list of the 20:56:47
12 user's -- a list of the authorized user's friends 20:56:51
13 that were taggable in the application. 20:56:58

14 The amount of data that these APIs 20:57:00
15 returned was very, very limited. In the case of 20:57:03
16 the Taggable Friend API, for example, the amount of 20:57:09
17 data emitted was the name, a URL to a person's 20:57:13
18 profile picture, and a token which could be passed 20:57:17
19 back to the API to tag them in a post. 20:57:21

20 That was the extent of the information 20:57:24
21 available via those APIs -- via the Taggable 20:57:26
22 Friends API, in my recollection. 20:57:30

23 Q. And you say it's limited information, but 20:57:33
24 it is still fairly described as "friends data." 20:57:36
25 Right? 20:57:39

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1 A. It is some information about a friend or a 20:57:40
2 list of friends. 20:57:45
3 But I would draw a distinction between 20:57:47
4 that and the friend permissions, which gated a very 20:57:50
5 different set of information. 20:57:55
6 Q. And we might need to blow it up a bit, but 20:57:59
7 I'm interested in the Social Context API here, and 20:58:02
8 I'll read it: 20:58:07
9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
16 Did I more or less read that sentence 20:58:32
17 accurately? 20:58:34
18 A. You more or less read it accurately. 20:58:35
19 Q. And what is an "endpoint"? 20:58:37
20 A. An "endpoint" is another word to describe 20:58:42
21 an API. It's a -- it's a -- a term used to 20:58:47
22 describe an API that a developer could call. 20:58:54
23 Q. And so using this example of the -- the 20:59:02
24 movie ID context endpoint, it says: 20:59:07
25 "For example, you might be able to answer 20:59:12

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1 the question, 'Which of my friend have 20:59:13
2 watched this movie?'" 20:59:16
3 So, technically, how would that app be 20:59:17
4 able to answer that question with the Social 20:59:20
5 Context API? 20:59:22
6 A. As I talked about earlier, the precise way 20:59:26
7 that the Social Context API worked is not something 20:59:30
8 I am very familiar with. In fact, I am not even 20:59:35
9 sure exactly when it existed and how it behaved. 20:59:41
10 So, I think, like, details on exactly how 20:59:48
11 the Social Context API worked, like, I don't think 20:59:50
12 I can give a clear answer to. 20:59:53
13 MR. LOESER: Mr. Cross, I'm noting for the 21:00:00
14 record that I believe it is now 9:00 P.M. your 21:00:02
15 time. Is that correct? 21:00:04
16 THE WITNESS: It is. But I'm happy to do 21:00:05
17 15 or 20 more minutes if that -- if that would help 21:00:08
18 us get through stuff. 21:00:11
19 If now is a convenient time to break for 21:00:13
20 you, let's break. But if there was a convenient 21:00:15
21 time to break for you that's 10, 15-minutes away, 21:00:17
22 these -- let's do that. I don't want to -- 21:00:21
23 MR. LOESER: Okay. I appreciate your 21:00:24
24 flexibility, and I'll keep going, and we'll pretty 21:00:27
25 quickly get through those 15 minutes. And that 21:00:31

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1 would probably be a good time in where I am to stop 21:00:34

2 anyway. So -- 21:00:37

3 THE WITNESS: Cool. Let's do that. 21:00:38

4 BY MR. LOESER: 21:00:39

5 Q. And, I should say, in order to go further, 21:00:39

6 it would take a lot longer than 15 minutes. So in 21:00:41

7 light of the schedule you have, I think that's a 21:00:44

8 good time to stop. 21:00:46

9 A. Okay. Great. 21:00:47

10 Q. Okay. This is a broad question, and we 21:00:48

11 can start big and go small. 21:00:52

12 But how did Facebook determine what apps 21:00:54

13 to whitelist for friend -- for providing access to 21:00:56

14 friend data? 21:01:03

15 A. Again, to clarify, what do you mean by 21:01:07

16 "friend data"? 21:01:09

17 Do you mean the friends permissions? 21:01:11

18 Q. I mean information about users who are not 21:01:14

19 the users of the app. 21:01:16

20 So whatever information made available via 21:01:19

21 the -- the permission to access the friends -- you 21:01:22

22 know, I'm going to garble the terminology every 21:01:30

23 time I try and do it. 21:01:33

24 But there's an API that grants -- that 21:01:35

25 provides, technically, access to friends 21:01:37

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1 information about the app's users. 21:01:39

2 And I'm interested in understanding when 21:01:41

3 Facebook put an app on a whitelist so that it 21:01:43

4 continued to access the data of a user's friends, 21:01:46

5 how it made that decision. 21:01:48

6 A. Okay. So -- 21:01:50

7 Q. And let me make it even easier for you. 21:01:52

8 The time period I'm interested in is in 21:01:55

9 the transition from Graph API Version 1 to 21:01:58

10 Version 2. 21:02:00

11 A. Okay. So let me -- let me -- let me try 21:02:01

12 and play back some -- some context, I think, is 21:02:07

13 important to the answer here. 21:02:10

14 So, first of all, as you have kind of 21:02:15

15 defined "friends data" and we've discussed it 21:02:20

16 earlier in this testimony, like, there are APIs 21:02:24

17 that were available publicly in Version 2 that 21:02:31

18 would have emitted some limited amount of 21:02:36

19 information about an app using users' friends. 21:02:40

20 For example, their comments on my photos 21:02:45

21 or limited information about them in order to 21:02:48

22 render a taggable -- a "tagging" user type ahead, 21:02:51

23 for example. 21:03:01

24 So, in this context, let me play back to 21:03:01

25 you -- I want to make sure I'm understanding your 21:03:04

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1 question correctly. 21:03:06

2 You are specifically referring to 21:03:09

3 permissions or behaviors that were no longer 21:03:10

4 available in Version 2 of the API, and you're 21:03:14

5 interested in applications that continued to have 21:03:17

6 access to the behaviors in API Version 1 after they 21:03:22

7 were no longer available to a nonwhitelisted 21:03:28

8 developer. 21:03:31

9 Do I have that correct? 21:03:32

10 Q. Correct. 21:03:34

11 A. Okay. Cool. 21:03:34

12 So having talked to people, the -- the -- 21:03:42

13 my understanding of how these decisions were -- how 21:03:48

14 these discussions happened is that there were a 21:03:54

15 number of developers who had been unable to update 21:03:58

16 their apps in time for the public API deprecation, 21:04:05

17 or that they -- that their use case -- they 21:04:11

18 required more time to migrate than was available 21:04:14

19 to -- to regular developers. 21:04:17

20 And so there were conversations had about 21:04:20

21 whether or not some of these applications should be 21:04:23

22 granted additional time to -- to migrate from the 21:04:27

23 API Version 1 behavior to the standard API 21:04:34

24 Version 2 behavior. 21:04:37

25 Q. And were any other considerations relied 21:04:40

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1 on by Facebook when determining whether to 21:04:47

2 whitelist an app? 21:04:49

3 A. Again, can we -- specifically for -- 21:04:53

4 for -- continued access to the API of V1 behavior 21:04:56

5 and permissions associated with API V1? 21:05:02

6 Q. Right. 21:05:06

7 A. My understanding was that the rationale 21:05:12

8 was based on whether or not the user experience 21:05:15

9 would be broken if the deprecation timeline was 21:05:17

10 followed or whether or not there would be other 21:05:23

11 risks for the developer of the deprecation being 21:05:28

12 enforced on the general time frame. 21:05:34

13 So those -- primarily, it was about 21:05:38

14 developers needing more time to migrate because, if 21:05:42

15 they -- if the enforcement and deprecations 21:05:45

16 happened on that publicly available timeline, there 21:05:49

17 would be negative impacts primarily for the user 21:05:52

18 experience of the people using the app -- 21:05:54

19 Q. And you -- sorry. Go ahead. 21:05:57

20 A. No, go on. 21:05:59

21 Q. You mentioned other risks for the 21:06:02

22 developer. 21:06:04

23 What were the other risks? 21:06:04

24 A. So one I recall was that there was an 21:06:07

25 application providing compliance services to people 21:06:17

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1 in the financial and insurance industry, and their 21:06:21
2 customers would -- were still using their 21:06:25
3 application in a certain way, and they needed more 21:06:31
4 time to train their customers to not use the 21:06:34
5 application in a certain way because the 21:06:39
6 functionality they were relying upon would become 21:06:44
7 unavailable when the API deprecations were applied 21:06:47
8 to them. 21:06:54

9 Q. And what you described were considerations 21:06:56
10 taken into account vis-à-vis developers. 21:07:01

11 But were there different considerations 21:07:05
12 taken into account on whether to grant Facebook 21:07:06
13 partners with continued access to publicly 21:07:10
14 deprecated permissions? 21:07:13

15 A. Sorry. Say that again? 21:07:17

16 Q. So you indicated that the -- the -- there 21:07:20
17 was extensions provided so apps could migrate to 21:07:23
18 the new platform, and you spoke about that for a 21:07:26
19 minute. 21:07:31

20 But I'm wondering if there were other 21:07:31
21 considerations that were taken into account when 21:07:33
22 discussing partners in particular and whether they 21:07:35
23 should be provided continued access to publicly 21:07:39
24 deprecated permissions. 21:07:42

25 A. My understanding is that there were some 21:07:46

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1 contractual agreements that specified a longer 21:07:48
2 deprecation window than was available to -- than 21:07:54
3 was offered to regular developers; and, as such, 21:07:58
4 it's possible that some of the extensions to the 21:08:04
5 deprecations were granted on that basis. 21:08:11

6 Q. And were there any other bases that 21:08:14
7 Facebook had for providing continued access to 21:08:17
8 publicly deprecated permissions to partners? 21:08:20

9 A. Can you define again what you mean by 21:08:24
10 "partners" here? 'Cause all partners are 21:08:25
11 developers in this context. 21:08:28

12 Q. I mean the entities that have been 21:08:31
13 described by Facebook as "integration partners" 21:08:33
14 or -- there are a variety of other categories of 21:08:36
15 partner that Facebook uses. In fact, looking at 21:08:41
16 your notes, you have "integration partners, 21:08:44
17 business integrations, media integrations, search 21:08:47
18 integrations." 21:08:49

19 So with regard to any of those categories, 21:08:51
20 were there other considerations taken into account 21:08:54
21 by Facebook when deciding whether to provide 21:08:57
22 continued access to the publicly deprecated 21:09:00
23 permissions? 21:09:02

24 A. So I think what's important to understand 21:09:04
25 here is that -- let's take integration partners, 21:09:06

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1 for example. 21:09:10

2 They had -- they had always had access to 21:09:11

3 some permission -- some APIs that were not 21:09:16

4 available to regular developers because they were 21:09:22

5 rebuilding a Facebook replacement client experience 21:09:24

6 on their devices. 21:09:28

7 So "integration partners" as has been, you 21:09:30

8 know, defined in the -- in the documents, were 21:09:35

9 already on several whitelists in order to provide 21:09:38

10 the experience that they offered to users. 21:09:46

11 So that's my understanding of how 21:09:54

12 integration partners continued to have access to 21:09:56

13 the -- the private APIs and behaviors they had 21:10:00

14 always had access to that were not available to 21:10:04

15 regular developers. 21:10:07

16 Q. Okay. And, again, I want to make sure I'm 21:10:09

17 using the right terminology, and I'm talking about 21:10:13

18 continued access to friend data. 21:10:16

19 So you've just described the continued 21:10:17

20 access that integration partners had to friend 21:10:19

21 data. 21:10:22

22 Were there considerations that Facebook 21:10:22

23 took into account when deciding whether the other 21:10:24

24 types of partners that we just went through had 21:10:26

25 continued access to friend data? 21:10:29

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1 A. My understanding from talking to the 21:10:35
2 people involved in this at the time, plus my own 21:10:37
3 experience, is that the extensions granted to 21:10:40
4 applications to access API Version 1 and the friend 21:10:46
5 permissions was limited to cases where the user 21:10:51
6 experience would be significantly degraded if they 21:10:54
7 weren't given extra time or there was some form of 21:10:57
8 legal and regulatory risk to the partner if the 21:11:02
9 extension was not granted for a period of time. 21:11:05

10 But remember that there -- you know, there 21:11:09
11 were other reasons to -- there were other 21:11:11
12 deprecations and changes in the API behavior that 21:11:15
13 were not related to the deprecation of the friend 21:11:18
14 permissions. I think that's really important to 21:11:20
15 understand. 21:11:22

16 Q. Right. And I perhaps led us astray with 21:11:23
17 the terminology I was using. 21:11:26

18 And, really, what I'm asking -- and you 21:11:28
19 can tell me if it changes any of your answers -- 21:11:30
20 but I'm looking for the reasons Facebook had to 21:11:33
21 provide continued access to friend data by anyone 21:11:36
22 after the transition to Version 2. 21:11:39

23 And we've talked about apps, and we've 21:11:41
24 talked about business partner -- or integration 21:11:43
25 partners and business integrations. 21:11:47

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1 And so just more broadly put, have you 21:11:51
2 given me the full list of reasons that Facebook 21:11:53
3 used when deciding whether to provide continued 21:11:58
4 access to friend data after the transition to 21:12:00
5 Version 2? 21:12:06

6 A. So I provided -- friend data in 21:12:08
7 Version 2 -- like, again, I think it's important to 21:12:13
8 separate these things. Right? 21:12:20

9 You're asking a compound question that's, 21:12:23
10 like, somewhat impossible to answer with -- given 21:12:25
11 your definition of "friend data" and given the 21:12:30
12 variety of different applications we're talking 21:12:32
13 about here and the complexity of the whitelists -- 21:12:35
14 the various whitelists that these apps were on. 21:12:37

15 So, like, I think your question is hard to 21:12:41
16 answer in -- in simple terms given your definition 21:12:44
17 of "friend data." 21:12:49

18 Q. And you're saying that because my 21:12:53
19 definition includes the types of data that's 21:12:54
20 provided with regard to APIs other than the friends 21:12:58
21 permissions specifically and includes groups and 21:13:02
22 events and social context and all of that, or is 21:13:04
23 there some other complication? 21:13:08

24 A. That's primarily the complication. Like, 21:13:10
25 integration partners, the primary use case there is 21:13:12

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1 that these are experiences that are designed to 21:13:21
2 replicate the Facebook experience on another mobile 21:13:29
3 device platform, set-top box, or so on. 21:13:33

4 And those folks would have access to -- 21:13:39
5 always had access to information that wasn't 21:13:45
6 available via the -- via the standard APIs. So 21:13:46
7 that's one class of things. 21:13:51

8 Then there is the general deprecation -- 21:13:56
9 the general changes -- the whole package of changes 21:14:01
10 from Version 1 to Version 2, which included the 21:14:04
11 deprecation of the friend permissions, a number of 21:14:07
12 other changes, including app-scoped user IDs and so 21:14:10
13 on. 21:14:15

14 So in terms of granting extensions to the 21:14:15
15 API Version 1 to Version 2 transition, from talking 21:14:20
16 about all of -- from talking to all of the people 21:14:24
17 involved to the -- as many people as I could that 21:14:26
18 were involved at the time, the rationale for 21:14:29
19 granting an extension is that it was a belief that 21:14:33
20 the user experience would be severely degraded if 21:14:37
21 the app wasn't given extra time to migrate from API 21:14:44
22 Version 1 to Version 2. 21:14:48

23 Regular developers had a year. There were 21:14:51
24 some applications, it was determined, that would -- 21:14:54
25 would provide a broken user experience if they 21:14:57

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1 weren't given more time to upgrade. 21:14:59

2 And that was the determination based on, 21:15:03

3 again, speaking to the people involved, the 21:15:06

4 degradation in the user experience that would 21:15:08

5 result, or whether or not there was risk around, 21:15:10

6 like, legal and regulatory use of the Platform that 21:15:17

7 required extra time to unwind. 21:15:23

8 That's my understanding of the -- the 21:15:27

9 reasons why some applications were granted 21:15:29

10 additional time to migrate from Version 1 to 21:15:33

11 Version 2. 21:15:36

12 Q. And so those are all of the reasons that 21:15:38

13 Facebook had for providing continued access to 21:15:40

14 friend data for apps and partners after the 21:15:45

15 transition to Version 2. 21:15:51

16 MR. BLUME: Objection to form. 21:15:54

17 THE WITNESS: The answer I just gave was 21:15:55

18 in -- in two parts. 21:15:58

19 Part one is: Integration partners who had 21:16:01

20 built experiences that were on unusual devices, 21:16:06

21 operating systems, and set-top boxes and so on that 21:16:13

22 required, in order to function, always, permissions 21:16:16

23 which -- APIs that were not generally available. 21:16:22

24 The use of those APIs and permissions was 21:16:31

25 governed by contracts, typically. That's what 21:16:34

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1 determined an integration partner, and they were 21:16:37
2 considered as operating on a different set of 21:16:40
3 permissions and APIs than the public API surface 21:16:46
4 area. 21:16:51

5 The second part of your question was 21:16:51
6 determining extensions to Version-- the Version 1 21:16:53
7 to Version 2 deprecation timeline where Version 1 21:16:57
8 included friends permissions and Version 2 did not 21:17:01
9 include the friends permissions. 21:17:06

10 And my understanding from talking to the 21:17:08
11 people involved is that the reason for granting 21:17:11
12 extensions to the standard Version 1 deprecation 21:17:14
13 window was to do with degradation of the user 21:17:17
14 experience and/or a few cases where the use of the 21:17:21
15 API was involved in compliance use cases. 21:17:30

16 I -- it's possible that there are other 21:17:35
17 reasons, but having talked to people and reviewed 21:17:38
18 the documents in this case, it's consistent with 21:17:43
19 that understanding as -- as referring to the friend 21:17:46
20 permissions deprecations. 21:17:48

21 BY MR. LOESER: 21:17:52

22 Q. And, again, I just want to -- trying to 21:17:52
23 make a record and make the record clear, and I'm 21:17:54
24 trying to understand every type of entity -- call 21:17:57
25 it a partner, call it a developer, call it an 21:18:01

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1 app -- that continued to have access to friend data 21:18:04

2 after the transition from Version 1 to Version 2. 21:18:07

3 And you have described a couple different 21:18:10

4 types of entities. You've described apps and 21:18:12

5 business integrations, and you've described 21:18:15

6 extensions that were provided to some; and for 21:18:19

7 integrations, access that existed before and 21:18:23

8 existed after. 21:18:26

9 And what I'm trying to pin down is, is 21:18:27

10 there any other category of third party that 21:18:30

11 continued to have access to friend data after the 21:18:36

12 transition to Version 2? 21:18:39

13 Are there any other reasons that Facebook 21:18:42

14 had for providing continued access to those 21:18:46

15 categories? 21:18:48

16 MR. BLUME: Objection. Form. 21:18:49

17 THE WITNESS: So I -- it -- I think 21:18:53

18 we're -- you're mixing up here the friend 21:18:55

19 permissions, right, and the permissions that were 21:18:59

20 used in the API to govern access to the data 21:19:02

21 exposed via those permissions from friends data in 21:19:07

22 the more general sense that you defined it earlier 21:19:13

23 in this -- when we discussed earlier in this 21:19:17

24 testimony. 21:19:20

25 Like, it's -- I'm -- 21:19:20

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1 BY MR. LOESER: 21:19:23

2 Q. Let's go back. Let me make it easier. 21:19:23

3 Let's put that aside for a moment, the 21:19:25

4 other APIs that are not categorized as friend 21:19:27

5 permissions, and just talk about friends; the APIs 21:19:30

6 that were on that list that were deprecated. 21:19:34

7 Other than the -- the third parties you've 21:19:37

8 already described, are there any other categories 21:19:40

9 of partner or developer or third party at all that 21:19:42

10 had continued access to those permissions after the 21:19:48

11 transition? 21:19:52

12 And if so -- let's stop with that. Let's 21:19:53

13 start with that half of the question. 21:19:58

14 A. Okay. So my understanding is that the 21:20:01

15 ability of applications to request the friend 21:20:04

16 permissions from users, which is, again, how this 21:20:08

17 works, right? We're talking specifically about the 21:20:11

18 friend permissions. These are things that apps 21:20:14

19 could request users to grant to the application. 21:20:17

20 My understanding is that the reasons for 21:20:22

21 continuing to allow apps to request the friend 21:20:26

22 permissions from users was limited to applications 21:20:31

23 that needed additional time to -- to migrate. 21:20:38

24 The -- and we've gone through the reasons for that. 21:20:42

25 Q. Okay. And there's -- and you also 21:20:50

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1 described business integrations, and you gave the 21:20:52
2 reason for that. 21:20:54

3 And I just want to make sure that there's 21:20:55
4 not any other category of partner, according to 21:20:58
5 Facebook, that continued to have access to those 21:21:00
6 permissions that were whitelisted. 21:21:03

7 A. So when apps were whitelisted -- if an app 21:21:08
8 was whitelisted to continue to have access to 21:21:12
9 Version 1, then it could continue to request those 21:21:15
10 permissions from some users. 21:21:18

11 So by being granted an exception -- an 21:21:21
12 extension to the deprecation timeline window, 21:21:25
13 applications that were whitelisted to continue to 21:21:30
14 have access to Version 1 could continue to access 21:21:33
15 the friend -- could continue to request the friends 21:21:37
16 permissions from users until that access was -- was 21:21:39
17 removed. 21:21:43

18 And my understanding is that the reason 21:21:45
19 for that was to give those apps extra time to 21:21:50
20 migrate to prevent degradation to the user 21:21:54
21 experience. 21:21:58

22 There are apps on -- I've been through the 21:22:00
23 list of applications that were granted an 21:22:03
24 extension, and a good example of that -- an 21:22:05
25 application in that category was, like, the -- an 21:22:14

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1 integration with car manufacturers and their head 21:22:18
2 unit so you could access some kind of Facebook 21:22:22
3 experience inside your car. 21:22:25

4 It's very hard to update the software on 21:22:27
5 those devices, and they needed more time. 21:22:29

6 So that's my understanding of, like, the 21:22:37
7 reason why extensions were granted; to give more -- 21:22:40
8 developers more time to upgrade, given the changes 21:22:44
9 in the API that would affect them -- not just the 21:22:47
10 friends permissions, but other changes between 21:22:50
11 Version 1 and Version 2, and that's why the 21:22:53
12 extensions were granted. 21:22:57

13 Q. I'm not trying to get you to repeat the 21:23:04
14 same testimony. I am simply trying to make sure 21:23:06
15 that we've exhausted Facebook's reasons for 21:23:09
16 whitelisting and the categories of apps or partners 21:23:12
17 that were whitelisted. 21:23:16

18 And so there's nothing else to add to that 21:23:18
19 from Facebook's perspective? 21:23:20

20 A. So the -- in terms of, like, whitelisting 21:23:24
21 extensions to Version 1, there are other reasons 21:23:27
22 why an app might be whitelisted, but that's 21:23:33
23 generally not to do with their use of the friend 21:23:37
24 permissions. 21:23:39

25 Q. Was it something to do with their use of 21:23:42

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1 other deprecated permissions? 21:23:44

2 A. Other changes in behavior from Version 1 21:23:47

3 to Version 2. For example, app-scoped user IDs. 21:23:49

4 Big change to how the Facebook Developer Platform 21:23:55

5 operated. As I say, there's a whole number of 21:23:58

6 changes between Version 1 and Version 2. 21:24:02

7 Your question was about friends 21:24:04

8 permissions, and there are other reasons why some 21:24:06

9 apps were granted an extension. And my 21:24:09

10 understanding is that, you know, the reasons for 21:24:12

11 granting an extension to the friend permissions is 21:24:16

12 because of a user experience degradation and 21:24:19

13 striking a balance of giving more time -- those 21:24:23

14 developers more time to update their use of the 21:24:26

15 Platform or cases where the use of the Platform was 21:24:29

16 related to -- where the friend permissions were 21:24:33

17 used in the context of, like, regulated industries. 21:24:39

18 As I say, there are a number of developers 21:24:44

19 also whitelisted for continued access to Version 1 21:24:46

20 because of their use of other -- because of 21:24:50

21 their -- because of them being affected by other 21:24:53

22 changes in the API between Version 1 and Version 2. 21:24:55

23 MR. LOESER: Okay. Mr. Cross, we're at 21:25:07

24 now 9:25 your time, and I want to be sensitive to 21:25:09

25 your schedule. 21:25:12

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1 So we're more than happy to keep going, 21:25:13

3 So -- 21:25:19

5 | can feel my voice going, and this stuff is 21:25:21

7 moment to pause and then come back and continue on 21:25:27

9 MR. LOESER: Okay. Well, thank you for 21:25:31

11	Thursday.	21:25:35
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13	record. It's 9:25 P.M.	21:25:39
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15	Time)	21:25:43
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, HOLLY THUMAN, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, hereby certify that the witness in the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in the within-entitled cause; that said deposition was taken down in shorthand by me, a disinterested person, at the time and place therein stated; and that the testimony of said witness was thereafter reduced to typewriting by computer, to the best of my ability via remote videoconferencing, under my direction and supervision;

That before completion of the deposition review of the transcript [] was [X] was not requested/offered. If requested, any changes made by the deponent (and provided to the reporter) during the period allowed are appended hereto.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for either or any of the parties to the said deposition, nor in any way interested in the event of this cause, and that I am not related to any of the parties thereto.

DATED: May 12, 2022



HOLLY THUMAN, CSR

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IN RE: FACEBOOK, INC., CONSUMER PRIVACY USER PROFILE LITIGATION
SIMON CROSS, JOB NO. 5210141

E R R A T A S H E E T

PAGE 10 LINE 16 CHANGE "international" to "international travel"

REASON misspoke

PAGE 27 LINE 25 CHANGE "and are" to "and that are"

REASON misspoke

PAGE 33 LINE 6 CHANGE "those" to "them"

REASON misspoke

PAGE 36 LINE 12 CHANGE "a documentation" to "documentation"

REASON transcription error

PAGE 43 LINE 15 CHANGE "It was" to "There were"

REASON transcription error

PAGE 52 LINE 19 CHANGE delete "Facebook-like or - - Facebook-branded or"

REASON transcription error



24th June 2022

WITNESS

Date

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IN RE: FACEBOOK, INC., CONSUMER PRIVACY USER PROFILE LITIGATION
SIMON CROSS, JOB NO. 5210141

E R R A T A S H E E T

PAGE 55 LINE 2 CHANGE "billing" to "building"

REASON transcription error

PAGE 65 LINE 7 CHANGE "would refresh" to "to refresh"

REASON transcription error

PAGE 79 LINE 12 CHANGE "138S" to "138X"

REASON transcription error

PAGE 86 LINE 15 CHANGE "friend" to "friends"

REASON misspoke

PAGE 94 LINE 4 CHANGE delete "also using the same app"

REASON transcription error

PAGE 102 LINE 9 CHANGE "is the" to "of the"

REASON transcription error

24th June 2022

WITNESS

Date

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IN RE: FACEBOOK, INC., CONSUMER PRIVACY USER PROFILE LITIGATION
SIMON CROSS, JOB NO. 5210141

E R R A T A S H E E T

PAGE 127 LINE 5 CHANGE "functionality of the" to
"functionality the"

REASON transcription error

PAGE 146 LINE 18 CHANGE "he can" to "he can answer"

REASON transcription error

PAGE 168 LINE 16 CHANGE "API 1" to "API V1"

REASON transcription error

PAGE _____ LINE _____ CHANGE _____

REASON _____

PAGE _____ LINE _____ CHANGE _____

REASON _____

PAGE _____ LINE _____ CHANGE _____

REASON _____

24th June 2022

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[& - 4200]

&	125 4:12	2007 21:21 32:22	3
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0 117:5 137:3,7	13,000 131:7	2007/2008 154:12	19:22 46:16,18
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